We analyze symmetric protocols to rationally coordinate on an asymmetric, efficient allocation in an infinitely repeated N-agent, C-resource allocation problems, where the resources are all homogeneous. Bhaskar proposed one way to achieve this in 2-agent, 1-resource games: Agents start by symmetrically randomizing their actions, and as soon as they each choose different actions, they start to follow a potentially asymmetric "convention" that prescribes their actions from then on. We extend the concept of convention to the general case of infinitely repeated resource allocation games with N agents and C resources. We show that for any convention, there exists a symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium which implements it. We present two conventions: bourgeois, where agents stick to the first allocation; and market, where agents pay for the use of resources, and observe a global coordination signal which allows them to alternate between different allocations. We define price of anonymity of a convention as a ratio between the maximum social payoff of any (asymmetric) strategy profile and the expected social payoff of the subgame-perfect equilibrium which implements the convention. We show that while the price of anonymity of the bourgeois convention is infinite, the market convention decreases this price by reducing the conflict between the agents.

Computational Grids are a new trend in distributed computing systems. They allow the sharing of geographically distributed resources in an efficient way, extending the boundaries of what we perceive as distributed computing. Various sciences can benefit from the use of grids to solve CPU-intensive problems, creating potential benefits to the entire society. Job scheduling is an integrated part of parallel and distributed computing. It allows selecting correct match of resource for a particular job and thus increases the job throughput and utilization of resources. Job should be scheduled in an automatic way to make the system more reliable, accessible and less sensitive to subsystem failures. This paper provides a survey on various heuristic algorithms, used for scheduling in grid.

Collecting and maintaining accurate world knowledge in a dynamic, complex, adversarial, and stochastic environment such as the RoboCup 3D Soccer Simulation is a challenging task. Knowledge should be learned in real-time with time constraints. We use recently introduced Off-Policy Gradient Descent algorithms within Reinforcement Learning that illustrate learnable knowledge representations for dynamic role assignments. The results show that the agents have learned competitive policies against the top teams from the RoboCup 2012 competitions for three vs three, five vs five, and seven vs seven agents. We have explicitly used subsets of agents to identify the dynamics and the semantics for which the agents learn to maximize their performance measures, and to gather knowledge about different objectives, so that all agents participate effectively and efficiently within the group.

A general game player is a system that can play previously unknown games just by being given their rules. For this purpose, the Game Description Language (GDL) has been developed as a high-level knowledge representation formalism to communicate game rules to players. In this paper, we address a fundamental limitation of state-of-the-art methods and systems for General Game Playing, namely, their being confined to deterministic games with complete information about the game state. We develop a simple yet expressive extension of standard GDL that allows for formalising the rules of arbitrary finite, n-player games with randomness and incomplete state knowledge. In the second part of the paper, we address the intricate reasoning challenge for general game-playing systems that comes with the new description language. We develop a full embedding of extended GDL into the Situation Calculus augmented by Scherl and Levesque's knowledge fluent. We formally prove that this provides a sound and complete reasoning method for players' knowledge about game states as well as about the knowledge of the other players.

The Generalized Traveling Salesman Problem (GTSP) is one of the NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems. A variant of GTSP is E-GTSP where E, meaning equality, has the constraint: exactly one node from a cluster of a graph partition is visited. The main objective of the E-GTSP is to find a minimum cost tour passing through exactly one node from each cluster of an undirected graph. Agent-based approaches involving are successfully used nowadays for solving real life complex problems. The aim of the current paper is to illustrate some variants of agent-based algorithms including ant-based models with specific properties for solving E-GTSP.

We describe a probabilistic framework for synthesizing control policies for general multi-robot systems, given environment and sensor models and a cost function. Decentralized, partially observable Markov decision processes (Dec-POMDPs) are a general model of decision processes where a team of agents must cooperate to optimize some objective (specified by a shared reward or cost function) in the presence of uncertainty, but where communication limitations mean that the agents cannot share their state, so execution must proceed in a decentralized fashion. While Dec-POMDPs are typically intractable to solve for real-world problems, recent research on the use of macro-actions in Dec-POMDPs has significantly increased the size of problem that can be practically solved as a Dec-POMDP. We describe this general model, and show how, in contrast to most existing methods that are specialized to a particular problem class, it can synthesize control policies that use whatever opportunities for coordination are present in the problem, while balancing off uncertainty in outcomes, sensor information, and information about other agents. We use three variations on a warehouse task to show that a single planner of this type can generate cooperative behavior using task allocation, direct communication, and signaling, as appropriate.

We consider the problem of learning in repeated games against arbitrary associates. Specifically, we study the ability of expert algorithms to quickly learn effective strategies in repeated games, towards the ultimate goal of learning near-optimal behavior against any arbitrary associate within only a handful of interactions. Our contribution is three-fold. First, we advocate a new metric, called disappointment, for evaluating expert algorithms in repeated games. Unlike minimizing traditional notions of regret, minimizing disappointment in repeated games is equivalent to maximizing payoffs. Unfortunately, eliminating disappointment is impossible to guarantee in general. However, it is possible for an expert algorithm to quickly achieve low disappointment against many known classes of algorithms in many games. Second, we show that popular existing expert algorithms often fail to achieve low disappointment against a variety of associates, particularly in early rounds of the game. Finally, we describe a new meta-algorithm that can be applied to existing expert algorithms to substantially reduce disappointment in many two-player repeated games when associates follow various static, reinforcement learning, and expert algorithms.

This paper formalizes a latent variable inference problem we call {\em supervised pattern discovery}, the goal of which is to find sets of observations that belong to a single ``pattern.'' We discuss two versions of the problem and prove uniform risk bounds for both. In the first version, collections of patterns can be generated in an arbitrary manner and the data consist of multiple labeled collections. In the second version, the patterns are assumed to be generated independently by identically distributed processes. These processes are allowed to take an arbitrary form, so observations within a pattern are not in general independent of each other. The bounds for the second version of the problem are stated in terms of a new complexity measure, the quasi-Rademacher complexity.

We revisit the classical decision-theoretic problem of weighted expert voting from a statistical learning perspective. In particular, we examine the consistency (both asymptotic and finitary) of the optimal Nitzan-Paroush weighted majority and related rules. In the case of known expert competence levels, we give sharp error estimates for the optimal rule. When the competence levels are unknown, they must be empirically estimated. We provide frequentist and Bayesian analyses for this situation. Some of our proof techniques are non-standard and may be of independent interest. The bounds we derive are nearly optimal, and several challenging open problems are posed. Experimental results are provided to illustrate the theory.

In this paper, we consider decentralized sequential decision making in distributed online recommender systems, where items are recommended to users based on their search query as well as their specific background including history of bought items, gender and age, all of which comprise the context information of the user. In contrast to centralized recommender systems, in which there is a single centralized seller who has access to the complete inventory of items as well as the complete record of sales and user information, in decentralized recommender systems each seller/learner only has access to the inventory of items and user information for its own products and not the products and user information of other sellers, but can get commission if it sells an item of another seller. Therefore the sellers must distributedly find out for an incoming user which items to recommend (from the set of own items or items of another seller), in order to maximize the revenue from own sales and commissions. We formulate this problem as a cooperative contextual bandit problem, analytically bound the performance of the sellers compared to the best recommendation strategy given the complete realization of user arrivals and the inventory of items, as well as the context-dependent purchase probabilities of each item, and verify our results via numerical examples on a distributed data set adapted based on Amazon data. We evaluate the dependence of the performance of a seller on the inventory of items the seller has, the number of connections it has with the other sellers, and the commissions which the seller gets by selling items of other sellers to its users.