The paper identifies a special case in which the complex problem of synthesis from specifications in temporal-epistemic logic can be reduced to the simpler problem of model checking such specifications. An application is given of strategy synthesis in pursuit-evasion games, where one or more pursuers with incomplete information aim to discover theexistence of an evader. Experimental results are provided to evaluate the feasibility of the approach.

Active participation of customers in the management of demand, and renewable energy supply, is a critical goal of the Smart Grid vision. However, this is a complex problem with numerous scenarios that are difficult to test in field projects. Rich and scalable simulations are required to develop effective strategies and policies that elicit desirable behavior from customers. We present a versatile agent-based "factored model" that enables rich simulation scenarios across distinct customer types and varying agent granularity. We formally characterize the decisions to be made by Smart Grid customers as a multiscale decision-making problem and show how our factored model representation handles several temporal and contextual decisions by introducing a novel "utility optimizing agent." We further contribute innovative algorithms for (i) statistical learning-based hierarchical Bayesian timeseries simulation, and (ii) adaptive capacity control using decision-theoretic approximation of multiattribute utility functions over multiple agents. Prominent among the approaches being studied to achieve active customer participation is one based on offering customers financial incentives through variable-price tariffs; we also contribute an effective solution to the problem of "customer herding" under such tariffs. We support our contributions with experimental results from simulations based on real-world data on an open Smart Grid simulation platform.

This research is motivated by large scale problems in urban transportation and labor mobility where there is congestion for resources and uncertainty in movement. In such domains, even though the individual agents do not have an identity of their own and do not explicitly interact with other agents, they effect other agents. While there has been much research in handling such implicit effects, it has primarily assumed de- terministic movements of agents. We address the issue of decision support for individual agents that are identical and have involuntary movements in dynamic environments. For instance, in a taxi fleet serving a city, when a taxi is hired by a customer, its movements are uncontrolled and depend on (a) the customers requirement; and (b) the location of other taxis in the fleet. Towards addressing decision support in such problems, we make two key contributions: (a) A framework to represent the decision problem for selfish individuals in a dynamic population, where there is transitional uncertainty (involuntary movements); and (b) Two techniques (Fictitious Play for Symmetric Agent Populations, FP-SAP and Soft- max based Flow Update, SMFU) that converge to equilibrium solutions. We show that our techniques (apart from providing equilibrium strategies) outperform “driver” strategies with re- spect to overall availability of taxis and the revenue obtained by the taxi drivers. We demonstrate this on a real world data set with 8,000 taxis and 83 zones (representing the entire area of Singapore).

In case of a plan failure, plan-repair is a more promising solution than replanning from scratch. The effectiveness of plan-repair depends on knowledge of which plan action failed and why. Therefore, in this paper, we propose an Extended Spectrum Based Diagnosis approach that efficiently pinpoints failed actions. Unlike Model Based Diagnosis (MBD), it does not require the fault models and behavioral descriptions of actions. Our approach first computes the likelihood of an action being faulty and subsequently proposes optimal probe locations to refine the diagnosis. We also exploit knowledge of plan steps that are instances of the same plan operator to optimize the selection of the most informative diagnostic probes. In this paper, we only focus on diagnostic aspect of plan-repair process.

Multiagent Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (MPOMDPs) provide a powerful framework for optimal decision making under the assumption of instantaneous communication. We focus on a delayed communication setting (MPOMDP-DC), in which broadcasted information is delayed by at most one time step. This model allows agents to act on their most recent (private) observation. Such an assumption is a strict generalization over having agents wait until the global information is available and is more appropriate for applications in which response time is critical. In this setting, however, value function backups are significantly more costly, and naive application of incremental pruning, the core of many state-of-the-art optimal POMDP techniques, is intractable. In this paper, we overcome this problem by demonstrating that computation of the MPOMDP-DC backup can be structured as a tree and introducing two novel tree-based pruning techniques that exploit this structure in an effective way. We experimentally show that these methods have the potential to outperform naive incremental pruning by orders of magnitude, allowing for the solution of larger problems.

Introspection mechanisms are employed in agent architectures toimprove agent performance. However, there is currently no approach tointrospection that makes automatic adjustments at multiple levels inthe implemented agent system. We introduce our novel multi-levelintrospection framework that can be used to automatically adjustarchitectural configurations based on the introspection results at theagent, infrastructure and component level. We demonstrate the utilityof such adjustments in a concrete implementation on a robot where thehigh-level goal of the robot is used to automatically configure thevision system in a way that minimizes resource consumption whileimproving overall task performance.

Randomized first-mover strategies of Stackelberg games are used in several deployed applications to allocate limited resources for the protection of critical infrastructure. Stackelberg games model the fact that a strategic attacker can surveil and exploit the defender's strategy, and randomization guards against the worst effects by making the defender less predictable. In accordance with the standard game-theoretic model of Stackelberg games, past work has typically assumed that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the defender's randomized strategy and will react correspondingly. In light of the fact that surveillance is costly, risky, and delays an attack, this assumption is clearly simplistic: attackers will usually act on partial knowledge of the defender's strategies. The attacker's imperfect estimate could present opportunities and possibly also threats to a strategic defender. In this paper, we therefore begin a systematic study of security games with limited surveillance. We propose a natural model wherein an attacker forms or updates a belief based on observed actions, and chooses an optimal response. We investigate the model both theoretically and experimentally. In particular, we give mathematical programs to compute optimal attacker and defender strategies for a fixed observation duration, and show how to use them to estimate the attacker's observation durations. Our experimental results show that the defender can achieve significant improvement in expected utility by taking the attacker's limited surveillance into account, validating the motivation of our work.

We introduce the Multiagent Disjunctive Temporal Problem (MaDTP), a new distributed formulation of the widely-adopted Disjunctive Temporal Problem (DTP) representation. An agent that generates a summary of all viable schedules, rather than a single schedule, can be more useful in dynamic environments. We show how a (Ma)DTP with the properties of minimality and decomposability provides a particularly efficacious solution space summary.However, in the multiagent case, these properties sacrifice an agent's strategic interests while incurring significant computational overhead. We introduce a new property called local decomposability that exploits loose-coupling between agents' problems, protects strategic interests, and supports typical queries. We provide and evaluate a new distributed algorithm that summarizes agents' solution spaces in significantly less time and space by using local, rather than full, decomposability.

Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) are fast emerging as a suitable means of integrating small and distributed energy resources (DERs), like wind and solar, into the electricity supply network (Grid). VPPs are formed via the aggregation of a large number of such DERs, so that they exhibit the characteristics of a traditional generator in terms of predictability and robustness. In this work, we promote the formation of such "cooperative'' VPPs (CVPPs) using multi-agent technology. In particular, we design a payment mechanism that encourages DERs to join CVPPs with large overall production. Our method is based on strictly proper scoring rules and incentivises the provision of accurate predictions from the CVPPs---and in turn, the member DERs---which aids in the planning of the supply schedule at the Grid. We empirically evaluate our approach using the real-world setting of 16 commercial wind farms in the UK. We show that our mechanism incentivises real DERs to form CVPPs, and outperforms the current state of the art payment mechanism developed for this problem.

We consider the problem of selecting fair divisions of a heterogeneous divisible good among a set of agents. Recent work (Cohler et al., AAAI 2011) focused on designing algorithms for computing maxsum—social welfare maximizing—allocations under the fairness notion of envy-freeness. Maxsum allocations can also be found under alternative notions such as equitability. In this paper, we examine the properties of these allocations. In particular, We provide conditions for when maxsum envy-free or equitable allocations are Pareto optimal and give examples where fairness with Pareto optimality is not possible. We also prove that maxsum envy-free allocations have weakly greater welfare than maxsum equitable allocations when agents have structured valuations, and we derive an approximate version of this inequality for general valuations.