Agent programming is mostly a symbolic discipline and, as such, draws little benefits from probabilistic areas as machine learning and graphical models. However, the greatest objective of agent research is the achievement of autonomy in dynamical and complex environments --- a goal that implies embracing uncertainty and therefore the entailed representations, algorithms and techniques. This paper proposes an innovative and conflict free two layer approach to agent programming that uses already established methods and tools from both symbolic and probabilistic artificial intelligence. Moreover, this framework is illustrated by means of a widely used agent programming example, GoldMiners.

A key challenge in creating a sustainable and energy-efficient society is to make consumer demand adaptive to the supply of energy, especially to the renewable supply. In this article, we propose a partially-centralized organization of consumers (or agents), namely, a consumer cooperative that purchases electricity from the market. In the cooperative, a central coordinator buys the electricity for the whole group. The technical challenge is that consumers make their own demand decisions, based on their private demand constraints and preferences, which they do not share with the coordinator or other agents. We propose a novel multiagent coordination algorithm, to shape the energy demand of the cooperative. To coordinate individual consumers under incomplete information, the coordinator determines virtual price signals that it sends to the consumers to induce them to shift their demands when required. We prove that this algorithm converges to the central optimal solution and minimizes the electric energy cost of the cooperative. Additionally, we present results on the time complexity of the iterative algorithm and its implications for agents' incentive compatibility. Furthermore, we perform simulations based on real world consumption data to (a) characterize the convergence properties of our algorithm and (b) understand the effect of differing demand characteristics of participants as well as of different price functions on the cost reduction. The results show that the convergence time scales linearly with the agent population size and length of the optimization horizon. Finally, we observe that as participants' flexibility of shifting their demands increases, cost reduction increases and that the cost reduction is not sensitive to variation in consumption patterns of the consumers.

Overlapping Coalition Formation (OCF) games, introduced by Chalkiadakis, Elkind, Markakis, Polukarov and Jennings in 2010, are cooperative games where players can simultaneously participate in several coalitions. Capturing the notion of stability in OCF games is a difficult task:deviating players may continue to contribute resources to joint projects with non-deviators, and the crucial question is what payoffs the deviators expect to receive from such projects. Chalkiadakis et al. introduce three stability concepts for OCF games---the conservative core, the refined core, and the optimistic core---that are based on different answers to this question. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for the study of stability in the OCF setting, which encompasses the stability concepts considered by Chalkiadakis et al. as well as a wide variety of alternative stability concepts. Our approach is based on the notion of arbitration functions, which determine the payoff obtained by the deviators, given their deviation and the current allocation of resources. We provide a characterization of stable outcomes under arbitration. We then conduct an in-depth study of four types of arbitration functions, which correspond to four notions of the core; these include the three notions of the core considered by Chalkiadakis et al. Our results complement those of Chalkiadakis et al. and answer questions left open by their work. In particular, we show that OCF games with the conservative arbitration function are essentially equivalent to non-OCF games, by relating the conservative core of an OCF game to the core of a non-overlapping cooperative game, and use this result to obtain a strictly weaker sufficient condition for conservative core non-emptiness than the one given by Chalkiadakis et al.

Social intelligence in natural and artificial systems is usually measured by the evaluation of associated traits or tasks that are deemed to represent some facets of social behaviour. The amalgamation of these traits is then used to configure the intuitive notion of social intelligence. Instead, in this paper we start from a parametrised definition of social intelligence as the expected performance in a set of environments with several agents, and we assess and derive tests from it. This definition makes several dependencies explicit: (1) the definition depends on the choice (and weight) of environments and agents, (2) the definition may include both competitive and cooperative behaviours depending on how agents and rewards are arranged into teams, (3) the definition mostly depends on the abilities of other agents, and (4) the actual difference between social intelligence and general intelligence (or other abilities) depends on these choices. As a result, we address the problem of converting this definition into a more precise one where some fundamental properties ensuring social behaviour (such as action and reward dependency and anticipation on competitive/cooperative behaviours) are met as well as some other more instrumental properties (such as secernment, boundedness, symmetry, validity, reliability, efficiency), which are convenient to convert the definition into a practical test. From the definition and the formalised properties, we take a look at several representative multi-agent environments, tests and games to see whether they meet these properties.

In this article, I show the robustness of optimality of exploration ratioagainst the number of agents (agent population)under multiagent learning (MAL) situation in nonstationary environments.Agent population will affect efficiency of agents' learning becauseeach agent's learning causes noisy factors for others.From this point, exploration ratio should be small to make MAL effective.In nonstationary environments, on the other hand, each agent needs explore with enough probability to catch-upchanges of the environments.This means the exploration ratio need to be significantly large.I investigate the relation between the population and the efficiency ofexploration based on a theorem about relations betweenthe exploration ratio and a lower boundary of learning error.Finally, it is shown that the population of the agents does not affectthe optimal exploration ratio under a certain condition.This consequence is confirmed by several experimentsusing population games with various reward functions.

False-name manipulation refers to the question of whether a player in a weighted voting game can increase her power by splitting into several players and distributing her weight among these false identities. Relatedly, the beneficial merging problem asks whether a coalition of players can increase their power in a weighted voting game by merging their weights. For the problems of whether merging or splitting players in weighted voting games is beneficial in terms of the Shapley--Shubik and the normalized Banzhaf index, merely NP-hardness lower bounds are known, leaving the question about their exact complexity open. For the Shapley--Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf index, we raise these lower bounds to hardness for PP, "probabilistic polynomial time," a class considered to be by far a larger class than NP. For both power indices, we provide matching upper bounds for beneficial merging and, whenever the new players' weights are given, also for beneficial splitting, thus resolving previous conjectures in the affirmative. Relatedly, we consider the beneficial annexation problem, asking whether a single player can increase her power by taking over other players' weights. It is known that annexation is never disadvantageous for the Shapley--Shubik index, and that beneficial annexation is NP-hard for the normalized Banzhaf index. We show that annexation is never disadvantageous for the probabilistic Banzhaf index either, and for both the Shapley--Shubik index and the probabilistic Banzhaf index we show that it is NP-complete to decide whether annexing another player is advantageous. Moreover, we propose a general framework for merging and splitting that can be applied to different classes and representations of games.

The task in the multi-agent path finding problem (MAPF) is to find paths for multiple agents, each with a different start and goal position, such that agents do not collide. A successful optimal MAPF solver is the conflict-based search (CBS) algorithm. CBS is a two level algorithm where special conditions ensure it returns the optimal solution. Solving MAPF optimally is proven to be NP-hard, hence CBS and all other optimal solvers do not scale up. We propose several ways to relax the optimality conditions of CBS trading solution quality for runtime as well as bounded-suboptimal variants, where the returned solution is guaranteed to be within a constant factor from optimal solution cost. Experimental results show the benefits of our new approach; a massive reduction in running time is presented while sacrificing a minor loss in solution quality. Our new algorithms outperform other existing algorithms in most of the cases.

Statistical relational artificial intelligence combines first-order logic and probability in order to handle the complexity and uncertainty present in many real-world domains. However, many real-world domains also include multiple agents that cooperate or compete according to their diverse goals. In order to handle such domains, an autonomous agent must also consider the actions of other agents. In this paper, we show that existing statistical relational modeling and inference techniques can be readily adapted to certain adversarial or non-cooperative scenarios. We also discuss how learning methods can be adapted to be robust to the behavior of adversaries. Extending and applying these methods to real-world problems will extend the scope and impact of statistical relational artificial intelligence.

Nearly all areas of artificial intelligence deal with choice situations and can thus benefit from computational methods for handling preferences. Moreover, social choice methods are also of key importance in computational domains such as multiagent systems. This broadened scope of preferences leads to new types of preference models, new problems for applying preference structures, and new kinds of benefits. Preferences are inherently a multi-disciplinary topic, of interest to economists, computer scientists, operations researchers, math- ematicians and more. The workshop on Advances in Preferences Handling promotes this broadened scope of preference handling. The workshop seeks to improve the overall understanding of the benefits of preferences for those tasks. Another important goal is to provide cross-fertilization between different fields.

We investigate the problem of creating a robust, rapidly converging, Distributed Communication Architecture (DCA) for the domain of low bandwidth, single channel Multiagent Systems (MAS) in which agents may drop in and out of communication without prior notification. There are only three capability-based assumptions made by the algorithm: 1) agents can classify a signal's message as either noise, silence, or clarity, 2) agents can classify their own messages, and 3) agents can understand one another to some degree. The final structure allows agents to communicate in a round-robin manner without any centralized or hierarchical control. We evaluate DCA's the convergence rate through four distinct experiments, including both a worst-case scenario that consists of all agents starting simultaneously and a more common-case scenario in which agents offset their starting times. We examine effective throughput as the average number of clearly sent messages in a cycle to determine the amount of information successfully communicated. Lastly, we emulate situations found in problems with moving agents to show that agents who incorporate local observations can improve both their convergence rates and throughput.