Distributed Constraint Optimization (DCOP) is a powerful framework for representing and solving distributed combinatorial problems, where the variables of the problem are owned by different agents. Many multi-agent problems include constraints that produce different gains (or costs) for the participating agents. Asymmetric gains of constrained agents cannot be naturally represented by the standard DCOP model. The present paper proposes a general framework for Asymmetric DCOPs (ADCOPs). In ADCOPs different agents may have different valuations for constraints that they are involved in. The new framework bridges the gap between multi-agent problems which tend to have asymmetric structure and the standard symmetric DCOP model. The benefits of the proposed model over previous attempts to generalize the DCOP model are discussed and evaluated. Innovative algorithms that apply to the special properties of the proposed ADCOP model are presented in detail. These include complete algorithms that have a substantial advantage in terms of runtime and network load over existing algorithms (for standard DCOPs) which use alternative representations. Moreover, standard incomplete algorithms (i.e., local search algorithms) are inapplicable to the existing DCOP representations of asymmetric constraints and when they are applied to the new ADCOP framework they often fail to converge to a local optimum and yield poor results. The local search algorithms proposed in the present paper converge to high quality solutions. The experimental evidence that is presented reveals that the proposed local search algorithms for ADCOPs achieve high quality solutions while preserving a high level of privacy.

We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin & Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the "sum of misrepresentations" is minimized. The winner determination problem for both systems is known to be NP-hard, hence this work aims at investigating whether there are variants of the proposed rules and/or specific electorates for which these problems can be solved efficiently. As a variation of these rules, instead of minimizing the sum of misrepresentations, we considered minimizing the maximal misrepresentation introducing effectively two new rules. In the general case these "minimax" versions of classical rules appeared to be still NP-hard. We investigated the parameterized complexity of winner determination of the two classical and two new rules with respect to several parameters. Here we have a mixture of positive and negative results: e.g., we proved fixed-parameter tractability for the parameter the number of candidates but fixed-parameter intractability for the number of winners. For single-peaked electorates our results are overwhelmingly positive: we provide polynomial-time algorithms for most of the considered problems. The only rule that remains NP-hard for single-peaked electorates is the classical Monroe rule.

To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How shall a designer of a multi-agent system program its identical agents to behave each in a different way? From a game theoretic perspective, such situations lead to undesirable Nash equilibria. For example consider a resource allocation game in that two players compete for an exclusive access to a single resource. It has three Nash equilibria. The two pure-strategy NE are efficient, but not fair. The one mixed-strategy NE is fair, but not efficient. Aumann's notion of correlated equilibrium fixes this problem: It assumes a correlation device that suggests each agent an action to take. However, such a "smart" coordination device might not be available. We propose using a randomly chosen, "stupid" integer coordination signal. "Smart" agents learn which action they should use for each value of the coordination signal. We present a multi-agent learning algorithm that converges in polynomial number of steps to a correlated equilibrium of a channel allocation game, a variant of the resource allocation game. We show that the agents learn to play for each coordination signal value a randomly chosen pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. Therefore, the outcome is an efficient correlated equilibrium. This CE becomes more fair as the number of the available coordination signal values increases.

The workshop on Trading Agent Design and Analysis focuses on all aspects of the design and evaluation of trading agents, including agent architectures, decision-making algorithms, theoretic analysis of agents or market games, empirical studies of agent performance, agent negotiation strategies, game-theoretic studies, market architectures and other related topics.

The combination of distinct algorithms expertise to improve prediction accuracy, inspired by the theory of wisdom of crowds, has been increasingly discussed in literature. However, its application to bioinformatics-related tasks is still in its infancy. This thesis aims at investigating the potential and limitations of ensemble-based solutions for two bioinformatics prediction tasks, namely inference of gene regulatory networks and prediction of microRNAs targets, as well as propose new integration methods. We approach this by considering heterogeneity in the contexts of data and methods, and adopting machine learning methods and concepts from multiagent systems, such as social choice functions, for integration purposes.

Security games involving the allocation of multiple security resources to defend multiple targets generally have an exponential number of pure strategies for the defender. One method that has been successful in addressing this computational issue is to instead directly compute the marginal probabilities with which the individual resources are assigned (first pursued by Kiekintveld et al. (2009)). However, in sufficiently general settings, there exist games where these marginal solutions are not implementable, that is, they do not correspond to any mixed strategy of the defender. In this paper, we examine security games where the defender tries to monitor the vertices of a graph, and we show how the type of graph, the type of schedules, and the type of defender resources affect the applicability of this approach. In some settings, we show the approach is applicable and give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an optimal defender strategy; in other settings, we give counterexample games that demonstrate that the approach does not work, and prove NP-hardness results for computing an optimal defender strategy.

We study a simple sequential allocation mechanism for allocating indivisible goods between agents in which agents take turns to pick items.We focus on agents behaving strategically. We view the allocation procedure as a finite repeated game with perfect information. We show that with just two agents, we can compute the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in linear time. With more agents, computing the subgame perfect Nash equilibria is more difficult. There can be an exponential number of equilibria and computing even one of them is PSPACE-hard. We identify a special case, when agents value many of the items identically, where we can efficiently compute the subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We also consider the effect of externalities and modifications to the mechanism that make it strategy proof.

We study hybrid online-batch matching problems, where agents arrive continuously, but are only matched in periodic rounds, when many of them can be considered simultaneously. Agents not getting matched in a given round remain in the market for the next round. This setting models several scenarios of interest, including many job markets as well as kidney exchange mechanisms. We consider the social utility of two commonly used mechanisms for such markets: one that aims for stability in each round (greedy), and one that attempts to maximize social utility in each round (max-weight). Surprisingly, we find that in the long term, the social utility of the greedy mechanism can be higher than that of the max-weight mechanism. We hypothesize that this is because the greedy mechanism behaves similarly to a soft threshold mechanism, where all connections below a certain threshold are rejected by the participants in favor of waiting until the next round. Motivated by this observation, we propose a method to approximately calculate the optimal threshold for an individual agent to use based on characteristics of the other agents participating, and demonstrate experimentally that social utility is high when all agents use this strategy. Thresholding can also be applied by the mechanism itself to improve social welfare; we demonstrate this with an example on graphs that model pairwise kidney exchange.

When operating in stochastic, partially observable, multiagent settings, it is crucial to accurately predict the actions of other agents. In my thesis work, I propose methodologies for learning the policy of external agents from their observed behavior, in the form of finite state controllers. To perform this task, I adopt Bayesian learning algorithms based on nonparametric prior distributions, that provide the flexibility required to infer models of unknown complexity. These methods are to be embedded in decision making frameworks for autonomous planning in partially observable multiagent systems.

Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting systems are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to single-peaked electorates, these systems suddenly become easy to manipulate. Recently, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra studied the complexity of dishonest behavior in nearly single-peaked electorates. These are electorates that are not single-peaked but close to it according to some distance measure. In this paper we introduce several new distance measures regarding single-peakedness. We prove that determining whether a given profile is nearly single-peaked is NP-complete in many cases. For one case we present a polynomial-time algorithm. Furthermore, we explore the relations between several notions of nearly single-peakedness.