We consider discrete protocols for the classical Steinhaus cake cutting problem. Under mild technical conditions, we show that any deterministic strategy-proof protocol for two agents in the standard Robertson-Webb query model is dictatorial, that is, there is a fixed agent to which the protocol allocates the entire cake. For n > 2 agents, a similar impossibility holds, namely there always exists an agent that gets the empty piece (i.e. no cake). In contrast, we exhibit randomized protocols that are truthful in expectation and compute approximately fair allocations.

We consider the computational complexity of computing welfare maximizing partitions for fractional hedonic games — a natural class of coalition formation games that can be succinctly represented by a graph. For such games, welfare maximizing partitions constitute desirable ways to cluster the vertices of the graph. We present both intractability results and approximation algorithms for computing welfare maximizing partitions.

We study the adjustment and use of the Max-sumalgorithm for solving Asymmetric Distributed ConstraintOptimization Problems (ADCOPs). First, we formalize asymmetric factor-graphs and apply the different versions of Max-sum to them. Apparently, in contrast to local search algorithms, most Max-sum versions perform similarly when solving symmetric and asymmetric problems and some even perform better on asymmetric problems. Second, we prove that the convergence properties of Max-sum ADVP (an algorithm that was previously found to outperform other Max-sum versions) and the quality of the solutions it produces are dependent on the order between nodes involved in each constraint, i.e., the inner constraint order (ICO). A standard ICO allows to reproduce the properties achieved for symmetric problems, and outperform previously proposed local search ADCOP algorithms. Third, we demonstrate that a non-standard ICO can be used to balance exploration and exploitation, resulting in the best performing Max-sum version on both symmetric and asymmetric standard benchmarks.

As part of the ongoing effort of designing secure DCOP algorithms, we propose P-Max-Sum, the first private algorithm that is based on Max-Sum. The proposed algorithm has multiple agents preforming the role of each node in the factor graph, on which the Max-Sum algorithm operates. P-Max-Sum preserves three types of privacy: topology privacy, constraint privacy, and assignment/decision privacy.By allowing a single call to a trusted coordinator, P-Max-Sum also preserves agent privacy. The two main cryptographic means that enable this privacy preservation are secret sharing and homomorphic encryption. Our experiments on structured and realistic problems show that the overhead of privacy preservation in terms of runtime is reasonable.

Distributed constraint optimization (DCOP) is an important framework for coordinated multiagent decision making. We address a practically useful variant of DCOP, called resource-constrained DCOP (RC-DCOP), which takes into account agents' consumption of shared limited resources. We present a promising new class of algorithm for RC-DCOPs by translating the underlying coordination problem to probabilistic inference. Using inference techniques such as expectation-maximization and convex optimization machinery, we develop a novel convergent message-passing algorithm for RC-DCOPs. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that our approach provides better quality than previous best DCOP algorithms and has much lower failure rate. Comparisons against an efficient centralized solver show that our approach provides near-optimal solutions, and is significantly faster on larger instances.

Standard results on and algorithms for repeated games assume that defections are instantly observable. In reality, it may take some time for the knowledge that a defection has occurred to propagate through the social network. How does this affect the structure of equilibria and algorithms for computing them? In this paper, we consider games with cooperation and defection. We prove that there exists a unique maximal set of forever-cooperating agents in equilibrium and give an efficient algorithm for computing it. We then evaluate this algorithm on random graphs and find experimentally that there appears to be a phase transition between cooperation everywhere and defection everywhere, based on the value of cooperation and the discount factor. Finally, we provide a condition for when the equilibrium found is credible, in the sense that agents are in fact motivated to punish deviating agents. We find that this condition always holds in our experiments, provided the graphs are sufficiently large.

We explore the mechanism design problem for lung exchange and its implementation in practice. We prove that determining whether there exists a non-trivial solution of the lung exchange problem is NP-complete. We propose a mechanism that is individually rational, strategy-proof and maximizes exchange size. To implement this mechanism in practice, we propose an algorithm based on Integer Linear Program and another based on search. Both of our algorithms for this mechanism yield excellent performances in simulated data sets.

Argumentation mining aims to automatically identify structured argument data from unstructured natural language text. This challenging, multi-faceted task is recently gaining a growing attention, especially due to its many potential applications. One particularly important aspect of argumentation mining is claim identification. Most of the current approaches are engineered to address specific domains. However, argumentative sentences are often characterized by common rhetorical structures, independently of the domain. We thus propose a method that exploits structured parsing information to detect claims without resorting to contextual information, and yet achieve a performance comparable to that of state-of-the-art methods that heavily rely on the context.

We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding possible winners is NP-hard for both procedures. Whereas finding necessary winners is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.

Exploiting parallelism is a key strategy for speeding up computation. However, on hard combinatorial problems, such a strategy has been surprisingly challenging due to the intricate variable interactions.We introduce a novel way in which parallelism can be used to exploit hidden structure of hard combinatorial problems. Our approach complements divide-and-conquer and portfolio approaches. We evaluate our approach on the minimum set basis problem: a core combinatorial problem with a range of applications in optimization, machine learning, and system security. We also highlight a novel sustainability related application, concerning the discovery of new materials for renewable energy sources such as improved fuel cell catalysts. In our approach, a large number of smaller sub-problems are identified and solved concurrently. We then aggregate the information from those solutions, and use this information to initialize the search of a global, complete solver. We show that this strategy leads to a substantial speed-up over a sequential approach, since the aggregated sub-problem solution information often provides key structural insights to the complete solver. Our approach also greatly outperforms state-of-the-art incomplete solvers in terms of solution quality. Our work opens up a novel angle for using parallelism to solve hard combinatorial problems.