The aim of this note is to discuss the reasons why temporal logic, specifically Linear Temporal Logic [7] might not be suitable to check whether the specifications of a system comply with a set of normative requirements. The debate whether it is possible to use temporal logic for the representation of norms is not a novel one (see for example [9]), and while the argument had settled for a while, the past decade saw a resurgence of the topic with many works in the fields of normative multi-agents and business process compliance advocating temporal logic as the formalism to express normative constraints on agent behaviours and process executions.

Intelligent systems that learn interactively from their end-users are quickly becoming widespread. Until recently, this progress has been fueled mostly by advances in machine learning; however, more and more researchers are realizing the importance of studying users of these systems. In this article we promote this approach and demonstrate how it can result in better user experiences and more effective learning systems. We present a number of case studies that characterize the impact of interactivity, demonstrate ways in which some existing systems fail to account for the user, and explore new ways for learning systems to interact with their users. We argue that the design process for interactive machine learning systems should involve users at all stages: explorations that reveal human interaction patterns and inspire novel interaction methods, as well as refinement stages to tune details of the interface and choose among alternatives. After giving a glimpse of the progress that has been made so far, we discuss the challenges that we face in moving the field forward.

We study the computational complexity of computing Nash equilibria in generalized interdependent-security (IDS) games. Like traditional IDS games, originally introduced by economists and risk-assessment experts Heal and Kunreuther about a decade ago, generalized IDS games model agents’ voluntary investment decisions when facing potential direct risk and transfer risk exposure from other agents. A distinct feature of generalized IDS games, however, is that full investment can reduce transfer risk. As a result, depending on the transfer-risk reduction level, generalized IDS games may exhibit strategic complementarity (SC) or strategic substitutability (SS). We consider three variants of generalized IDS games in which players exhibit only SC, only SS, and both SC+SS. We show that determining whether there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in SC+SS-type games is NP-complete, while computing a single PSNE in SC-type games takes worst-case polynomial time. As for the problem of computing all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE) efficiently, we produce a partial characterization. Whenever each agent in the game is indiscriminate in terms of the transfer-risk exposure to the other agents, a case that Kearns and Ortiz originally studied in the context of traditional IDS games in their NIPS 2003 paper, we can compute all MSNE that satisfy some ordering constraints in polynomial time in all three game variants. Yet, there is a computational barrier in the general (transfer) case: we show that the computational problem is as hard as the Pure-Nash-Extension problem, also originally introduced by Kearns and Ortiz, and that it is NP complete for all three variants. Finally, we experimentally examine and discuss the practical impact that the additional protection from transfer risk allowed in generalized IDS games has on MSNE by solving several randomly-generated instances of SC+SS-type games with graph structures taken from several real-world datasets.

We define a fairness solution criterion for multi-agent decision-making problems, where agents have local interests. This new criterion aims to maximize the worst performance of agents with consideration on the overall performance. We develop a simple linear programming approach and a more scalable game-theoretic approach for computing an optimal fairness policy. This game-theoretic approach formulates this fairness optimization as a two-player, zero-sum game and employs an iterative algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium, corresponding to an optimal fairness policy. We scale up this approach by exploiting problem structure and value function approximation. Our experiments on resource allocation problems show that this fairness criterion provides a more favorable solution than the utilitarian criterion, and that our game-theoretic approach is significantly faster than linear programming.

We investigate the power of voting among diverse, randomized software agents. With teams of computer Go agents in mind, we develop a novel theoretical model of two-stage noisy voting that builds on recent work in machine learning. This model allows us to reason about a collection of agents with different biases (determined by the first-stage noise models), which, furthermore, apply randomized algorithms to evaluate alternatives and produce votes (captured by the second-stage noise models). We analytically demonstrate that a uniform team, consisting of multiple instances of any single agent, must make a significant number of mistakes, whereas a diverse team converges to perfection as the number of agents grows. Our experiments, which pit teams of computer Go agents against strong agents, provide evidence for the effectiveness of voting when agents are diverse.

Developing scalable solution algorithms is one of the central problems in computational game theory. We present an iterative algorithm for computing an exact Nash equilibrium for two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information. Our approach combines two key elements: (1) the compact sequence-form representation of extensive-form games and (2) the algorithmic framework of double-oracle methods. The main idea of our algorithm is to restrict the game by allowing the players to play only selected sequences of available actions. After solving the restricted game, new sequences are added by finding best responses to the current solution using fast algorithms. We experimentally evaluate our algorithm on a set of games inspired by patrolling scenarios, board, and card games. The results show significant runtime improvements in games admitting an equilibrium with small support, and substantial improvement in memory use even on games with large support. The improvement in memory use is particularly important because it allows our algorithm to solve much larger game instances than existing linear programming methods. Our main contributions include (1) a generic sequence-form double-oracle algorithm for solving zero-sum extensive-form games; (2) fast methods for maintaining a valid restricted game model when adding new sequences; (3) a search algorithm and pruning methods for computing best-response sequences; (4) theoretical guarantees about the convergence of the algorithm to a Nash equilibrium; (5) experimental analysis of our algorithm on several games, including an approximate version of the algorithm.

We propose an artificial immune model for intrusion detection in distributed systems based on a relatively recent theory in immunology called Danger theory. Based on Danger theory, immune response in natural systems is a result of sensing corruption as well as sensing unknown substances. In contrast, traditional self-nonself discrimination theory states that immune response is only initiated by sensing nonself (unknown) patterns. Danger theory solves many problems that could only be partially explained by the traditional model. Although the traditional model is simpler, such problems result in high false positive rates in immune-inspired intrusion detection systems. We believe using danger theory in a multi-agent environment that computationally emulates the behavior of natural immune systems is effective in reducing false positive rates. We first describe a simplified scenario of immune response in natural systems based on danger theory and then, convert it to a computational model as a network protocol. In our protocol, we define several immune signals and model cell signaling via message passing between agents that emulate cells. Most messages include application-specific patterns that must be meaningfully extracted from various system properties. We show how to model these messages in practice by performing a case study on the problem of detecting distributed denial-of-service attacks in wireless sensor networks. We conduct a set of systematic experiments to find a set of performance metrics that can accurately distinguish malicious patterns. The results indicate that the system can be efficiently used to detect malicious patterns with a high level of accuracy.

This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a reinforcement learning (adaptive filtering) algorithm that facilitates learning an equilibrium by resorting to diffusion cooperation strategies in a social network. Agents form homophilic social groups, within which they exchange past experiences over an undirected graph. It is shown that, if all agents follow the proposed algorithm, their global behavior is attracted to the correlated equilibria set of the game. The second part of the paper provides a test to detect if the actions of agents are consistent with play from the equilibrium of a concave potential game. The theory of revealed preference from microeconomics is used to construct a non-parametric decision test and statistical test which only require the probe and associated actions of agents. A stochastic gradient algorithm is given to optimize the probe in real time to minimize the Type-II error probabilities of the detection test subject to specified Type-I error probability. We provide a real-world example using the energy market, and a numerical example to detect malicious agents in an online social network.

We study the model of projective simulation (PS), a novel approach to artificial intelligence based on stochastic processing of episodic memory which was recently introduced [H.J. Briegel and G. De las Cuevas. Sci. Rep. 2, 400, (2012)]. Here we provide a detailed analysis of the model and examine its performance, including its achievable efficiency, its learning times and the way both properties scale with the problems' dimension. In addition, we situate the PS agent in different learning scenarios, and study its learning abilities. A variety of new scenarios are being considered, thereby demonstrating the model's flexibility. Furthermore, to put the PS scheme in context, we compare its performance with those of Q-learning and learning classifier systems, two popular models in the field of reinforcement learning. It is shown that PS is a competitive artificial intelligence model of unique properties and strengths.

Recently fair division theory has emerged as a promising approach for allocation of multiple computational resources among agents. While in reality agents are not all present in the system simultaneously, previous work has studied static settings where all relevant information is known upfront. Our goal is to better understand the dynamic setting. On the conceptual level, we develop a dynamic model of fair division, and propose desirable axiomatic properties for dynamic resource allocation mechanisms. On the technical level, we construct two novel mechanisms that provably satisfy some of these properties, and analyze their performance using real data. We believe that our work informs the design of superior multiagent systems, and at the same time expands the scope of fair division theory by initiating the study of dynamic and fair resource allocation mechanisms.