Animals in social foraging not only present the ordered and aggregated group movement but also the individual movement patterns of Lévy walks that are characterized as the power-law frequency distribution of flight lengths. The environment and the conspecific effects between group members are two fundamental inducements to the collective behavior. However, most previous models emphasize one of the two inducements probably because of the great difficulty to solve the behavior conflict caused by two inducements. Here, we propose an environment-driven social force model to simulate overall foraging process of an agent group. The social force concept is adopted to quantify the conspecific effects and the interactions between individuals and the environment. The cohesion-first rule is implemented to solve the conflict, which means that individuals preferentially guarantee the collective cohesion under the environmental effect. The obtained results efficiently comply with the empirical reports that mean the Lévy walk pattern of individual movement paths and the high consistency and cohesion of the entity group. By extensive simulations, we also validate the impact of two inducements for individual behaviors in comparison with several classic models

We consider revenue negotiation problems in iterative settings. In our model, a group of agentshas some initial resources, used in order to generate revenue. Agents must agree on some way of dividing resources, but there’s a twist. At every time-step, the revenue shares received at time t are agent resources at time t + 1, and the game is repeated. The key issue here is that the way resources are shared has a dramatic effect on long term social welfare, so in order to maximize individual long-term revenue one must consider the welfare of others, a behavior not captured by other models of cooperation and bargaining. Our work focuses on homogeneous production functions. We identify conditions that ensure that the socially optimal outcome is an epsilon-Nash equilibrium. We apply our results to some families of utility functions, and discuss their strategic implications.

Hedonic games provide a natural model of coalition formation among self-interested agents. The associated problem of finding stable outcomes in such games has been extensively studied. In this paper, we identify simple conditions on expressivity of hedonic games that are sufficient for the problem of checking whether a given game admits a stable outcome to be computationally hard. Somewhat surprisingly, these conditions are very mild and intuitive. Our results apply to a wide range of stability concepts (core stability, individual stability, Nash stability, etc.) and to many known formalisms for hedonic games (additively separable games, games with W-preferences, fractional hedonic games, etc.), and unify and extend known results for these formalisms. They also have broader applicability: for several classes of hedonic games whose computational complexity has not been explored in prior work, we show that our framework immediately implies a number of hardness results for them.

We propose new mechanisms that can be used by a demand response aggregator to flexibly shift the charging of electric vehicles (EVs) to times where cheap but intermittent renewable energy is in high supply. Here, it is important to consider the constraints and preferences of EV owners, while eliminating the scope for strategic behaviour. To achieve this, we propose, for the first time, a generic class of incentive mechanisms for settings with both varying marginal electricity costs and multidimensional preferences. We show these are dominant strategy incentive compatible, i.e., EV owners are incentivised to report their constraints and preferences truthfully. We also detail a specific instance of this class, show that it achieves ≈98% of the optimal in realistic scenarios and demonstrate how it can be adapted to trade off efficiency with profit.

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for assigning indivisible goods to agents. Although it is well known for its good fairness and welfare properties, it is not strategyproof. In view of this, we address several fundamental questions regarding equilibria under PS. Firstly, we show that Nash deviations under the PS rule can cycle. Despite the possibilities of cycles, we prove that a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist under the PS rule. We then show that verifying whether a given profile is a pure Nash equilibrium is coNP-complete, and computing a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard. For two agents, we present a linear-time algorithm to compute a pure Nash equilibrium which yields the same assignment as the truthful profile. Finally, we conduct experiments to evaluate the quality of the equilibria that exist under the PS rule, finding that the vast majority of pure Nash equilibria yield social welfare that is at least that of the truthful profile.

Goal-driven autonomy (GDA) agents reason about goals while introspectively examining if their course of action matches their expectations. Many GDA agents adopt a hierarchical planning model to generate plans but limit reasoning with expectations to individual actions or projecting the expected state. In this paper we present a relaxation of this limitation. Taking advantage of hierarchical planning principles, our GDA agent elicits expectations that not only validate the next action but the overall plan trajectory without requiring validation against the complete state. We report on (1) a formalization of GDA's expectations that covers trajectories, (2) an implementation of these ideas and (3) benchmarking on two domains used in the GDA literature.

Computational models of argument could play a valuable role in persuasion technologies for behaviour change (e.g. persuading a user to eat a more healthy diet, or to drink less, or to take more exercise, or to study more conscientiously, etc). For this, the system (the persuader) could present arguments to convince the user (the persuadee). In this paper, we consider asymmetric dialogues where only the system presents arguments, and the system maintains a model of the user to determine the best choice of arguments to present (including counterarguments to key arguments believed to be held by the user). The focus of the paper is on the user model, including how we update it as the dialogue progresses, and how we use it to make optimal choices for dialogue moves.

We introduce epistemic quantified boolean logic (EQBL), an extension of propositional epistemic logic with quantification over propositions. We show that EQBL can express relevant properties about agents’ knowledge in multi-agent contexts, such as “agent a knows as much as agent b”. We analyse the expressiveness of EQBL through a translation into monadic second-order logic, and provide completeness results w.r.t. various classes of Kripke frames. Finally, we prove that model checking EQBL is PSPACE-complete. Thus, the complexity of model checking EQBL is no harder than for (non-modal) quantified boolean logic.

Argumentation mining aims to automatically identify structured argument data from unstructured natural language text. This challenging, multi-faceted task is recently gaining a growing attention, especially due to its many potential applications. One particularly important aspect of argumentation mining is claim identification. Most of the current approaches are engineered to address specific domains. However, argumentative sentences are often characterized by common rhetorical structures, independently of the domain. We thus propose a method that exploits structured parsing information to detect claims without resorting to contextual information, and yet achieve a performance comparable to that of state-of-the-art methods that heavily rely on the context.

However, as pointed out by [Moran et al., 2013], such We consider a setting where an agent-based planner assumptions simply do not hold in reality. The environment instructs teams of human emergency responders to is typically prone to significant uncertainties and humans may perform tasks in the real world. Due to uncertainty reject plans suggested by a software agent if they are tired or in the environment and the inability of the planner prefer to work with specific partners. Now, a naïve solution to consider all human preferences and all attributes to this would involve re-planning every time a rejection is of the real-world, humans may reject plans received. However, this may instead result in a high computational computed by the agent. A naïve solution that replans cost (as a whole new plan needs to be computed for given a rejection is inefficient and does not the whole team), may generate a plan that is still not acceptable, guarantee the new plan will be acceptable. Hence, and, following multiple rejection/replanning cycles (as we propose a new model re-planning problem using all individual team members need to accept the new plan), a Multi-agent Markov Decision Process that may lead the teams to suboptimal solutions.