As part of the ongoing effort of designing secure DCOP algorithms, we propose P-Max-Sum, the first private algorithm that is based on Max-Sum. The proposed algorithm has multiple agents preforming the role of each node in the factor graph, on which the Max-Sum algorithm operates. P-Max-Sum preserves three types of privacy: topology privacy, constraint privacy, and assignment/decision privacy.By allowing a single call to a trusted coordinator, P-Max-Sum also preserves agent privacy. The two main cryptographic means that enable this privacy preservation are secret sharing and homomorphic encryption. Our experiments on structured and realistic problems show that the overhead of privacy preservation in terms of runtime is reasonable.

Pricing-based mechanisms have been widely studied and developed for resource allocation in multi-agent systems. One of the main goals in such studies is to avoid envy between the agents, i.e., guarantee fair allocation. However, even the simplest combinatorial cases of this problem is not well understood. Here, we try to fill these gaps and design polynomial revenue maximizing pricing mechanisms to allocate homogeneous resources among buyers in envy-free manner. In particular, we consider envy-free outcomes in which all buyers' utilities are maximized. We also consider pair envy-free outcomes in which all buyers prefer their allocations to the allocations obtained by other agents. For both notions of envy-freeness, we consider item and bundle pricing schemes. Our results clearly demonstrate the limitations and advantages in terms of revenue between these two different notions of envy-freeness.

We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding possible winners is NP-hard for both procedures. Whereas finding necessary winners is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.

Costly preference elicitation has also been studied The last two decades have seen a growing interest in the setting of auctions; notably by Conen and Sandholm in the development of automated agents that are [2001] and Parkes [2005]. These works are primarily able to negotiate on the user's behalf. When representing aimed at designing mechanisms that can avoid unnecessary a user in a negotiation, it is essential for the elicitation. Costly preference elicitation may alternatively be agent to understand the user's preferences, without cast as a problem in which agents have to allocate costly computational exposing them to elicitation fatigue. To this end, we resources to compute their valuation [Larson and propose a new model in which a negotiating agent Sandholm, 2001], but this work focuses on interactions between may incrementally elicit the user's preference during different strategies.

In repeated stochastic games (RSGs), an agent must quickly adapt to the behavior of previously unknown associates, who may themselves be learning. This machine-learning problem is particularly challenging due, in part, to the presence of multiple (even infinite) equilibria and inherently large strategy spaces. In this paper, we introduce a method to reduce the strategy space of two-player general-sum RSGs to a handful of expert strategies. This process, called mega, effectually reduces an RSG to a bandit problem. We show that the resulting strategy space preserves several important properties of the original RSG, thus enabling a learner to produce robust strategies within a reasonably small number of interactions. To better establish strengths and weaknesses of this approach, we empirically evaluate the resulting learning system against other algorithms in three different RSGs.

Solving cooperative path finding (CPF) by translating it to propositional satisfiability represents a viable option in highly constrained situations. The task in CPF is to relocate agents from their initial positions to given goals in a collision free manner. In this paper, we propose a reduced time expansion that is focused on makespan sub-optimal solving. The suggested reduced time expansion is especially beneficial in conjunction with a goal decomposition where agents are relocated one by one.

The intractability in cooperative, decentralized control models is mainly due to prohibitive memory requirements in both optimal policies and value functions. The complexity analysis has emerged as the standard method to estimating the memory needed for solving a given computational problem, but complexity results may be somewhat limited. This paper introduces a general methodology — structural analysis — for the design of optimality-preserving concise policies and value functions, which will eventually lead to the development of efficient theory and algorithms. For the first time, we show that memory requirements for policies and value functions may be asymmetric, resulting in cooperative, decentralized control models with exponential reductions in memory requirements.

The number of multi-robot systems deployed in field applications has risen dramatically over the years. Nevertheless, supervising and operating multiple robots at once is a difficult task for a single operator to execute. In this paper we propose a novel approach for utilizing advising automated agents when assisting an operator to better manage a team of multiple robots in complex environments. We introduce the Myopic Advice Optimization (MYAO) Problem and exemplify its implementation using an agent for the Search And Rescue (SAR) task. Our intelligent advising agent was evaluated through extensive field trials, with 44 non-expert human operators and 10 low-cost mobile robots, in simulation and physical deployment, and showed a significant improvement in both team performance and the operator’s satisfaction.

Distributed constraint optimization (DCOP) is an important framework for coordinated multiagent decision making. We address a practically useful variant of DCOP, called resource-constrained DCOP (RC-DCOP), which takes into account agents' consumption of shared limited resources. We present a promising new class of algorithm for RC-DCOPs by translating the underlying coordination problem to probabilistic inference. Using inference techniques such as expectation-maximization and convex optimization machinery, we develop a novel convergent message-passing algorithm for RC-DCOPs. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that our approach provides better quality than previous best DCOP algorithms and has much lower failure rate. Comparisons against an efficient centralized solver show that our approach provides near-optimal solutions, and is significantly faster on larger instances.

We study resource allocation in a model due to Brams and King [2005] and further developed by Baumeister et al. [2014]. Resource allocation deals with the distribution of resources to agents. We assume resources to be indivisible, nonshareable, and of single-unit type. Agents have ordinal preferences over single resources. Using scoring vectors, every ordinal preference induces a utility function. These utility functions are used in conjunction with utilitarian social welfare to assess the quality of allocations of resources to agents. Then allocation correspondences determine the optimal allocations that maximize utilitarian social welfare. Since agents may have an incentive to misreport their true preferences, the question of strategy-proofness is important to resource allocation. We assume that a manipulator has a strictly monotonic and strictly separable linear order on the power set of the resources. We use extension principles (from social choice theory, such as the Kelly and the Gärdenfors extension) for preferences to study manipulation of allocation correspondences. We characterize strategy-proofness of the utilitarian allocation correspondence: It is Gärdenfors/Kelly-strategy-proof if and only if the number of different values in the scoring vector is at most two or the number of occurrences of the greatest value in the scoring vector is larger than half the number of goods.