When market works and when it fails has been an issue long pursued by economists. While to an extreme extent the view, as characterized by the “invisible hand” or “market mechanism”, has been so dominant in economics education and public policy debates, it is generally acceptable that markets are not out there and have to designed properly so as to work (McMillan, 2004). The significance of designs has been further illustrated by experimental economics. As opposed to designs, what, however, has been drawn less attention is the role of traders, their characteristics and behavior. To one extreme, one may consider that a good design is so dominant that there leaves little room for individual traders to play a role. The literature inspired by the zero-intelligence agent (Gode and Sunder, 1993) provides a good background of this issue, and many later studies do cast doubt on the sufficiency of this minimal intelligence and propose different versions of additional intelligence.  

We propose a dynamic logic of lying, wherein a 'lie that phi' (where phi is a formula in the logic) is an action in the sense of dynamic modal logic, that is interpreted as a state transformer relative to the formula phi. The states that are being transformed are pointed Kripke models encoding the uncertainty of agents about their beliefs. Lies can be about factual propositions but also about modal formulas, such as the beliefs of other agents or the belief consequences of the lies of other agents. We distinguish (i) an outside observer who is lying to an agent that is modelled in the system, from (ii) one agent who is lying to another agent, and where both are modelled in the system. For either case, we further distinguish (iii) the agent who believes everything that it is told (even at the price of inconsistency), from (iv) the agent who only believes what it is told if that is consistent with its current beliefs, and from (v) the agent who believes everything that it is told by consistently revising its current beliefs. The logics have complete axiomatizations, which can most elegantly be shown by way of their embedding in what is known as action model logic or the extension of that logic to belief revision.

Standard models of multi-agent modal logic do not capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and may be interpreted in different ways by different agents. We propose a framework that can model this, and consider different semantics that capture different assumptions about the agents' beliefs regarding whether or not there is ambiguity. We consider the impact of ambiguity on a seminal result in economics: Aumann's result saying that agents with a common prior cannot agree to disagree. This result is known not to hold if agents do not have a common prior; we show that it also does not hold in the presence of ambiguity. We then consider the tradeoff between assuming a common interpretation (i.e., no ambiguity) and a common prior (i.e., shared initial beliefs).

Language evolution might have preferred certain prior social configurations over others. Experiments conducted with models of different social structures (varying subgroup interactions and the role of a dominant interlocutor) suggest that having isolated agent groups rather than an interconnected agent is more advantageous for the emergence of a social communication system. Distinctive groups that are closely connected by communication yield systems less like natural language than fully isolated groups inhabiting the same world. Furthermore, the addition of a dominant male who is asymmetrically favoured as a hearer, and equally likely to be a speaker has no positive influence on the disjoint groups.

The first decade of this century has seen the nascency of the first mathematical theory of general artificial intelligence. This theory of Universal Artificial Intelligence (UAI) has made significant contributions to many theoretical, philosophical, and practical AI questions. In a series of papers culminating in book (Hutter, 2005), an exciting sound and complete mathematical model for a super intelligent agent (AIXI) has been developed and rigorously analyzed. While nowadays most AI researchers avoid discussing intelligence, the award-winning PhD thesis (Legg, 2008) provided the philosophical embedding and investigated the UAI-based universal measure of rational intelligence, which is formal, objective and non-anthropocentric. Recently, effective approximations of AIXI have been derived and experimentally investigated in JAIR paper (Veness et al. 2011). This practical breakthrough has resulted in some impressive applications, finally muting earlier critique that UAI is only a theory. For the first time, without providing any domain knowledge, the same agent is able to self-adapt to a diverse range of interactive environments. For instance, AIXI is able to learn from scratch to play TicTacToe, Pacman, Kuhn Poker, and other games by trial and error, without even providing the rules of the games. These achievements give new hope that the grand goal of Artificial General Intelligence is not elusive. This article provides an informal overview of UAI in context. It attempts to gently introduce a very theoretical, formal, and mathematical subject, and discusses philosophical and technical ingredients, traits of intelligence, some social questions, and the past and future of UAI.

We focus on the problem of sequential decision making in partially observable environments shared with other agents of uncertain types having similar or conflicting objectives. This problem has been previously formalized by multiple frameworks one of which is the interactive dynamic influence diagram (I-DID), which generalizes the well-known influence diagram to the multiagent setting. I-DIDs are graphical models and may be used to compute the policy of an agent given its belief over the physical state and others' models, which changes as the agent acts and observes in the multiagent setting. As we may expect, solving I-DIDs is computationally hard. This is predominantly due to the large space of candidate models ascribed to the other agents and its exponential growth over time. We present two methods for reducing the size of the model space and stemming its exponential growth. Both these methods involve aggregating individual models into equivalence classes. Our first method groups together behaviorally equivalent models and selects only those models for updating which will result in predictive behaviors that are distinct from others in the updated model space. The second method further compacts the model space by focusing on portions of the behavioral predictions. Specifically, we cluster actionally equivalent models that prescribe identical actions at a single time step. Exactly identifying the equivalences would require us to solve all models in the initial set. We avoid this by selectively solving some of the models, thereby introducing an approximation. We discuss the error introduced by the approximation, and empirically demonstrate the improved efficiency in solving I-DIDs due to the equivalences.

The way in which social conventions emerge in communities has been of interest to social scientists for decades. Here we report on the emergence of a particular social convention on Twitter—the way to indicate a tweet is being reposted and to attribute the content to its source. Initially, different variations were invented and spread through the Twitter network. The inventors and early adopters were well-connected, active, core members of the Twitter community. The diffusion networks of these conventions were dense and highly clustered, so no single user was critical to the adoption of the conventions. Despite being invented at different times and having different adoption rates, only two variations came to be widely adopted. In this paper we describe this process in detail, highlighting insights and raising questions about how social conventions emerge.

Bots are, for many Web and social media users, the source of many dangerous attacks or the carrier of unwanted messages, such as spam. Nevertheless, crawlers and software agents are a precious tool for analysts, and they are continuously executed to collect data or to test distributed applications. However, no one knows which is the real potential of a bot whose purpose is to control a community, to manipulate consensus, or to influence user behavior. It is commonly believed that the better an agent simulates human behavior in a social network, the more it can succeed to generate an impact in that community. We contribute to shed light on this issue through an online social experiment aimed to study to what extent a bot with no trust, no profile, and no aims to reproduce human behavior, can become popular and influential in a social media. Results show that a basic social probing activity can be used to acquire social relevance on the network and that the so-acquired popularity can be effectively leveraged to drive users in their social connectivity choices. We also register that our bot activity unveiled hidden social polarization patterns in the community and triggered an emotional response of individuals that brings to light subtle privacy hazards perceived by the user base.

Traditional economic models typically treat private information, or signals, as generated from some underlying state. Recent work has explicated alternative models, where signals correspond to interpretations of available information. We show that the difference between these formulations can be sharply cast in terms of causal dependence structure, and employ graphical models to illustrate the distinguishing characteristics. The graphical representation supports inferences about signal patterns in the interpreted framework, and suggests how results based on the generated model can be extended to more general situations. Specific insights about bidding games in classical auction mechanisms derive from qualitative graphical models.

The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are observable by the controller, this problem is that of finding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). When the states are held by strategic agents, the problem of an efficient task allocation extends beyond that of solving an MDP and becomes that of designing a mechanism. Motivated by this fact, we propose a general mechanism which decides on an allocation rule for the tasks and resources and a payment rule to incentivize agents' participation and truthful reports. In contrast to related dynamic strategic control problems studied in recent literature, the problem studied here has interdependent values: the benefit of an allocation to the task owner is not simply a function of the characteristics of the task itself and the allocation, but also of the state of the resources. We introduce a dynamic extension of Mezzetti's two phase mechanism for interdependent valuations. In this changed setting, the proposed dynamic mechanism is efficient, within period ex-post incentive compatible, and within period ex-post individually rational.