Multi-agent path-finding (MAPF) is important for applications such as the kind of warehousing done by Kiva systems. Solving the problem optimally is NP-hard, yet finding low-cost solutions is important. Bounded-suboptimal MAPF algorithms, such as enhanced conflict-based search (ECBS), often do not perform well in warehousing domains with many agents. We therefore develop bounded-suboptimal MAPF algorithms, called CBS+HWY and ECBS+HWY, that exploit the problem structure of a given MAPF instance by finding paths for the agents that include edges from user-provided highways, which encourages a global behavior of the agents that avoids collisions. On the theoretical side, we develop a simple approach that uses highways for MAPF and provides suboptimality guarantees. On the experimental side, we demonstrate that ECBS+HWY can decrease the runtimes and solution costs of ECBS in Kiva-like domains with many agents if the highways capture the problem structures well.

Conflict-Based Search (CBS) and its generalization, Meta-Agent CBS are amongst the strongest newly introduced algorithms for Multi-Agent Path Finding. This paper introduces ICBS, an improved version of CBS. ICBS incorporates three orthogonal improvements to CBS which are systematically described and studied. Experimental results show that each of these improvements reduces the runtime over basic CBS by up to 20x in many cases. When all three improvements are combined, an even larger improvement is achieved, producing state-ofthe art results for a number of domains.

Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy -- an issue we refer to as information leakage -- is a significant concern in practical applications. While previous research on patrolling games has considered the attacker's real-time surveillance, our settings, therefore models and techniques, are fundamentally different. More specifically, after describing the information leakage model, we start with an LP formulation to compute the defender's optimal strategy in the presence of leakage. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that a key subproblem to solve this LP (more precisely, the defender oracle) is NP-hard even for the simplest of security game models. We then approach the problem from three possible directions: efficient algorithms for restricted cases, approximation algorithms, and heuristic algorithms for sampling that improves upon the status quo. Our experiments confirm the necessity of handling information leakage and the advantage of our algorithms.

We consider learning, from strictly behavioral data, the structure and parameters of linear influence games (LIGs), a class of parametric graphical games introduced by Irfan and Ortiz (2014). LIGs facilitate causal strategic inference (CSI): Making inferences from causal interventions on stable behavior in strategic settings. Applications include the identification of the most influential individuals in large (social) networks. Such tasks can also support policy-making analysis. Motivated by the computational work on LIGs, we cast the learning problem as maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) of a generative model defined by pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). Our simple formulation uncovers the fundamental interplay between goodness-of-fit and model complexity: good models capture equilibrium behavior within the data while controlling the true number of equilibria, including those unobserved. We provide a generalization bound establishing the sample complexity for MLE in our framework. We propose several algorithms including convex loss minimization (CLM) and sigmoidal approximations. We prove that the number of exact PSNE in LIGs is small, with high probability; thus, CLM is sound. We illustrate our approach on synthetic data and real-world U.S. congressional voting records. We briefly discuss our learning framework's generality and potential applicability to general graphical games.

Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) is a nature-inspired meta-heuristic for solving continuous optimization problems. In the literature, the potential of the particles of swarm has been used to show that slightly modified PSO guarantees convergence to local optima. Here we show that under specific circumstances the unmodified PSO, even with swarm parameters known (from the literature) to be good, almost surely does not yield convergence to a local optimum is provided. This undesirable phenomenon is called stagnation. For this purpose, the particles' potential in each dimension is analyzed mathematically. Additionally, some reasonable assumptions on the behavior if the particles' potential are made. Depending on the objective function and, interestingly, the number of particles, the potential in some dimensions may decrease much faster than in other dimensions. Therefore, these dimensions lose relevance, i.e., the contribution of their entries to the decisions about attractor updates becomes insignificant and, with positive probability, they never regain relevance. If Brownian Motion is assumed to be an approximation of the time-dependent drop of potential, practical, i.e., large values for this probability are calculated. Finally, on chosen multidimensional polynomials of degree two, experiments are provided showing that the required circumstances occur quite frequently. Furthermore, experiments are provided showing that even when the very simple sphere function is processed the described stagnation phenomenon occurs. Consequently, unmodified PSO does not converge to any local optimum of the chosen functions for tested parameter settings.

The Coalitional Manipulation (CM) problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. The CM problem, however, has been studied only in the complete information setting, that is, when the manipulators know the votes of the non-manipulators. A more realistic scenario is an incomplete information setting where the manipulators do not know the exact votes of the non- manipulators but may have some partial knowledge of the votes. In this paper, we study a setting where the manipulators know a partial order for each voter that is consistent with the vote of that voter. In this setting, we introduce and study two natural computational problems - (1) Weak Manipulation (WM) problem where the manipulators wish to vote in a way that makes their preferred candidate win in at least one extension of the partial votes of the non-manipulators; (2) Strong Manipulation (SM) problem where the manipulators wish to vote in a way that makes their preferred candidate win in all possible extensions of the partial votes of the non-manipulators. We study the computational complexity of the WM and the SM problems for commonly used voting rules such as plurality, veto, k-approval, k-veto, maximin, Copeland, and Bucklin. Our key finding is that, barring a few exceptions, manipulation becomes a significantly harder problem in the setting of incomplete votes.

We propose an optimum mechanism for providing monetary incentives to the data sources of a statistical estimator such as linear regression, so that high quality data is provided at low cost, in the sense that the sum of payments and estimation error is minimized. The mechanism applies to a broad range of estimators, including linear and polynomial regression, kernel regression, and, under some additional assumptions, ridge regression. It also generalizes to several objectives, including minimizing estimation error subject to budget constraints. Besides our concrete results for regression problems, we contribute a mechanism design framework through which to design and analyze statistical estimators whose examples are supplied by workers with cost for labeling said examples.

Definition of an accurate system model for Automated Planner (AP) is often impractical, especially for real-world problems. Conversely, off-the-shelf planners fail to scale up and are domain dependent. These drawbacks are inherited from conventional transition systems such as Finite State Machines (FSMs) that describes the action-plan execution generated by the AP. On the other hand, Behavior Trees (BTs) represent a valid alternative to FSMs presenting many advantages in terms of modularity, reactiveness, scalability and domain-independence. In this paper, we propose a model-free AP framework using Genetic Programming (GP) to derive an optimal BT for an autonomous agent to achieve a given goal in unknown (but fully observable) environments. We illustrate the proposed framework using experiments conducted with an open source benchmark Mario AI for automated generation of BTs that can play the game character Mario to complete a certain level at various levels of difficulty to include enemies and obstacles.

Although manipulation and bribery have been extensively studied under weighted voting, there has been almost no work done on election control under weighted voting. This is unfortunate, since weighted voting appears in many important natural settings. In this paper, we study the complexity of controlling the outcome of weighted elections through adding and deleting voters. We obtain polynomial-time algorithms, NP-completeness results, and for many NP-complete cases, approximation algorithms. In particular, for scoring rules we completely characterize the complexity of weighted voter control. Our work shows that for quite a few important cases, either polynomial-time exact algorithms or polynomial-time approximation algorithms exist.

Twitter, a popular social network, presents great opportunities for on-line machine learning research. However, previous research has focused almost entirely on learning from passively collected data. We study the problem of learning to acquire followers through normative user behavior, as opposed to the mass following policies applied by many bots. We formalize the problem as a contextual bandit problem, in which we consider retweeting content to be the action chosen and each tweet (content) is accompanied by context. We design reward signals based on the change in followers. The result of our month long experiment with 60 agents suggests that (1) aggregating experience across agents can adversely impact prediction accuracy and (2) the Twitter community's response to different actions is non-stationary. Our findings suggest that actively learning on-line can provide deeper insights about how to attract followers than machine learning over passively collected data alone.