The Semantic Web aims to offer an interoperable environment that will allow users to safely delegate complex actions to intelligent agents. Much work has been done for agents' interoperability; especially in the areas of ontology-based metadata and rule-based reasoning. Nevertheless, the SW proof layer has been neglected so far, although it is vital for agents and humans to understand how a result came about, in order to increase the trust in the interchanged information. This paper focuses on the implementation of third party SW reasoning and proofing services wrapped as agents in a multi-agent framework. This way, agents can exchange and justify their arguments without the need to conform to a common rule paradigm. Via external reasoning and proofing services, the receiving agent can grasp the semantics of the received rule set and check the validity of the inferred results.

We investigate the problem of influencing the preferences of players within a Boolean game so that, if all players act rationally, certain desirable outcomes will result. The way in which we influence preferences is by overlaying games with taxation schemes. In a Boolean game, each player has unique control of a set of Boolean variables, and the choices available to the player correspond to the possible assignments that may be made to these variables. Each player also has a goal, represented by a Boolean formula, that they desire to see satisfied. Whether or not a player’s goal is satisfied will depend both on their own choices and on the choices of others, which gives Boolean games their strategic charac- ter. We extend this basic framework by introducing an external principal who is able to levy a taxation scheme on the game, which imposes a cost on every possible action that a player can choose. By designing a taxation scheme appropriately, it is possible to perturb the preferences of the players, so that they are incentivised to choose some equilibrium that would not otherwise be chosen. After motivating and formally presenting our model, we explore some issues surrounding it, including the complexity of finding a taxation scheme that implements some socially desirable outcome, and then discuss desirable properties of taxation schemes.

We introduce a game-theoretic framework to address the community detection problem based on the social networks’ structure. The dynamics of community formation is framed as a strategic game called community formation game: Given a social network, each node is selfish and selects communities to join or leave based on her own utility measurement. A community structure can be interpreted as an equilibrium of this game. We formulate the agents’ utility by the combination of a gain function and a loss function. Each agent can select multiple communities, which naturally captures the concept of “overlapping communities”. We propose a gain function based on Newman’s modularity function and a simple loss function that reflects the intrinsic costs incurred when people join the communities. We conduct extensive experiments under this framework; our results show that our algorithm is effective in identifying overlapping communities, and is often better than other algorithms we evaluated especially when many people belong to multiple communities.

Complex adaptive systems (CAS) are composed of interacting agents, exhibit nonlinear properties such as positive and negative feedback, and tend to produce emergent behavior that cannot be wholly explained by deconstructing the system into its constituent parts. Both system dynamics (equation-based) approaches and agent-based approaches have been used to model such systems, and each has its benefits and drawbacks. In this paper, we introduce a class of agent-based models with an embedded system dynamics model, and detail the semantics of a simulation framework for these models. This model definition, along with the simulation framework, combines agent-based and system dynamics approaches in a way that retains the strengths of both paradigms. We show the applicability of our model by instantiating it for two example complex adaptive systems in the field of Computational Sustainability, drawn from ecology and epidemiology. We then present a more detailed application in epidemiology, in which we compare a previously unstudied intervention strategy to established ones. Our experimental results, unattainable using previous methods, yield insight into the effectiveness of these intervention strategies.

We propose a framework that adds learning for improving plan selection in the popular BDI agent programming paradigm. In contrast with previous proposals, the approach given here is able to scale up well with the complexity of the agent's plan library. Technically, we develop a novel confidence measure which allows the agent to adjust its reliance on the learning dynamically, facilitating in principle infinitely many (re)learning phases. We demonstrate the benefits of the approach in an example controller for energy management.

In this paper we describe a software assistant agent that can proactively assist human users situated in a time-constrained environment to perform normative reasoning--reasoning about prohibitions and obligations--so that the user can focus on her planning objectives. In order to provide proactive assistance, the agent must be able to 1) recognize the user's planned activities, 2) reason about potential needs of assistance associated with those predicted activities, and 3) plan to provide appropriate assistance suitable for newly identified user needs. To address these specific requirements, we develop an agent architecture that integrates user intention recognition, normative reasoning over a user's intention, and planning, execution and replanning for assistive actions. This paper presents the agent architecture and discusses practical applications of this approach.

Several logistics service providers serve a certain number of customers, geographically spread over an area of operations. They would like to coordinate their operations so as to minimize overall cost. At the same time, they would like to keep information about their costs, constraints and preferences private, thus precluding conventional negotiation. We show how AI techniques, in particular Distributed Constraint Optimization (DCOP), can be integrated with cryptographic techniques to allow such coordination without revealing agents' private information. The problem of assigning customers to companies is formulated as a DCOP, for which we propose two novel, privacy-preserving algorithms. We compare their performances and privacy properties on a set of Vehicle Routing Problem benchmarks.

This requires, for Goal-driven autonomy (GDA) is a reflective model example, experts to anticipate what discrepancies can occur, of goal reasoning that controls the focus of an identify what goals can be formulated, and define their agent's planning activities by dynamically relative priority. However, few techniques have been resolving unexpected discrepancies in the world investigated for learning this knowledge, and those that do state, which frequently arise when solving tasks in learn only goal formulation knowledge (Weber et al. 2010; complex environments. GDA agents have Powell et al. 2011). This can be problematic; while these performed well on such tasks by integrating agents may perform well in simple environments, in others a methods for discrepancy recognition, explanation, domain expert might not know the (state) expectations for goal formulation, and goal management. However, executing every action in every state, nor which goal should they require substantial domain knowledge, be pursued to resolve every possible discrepancy, or even including what constitutes a discrepancy and how the space of all possible discrepancies.

Predicting trust among the agents is of great importance to various open distributed settings (e.g., e-market, peer-to-peer networks, etc.) in that dishonest agents can easily join the system and achieve their goals by circumventing agreed rules, or gaining unfair advantages, etc. Most existing trust mechanisms derive trust by statistically investigating the target agent's historical information. However, even if rich historical information is available, it is challenging to model an agent's behavior since an intelligent agent may strategically change its behavior to maximize its profits. We therefore propose a trust prediction approach to capture dynamic behavior of the target agent. Specifically, we first identify features which are capable of describing/representing context of a transaction. Then we use these features to measure similarity between context of the potential transaction and that of previous transactions to estimate trustworthiness of the potential transaction based on previous similar transactions' outcomes. Evaluation using real auction data and synthetic data demonstrates efficacy of our approach in comparison with an existing representative trust mechanism.

Multiagent planning has seen much progress with the development of formal models such as Dec-POMDPs. However, the complexity of these models—NEXP-Complete even for two agents—has limited scalability. We identify certain mild conditions that are sufficient to make multiagent planning amenable to a scalable approximation w.r.t. the number of agents. This is achieved by constructing a graphical model in which likelihood maximization is equivalent to plan optimization. Using the Expectation-Maximization framework for likelihood maximization, we show that the necessary inference can be decomposed into processes that often involve a small subset of agents, thereby facilitating scalability. We derive a global update rule that combines these local inferences to monotonically increase the overall solution quality. Experiments on a large multiagent planning benchmark confirm the benefits of the new approach in terms of runtime and scalability.