Solution concepts from cooperative game theory, such as the Shapley value or the Banzhaf index, have recently been advocated as interesting extensions of standard measures of node centrality in networks. While this direction of research is promising, the computation of game-theoretic centrality can be challenging. In an attempt to address the computational issues of game-theoretic network centrality, we present a generic framework for constructing game-theoretic network centralities. We prove that all extensions that can be expressed in this framework are computable in polynomial time. Using our framework, we present the first game-theoretic extensions of weighted and normalized degree centralities, impact factor centrality,distance-scaled and normalized betweenness centrality,and closeness and normalized closeness centralities.

We present a credit-based matching mechanism for dynamic barter markets — and kidney exchange in particular — that is both strategy proof and efficient, that is, it guarantees truthful disclosure of donor-patient pairs from the transplant centers and results in the maximum global matching. Furthermore, the mechanism is individually rational in the sense that, in the long run, it guarantees each transplant center more matches than the center could have achieved alone. The mechanism does not require assumptions about the underlying distribution of compatibility graphs — a nuance that has previously produced conflicting results in other aspects of theoretical kidney exchange. Our results apply not only to matching via 2-cycles: the matchings can also include cycles of any length and altruist-initiated chains, which is important at least in kidney exchanges. The mechanism can also be adjusted to guarantee immediate individual rationality at the expense of economic efficiency, while preserving strategy proofness via the credits. This circumvents a well-known impossibility result in static kidney exchange concerning the existence of an individually rational, strategy-proof, and maximal mechanism. We show empirically that the mechanism results in significant gains on data from a national kidney exchange that includes 59% of all US transplant centers.

This paper presents an agent-based model of the emergence and transmission of a language system for the expression of logical combinations of propositions. The model assumes the agents have some cognitive capacities for invention, adoption, repair, induction and adaptation, a common vocabulary for basic categories, and the ability to construct complex concepts using recursive combinations of basic categories with logical categories. It also supposes the agents initially do not have a vocabulary for logical categories (i.e. logical connectives), nor grammatical constructions for expressing logical combinations of basic categories through language. The results of the experiments we have performed show that a language system for the expression of logical combinations emerges as a result of a process of self-organisation of the agents' linguistic interactions. Such a language system is concise, because it only uses words and grammatical constructions for three logical categories (i.e. and, or, not). It is also expressive, since it allows the communication of logical combinations of categories of the same complexity as propositional logic formulas, using linguistic devices such as syntactic categories, word order and auxiliary words. Furthermore, it is easy to learn and reliably transmitted across generations, according to the results of our experiments.

We present the first model of optimal voting under adversarial noise. From this viewpoint, voting rules are seen as error-correcting codes: their goal is to correct errors in the input rankings and recover a ranking that is close to the ground truth. We derive worst-case bounds on the relation between the average accuracy of the input votes, and the accuracy of the output ranking. Empirical results from real data show that our approach produces significantly more accurate rankings than alternative approaches.

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept prescribing for a player an optimal strategy to commit to, assuming the opponent knows this commitment and plays the best response. Although this solution concept is a cornerstone of many security applications, the existing works typically do not consider situations where the players can observe and react to the actions of the opponent during the course of the game. We extend the existing algorithmic work to extensive-form games and introduce novel algorithm for computing Stackelberg equilibria that exploits the compact sequence-form representation of strategies. Our algorithm reduces the size of the linear programs from exponential in the baseline approach to linear in the size of the game tree. Experimental evaluation on randomly generated games and a security-inspired search game demonstrates significant improvement in the scalability compared to the baseline approach.

Models of strategic candidacy analyze the incentives of candidates to run in an election. Most work on this topic assumes that strategizing only takes place among candidates, whereas voters vote truthfully. In this paper, we extend the analysis to also include strategic behavior on the part of the voters. (We also study cases where only candidates or only voters are strategic.) We consider two settings in which strategic voting is well-defined and has a natural interpretation: majority-consistent voting with single-peaked preferences and voting by successive elimination. In the former setting, we analyze the type of strategic behavior required in order to guarantee desirable voting outcomes. In the latter setting, we determine the complexity of computing the set of potential outcomes if both candidates and voters act strategically.

We examine the quality of social choice mechanisms using a utilitarian view, in which all of the agents have costs for each of the possible alternatives. While these underlying costs determine what the optimal alternative is, they may be unknown to the social choice mechanism; instead the mechanism must decide on a good alternative based only on the ordinal preferences of the agents which are induced by the underlying costs. Due to its limited information, such a social choice mechanism cannot simply select the alternative that minimizes the total social cost (or minimizes some other objective function). Thus, we seek to bound the distortion: the worst-case ratio between the social cost of the alternative selected and the optimal alternative. Distortion measures how good a mechanism is at approximating the alternative with minimum social cost, while using only ordinal preference information. The underlying costs can be arbitrary, implicit, and unknown; our only assumption is that the agent costs form a metric space, which is a natural assumption in many settings. We quantify the distortion of many well-known social choice mechanisms. We show that for both total social cost and median agent cost, many positional scoring rules have large distortion, while on the other hand Copeland and similar mechanisms perform optimally or near-optimally, always obtaining a distortion of at most 5. We also give lower bounds on the distortion that could be obtained by any deterministic social choice mechanism, and extend our results on median agent cost to more general objective functions.

Electric vehicles will play a crucial role in balancing the future electrical grid, which is complicated by many intermittent renewable energy sources. We developed an algorithm that determines for a fleet of electric vehicles, which EV at what price and location to commit to the operating reserve market to either absorb excess capacity or provide electricity during shortages (vehicle-2-grid). The algorithm takes the value of immobility into account by using carsharing fees as a reference point. A virtual power plant autonomously replaces cars that are committed to the operating reserves and are then rented out, with other idle cars to pool the risks of uncertainty. We validate our model with data from a free float carsharing fleet of 500 electric vehicles. An analysis of expected future developments (2015, 2018, and 2022) in operating reserve demand and battery costs yields that the gross profits for a carsharing operator increase between 7-12% with a negligible decrease in car availability (<0.01%).

Energy consumption in commercial and educational buildings is impacted by group activities such as meetings, workshops, classes and exams, and can be reduced by scheduling these activities to take place at times and locations that are favorable from an energy standpoint. This paper improves on the effectiveness of energy-aware room-booking and occupancy scheduling approaches, by allowing the scheduling decisions to rely on an explicit model of the building's occupancy-based HVAC control. The core component of our approach is a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model which optimally solves the joint occupancy scheduling and occupancy-based HVAC control problem. To scale up to realistic problem sizes, we embed this MILP model into a large neighbourhood search (LNS). We obtain substantial energy reduction in comparison with occupancy-based HVAC control using arbitrary schedules or using schedules obtained by existing heuristic energy-aware scheduling approaches.

Reputation-based approaches allow a crowdsourcing system to identify reliable workers to whom tasks can be delegated. In crowdsourcing systems that can be modeled as multi-agent trust networks consist of resource constrained trustee agents (i.e., workers), workers may need to further sub-delegate tasks to others if they determine that they cannot complete all pending tasks before the stipulated deadlines. Existing reputation-based decision-making models cannot help workers decide when and to whom to sub-delegate tasks. In this paper, we proposed a reputation aware task sub-delegation (RTS) approach to bridge this gap. By jointly considering a worker's reputation, workload, the price of its effort and its trust relationships with others, RTS can be implemented as an intelligent agent to help workers make sub-delegation decisions in a distributed manner. The resulting task allocation maximizes social welfare through efficient utilization of the collective capacity of a crowd, and provides provable performance guarantees. Experimental comparisons with state-of-the-art approaches based on the Epinions trust network demonstrate significant advantages of RTS under high workload conditions.