A common approach to interactive narrative involves imbuing the computer with all of the potential story pre-authored story experiences (e.g. as beats, plot points, planning operators, etc.). This has resulted in an accepted paradigm where stories are not created by or with the user; rather, the user is given piecemeal access to the story from the gatekeeper of story knowledge: the computer (e.g. as an AI drama manager). This article describes a formal process that provides for the equal co-creation of story-rich experiences, where neither the user nor computer is in a privileged position in an interactive narrative. It describes a new formal approach that acts as a first step for the real-time co-creation of narrative in games that rely on the negotiated shared mental model between a human actor and an AI improv agent.

In E-learning, there is still the problem of knowing how to ensure an individualized and continuous learner's follow-up during learning process, indeed among the numerous tools proposed, very few systems concentrate on a real time learner's follow-up. Our work in this field develops the design and implementation of a Multi-Agents System Based on Dynamic Case Based Reasoning which can initiate learning and provide an individualized follow-up of learner. When interacting with the platform, every learner leaves his/her traces in the machine. These traces are stored in a basis under the form of scenarios which enrich collective past experience. The system monitors, compares and analyses these traces to keep a constant intelligent watch and therefore detect difficulties hindering progress and/or avoid possible dropping out. The system can support any learning subject. The success of a case-based reasoning system depends critically on the performance of the retrieval step used and, more specifically, on similarity measure used to retrieve scenarios that are similar to the course of the learner (traces in progress). We propose a complementary similarity measure, named Inverse Longest Common Sub-Sequence (ILCSS). To help and guide the learner, the system is equipped with combined virtual and human tutors.

Existing theoretical universal algorithmic intelligence models are not practically realizable. More pragmatic approach to artificial general intelligence is based on cognitive architectures, which are, however, non-universal in sense that they can construct and use models of the environment only from Turing-incomplete model spaces. We believe that the way to the real AGI consists in bridging the gap between these two approaches. This is possible if one considers cognitive functions as a "cognitive bias" (priors and search heuristics) that should be incorporated into the models of universal algorithmic intelligence without violating their universality. Earlier reported results suiting this approach and its overall feasibility are discussed on the example of perception, planning, knowledge representation, attention, theory of mind, language, and some others.

We investigate a class of first-order temporal-epistemic logics for reasoning about multi-agent systems. We encode typical properties of systems including perfect recall, synchronicity, no learning, and having a unique initial state in terms of variants of quantified interpreted systems, a first-order extension of interpreted systems. We identify several monodic fragments of first-order temporal-epistemic logic and show their completeness with respect to their corresponding classes of quantified interpreted systems.

We propose parametric constructive Kripke-semantics for multi-agent KD45-belief and S5-knowledge in terms of elementary set-theoretic constructions of two basic functional building blocks, namely bias (or viewpoint) and visibility, functioning also as the parameters of the doxastic and epistemic accessibility relation. The doxastic accessibility relates two possible worlds whenever the application of the composition of bias with visibility to the first world is equal to the application of visibility to the second world. The epistemic accessibility is the transitive closure of the union of our doxastic accessibility and its converse. Therefrom, accessibility relations for common and distributed belief and knowledge can be constructed in a standard way. As a result, we obtain a general definition of knowledge in terms of belief that enables us to view S5-knowledge as accurate (unbiased and thus true) KD45-belief, negation-complete belief and knowledge as exact KD45-belief and S5-knowledge, respectively, and perfect S5-knowledge as precise (exact and accurate) KD45-belief, and all this generically for arbitrary functions of bias and visibility. Our results can be seen as a semantic complement to previous foundational results by Halpern et al. about the (un)definability and (non-)reducibility of knowledge in terms of and to belief, respectively.

In this paper, we study the problem of controlling a group of indistinguishable agents with non-negligible sizes to take arbitrary desired formations. The agents, confined to an arbitrary connected graph, are capable of moving from one vertex to an adjacent vertex in one time step. The control policy must ensure that no collisions occur, which may happen when two agents attempt to move to the same vertex or move along the same edge. Counting each edge as having unit distance, we show that a (centralized) policy/schedule exists that moves the agents to the desired formation along paths having shortest total distance. The control policy also guarantees that a convergence time (the time when the formation is complete) of no more than n l 1, in which n is the number of agents,lis the maximum (shortest) distance between any two initial and goal vertices.

Recently, prediction markets have shown considerable promise for developing flexible mechanisms for machine learning. In this paper, agents with isoelastic utilities are considered. It is shown that the costs associated with homogeneous markets of agents with isoelastic utilities produce equilibrium prices corresponding to alpha-mixtures, with a particular form of mixing component relating to each agent's wealth. We also demonstrate that wealth accumulation for logarithmic and other isoelastic agents (through payoffs on prediction of training targets) can implement both Bayesian model updates and mixture weight updates by imposing different market payoff structures. An iterative algorithm is given for market equilibrium computation. We demonstrate that inhomogeneous markets of agents with isoelastic utilities outperform state of the art aggregate classifiers such as random forests, as well as single classifiers (neural networks, decision trees) on a number of machine learning benchmarks, and show that isoelastic combination methods are generally better than their logarithmic counterparts.

Supply chain management is a very dynamic operation research problem where one has to quickly adapt according to the changes perceived in environment in order to maximize the benefit or minimize the loss. Therefore we require a system which changes as per the changing requirements. Multi agent system technology in recent times has emerged as a possible way of efficient solution implementation for many such complex problems. Our research here focuses on building a Multi Agent System (MAS), which implements a modified version of Gravitational Search swarm intelligence Algorithm (GSA) to find out an optimal strategy in managing the demand supply chain. We target the grains distribution system among various centers of Food Corporation of India (FCI) as application domain. We assume centers with larger stocks as objects of greater mass and vice versa. Applying Newtonian law of gravity as suggested in GSA, larger objects attract objects of smaller mass towards itself, creating a virtual grain supply source. As heavier object sheds its mass by supplying some to the one in demand, it loses its gravitational pull and thus keeps the whole system of supply chain per-fectly in balance. The multi agent system helps in continuous updation of the whole system with the help of autonomous agents which react to the change in environment and act accordingly. This model also reduces the communication bottleneck to greater extents.

Barring swarm robotics, a substantial share of current machine-human and machine-machine learning and interaction mechanisms are being developed and fed by results of agent-based computer simulations, game-theoretic models, or robotic experiments based on a dyadic communication pattern. Yet, in real life, humans no less frequently communicate in groups, and gain knowledge and take decisions basing on information cumulatively gleaned from more than one single source. These properties should be taken into consideration in the design of autonomous artificial cognitive systems construed to interact with learn from more than one contact or 'neighbour'. To this end, significant practical import can be gleaned from research applying strict science methodology to human and social phenomena, e.g. to discovery of realistic creativity potential spans, or the 'exposure thresholds' after which new information could be accepted by a cognitive agent. The results will be presented of a project analysing the social propagation of neologisms in a microblogging service. From local, low-level interactions and information flows between agents inventing and imitating discrete lexemes we aim to describe the processes of the emergence of more global systemic order and dynamics, using the latest methods of complexity science. Whether in order to mimic them, or to 'enhance' them, parameters gleaned from complexity science approaches to humans' social and humanistic behaviour should subsequently be incorporated as points of reference in the field of robotics and human-machine interaction.

In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate $n$ votes i.i.d. according to a distribution $\pi$, and let $n$ go to infinity, then for any $\epsilon >0$, with probability at least $1-\epsilon$, the minimum number of operations that are needed for the strategic individual to achieve her goal falls into one of the following four categories: (1) 0, (2) $\Theta(\sqrt n)$, (3) $\Theta(n)$, and (4) $\infty$. This theorem holds for any set of vote operations, any individual vote distribution $\pi$, and any integer generalized scoring rule, which includes (but is not limited to) almost all commonly studied voting rules, e.g., approval voting, all positional scoring rules (including Borda, plurality, and veto), plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs. We also show that many well-studied types of strategic behavior fall under our framework, including (but not limited to) constructive/destructive manipulation, bribery, and control by adding/deleting votes, margin of victory, and minimum manipulation coalition size. Therefore, our main theorem naturally applies to these problems.