In agent-based simulation, emergent equilibrium describes the macroscopic steady states of agents' interactions. While the state of individual agents might be changing, the collective behavior pattern remains the same in macroscopic equilibrium states. Traditionally, these emergent equilibriums are calculated using Monte Carlo methods. However, these methods require thousands of repeated simulation runs, which are extremely time-consuming. In this paper, we propose a novel three-layer framework to efficiently compute emergent equilibriums. The framework consists of a macro-level pseudo-arclength equilibrium solver (PAES), a micro-level simulator (MLS) and a macro-micro bridge (MMB). It can adaptively explore parameter space and recursively compute equilibrium states using the predictor-corrector scheme. We apply the framework to the popular opinion dynamics and labour market models. The experimental results show that our framework outperformed Monte Carlo experiments in terms of computation efficiency while maintaining the accuracy.

Social punishment, whereby cooperators punish defectors, has been suggested as an important mechanism that promotes the emergence of cooperation or maintenance of social norms in the context of the one-shot (i.e. non-repeated) interaction. However, whenever antisocial punishment, whereby defectors punish cooperators, is available, this antisocial behavior outperforms social punishment, leading to the destruction of cooperation. In this paper, we use evolutionary game theory to show that this antisocial behavior can be efficiently restrained by relying on prior commitments, wherein agents can arrange, prior to an interaction, agreements regarding posterior compensation by those who dishonor the agreements. We show that, although the commitment mechanism by itself can guarantee a notable level of cooperation, a significantly higher level is achieved when both mechanisms, those of proposing prior commitments and of punishment, are available in co-presence. Interestingly, social punishment prevails and dominates in this system as it can take advantage of the commitment mechanism to cope with antisocial behaviors. That is, establishment of a commitment system helps to pave the way for the evolution of social punishment and abundant cooperation, even in the presence of antisocial punishment.

The application of DCOP models to large problems faces two main limitations: (i) Modeling limitations, as each agent can handle only a single variable of the problem; and (ii) Resolution limitations, as current approaches do not exploit the local problem structure withineach agent. This paper proposes a novel Multi-Variable Agent (MVA) DCOP decompositiontechnique, which: (i) Exploits the co-locality of each agent's variables, allowing us to adopt efficient centralized techniques within each agent; (ii) Enables the use of hierarchical parallel models and proposes the use of GPUs; and (iii) Reduces the amount of computation and communication required in several classes of DCOP algorithms.

Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. We introduce and study two important special cases of the bribery problem, namely, FRUGAL-BRIBERY and FRUGAL-$BRIBERY where the briber is frugal in nature. By this, we mean that the briber is only able to influence voters who benefit from the suggestion of the briber. More formally, a voter is vulnerable if the outcome of the election improves according to her own preference when she accepts the suggestion of the briber. In the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem, the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only the vulnerable votes. In the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem, the vulnerable votes have prices and the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only the vulnerable votes, subject to a budget constraint. We show that both the FRUGAL-BRIBERY and the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problems are intractable for many commonly used voting rules for weighted as well as unweighted elections. These intractability results demonstrate that bribery is a hard computational problem, in the sense that several special cases of this problem continue to be computationally intractable. This strengthens the view that bribery, although a possible attack on an election in principle, may be infeasible in practice.

Pushdown multi-agent systems, modeled by pushdown game structures (PGSs), are an important paradigm of infinite-state multi-agent systems. Alternating-time temporal logics are well-known specification formalisms for multi-agent systems, where the selective path quantifier is introduced to reason about strategies of agents. In this paper, we investigate model checking algorithms for variants of alternating-time temporal logics over PGSs, initiated by Murano and Perelli at IJCAI'15. We first give a triply exponential-time model checking algorithm for ATL* over PGSs. The algorithm is based on the saturation method, and is the first global model checking algorithm with a matching lower bound. Next, we study the model checking problem for the alternating-time mu-calculus. We propose an exponential-time global model checking algorithm which extends similar algorithms for pushdown systems and modal mu-calculus. The algorithm admits a matching lower bound, which holds even for the alternation-free fragment and ATL.

Plan monitoring in a collaborative multi-agent system requires an agent to not only monitor the execution of its own plan, but also to detect possible deviations or failures in the plan execution of its teammates. In domains featuring partial observability and uncertainty in the agents’ sensing and actuation, especially where communication among agents is sparse (as a part of a cost-minimized plan), plan monitoring can be a significant challenge. We design an Expectation Maximization (EM) based algorithm for detection of plan deviation of teammates in such a multi-agent system. However, a direct implementation of this algorithm is intractable, so we also design an alternative approach grounded on the agents’ plans, for tractability. We establish its equivalence to the intractable version, and evaluate these techniques in some challenging tasks.

Proper epistemic knowledge bases (PEKBs) are syntactic knowledge bases that use multi-agent epistemic logic to represent nested multi-agent knowledge and belief. PEKBs have certain syntactic restrictions that lead to desirable computational properties; primarily, a PEKB is a conjunction of modal literals, and therefore contains no disjunction. Sound entailment can be checked in polynomial time, and is complete for a large set of arbitrary formulae in logics K n and KD n . In this paper, we extend PEKBs to deal with a restricted form of disjunction: 'knowing whether.' An agent i knows whether Q iff agent i knows Q or knows not Q; that is, []Q or []not(Q). In our experience, the ability to represent that an agent knows whether something holds is useful in many multi-agent domains. We represent knowing whether with a modal operator, and present sound polynomial-time entailment algorithms on PEKBs with the knowing whether operator in K n and KD n , but which are complete for a smaller class of queries than standard PEKBs.

One of the better studied properties for operators in judgment aggregation is independence, which essentially dictates that the collective judgment on one issue should not depend on the individual judgments given on some other issue(s) in the same agenda. Independence, although considered a desirable property, is too strong, because together with mild additional conditions it implies dictatorship. We propose here a weakening of independence, named agenda separability: a judgment aggregation rule satisfies it if, whenever the agenda is composed of several independent sub-agendas, the resulting collective judgment sets can be computed separately for each sub-agenda and then put together. We show that this property is discriminant, in the sense that among judgment aggregation rules so far studied in the literature, some satisfy it and some do not. We briefly discuss the implications of agenda separability on the computation of judgment aggregation rules.

We address verification of high-level programs over situation calculus action theories that have an infinite object domain, but bounded fluent extensions in each situation. We show that verification of mu-calculus temporal properties against ConGolog programs over such bounded theories is decidable in general. To do this, we reformulate the transition semantics of ConGolog to keep the bindings of “pick variables” into a separate variable environment whose size is naturally bounded by the number of variables. We also show that for situation-determined ConGolog programs, we can compile away the program into the action theory itself without loss of generality. This can also be done for arbitrary programs, but only to check certain properties, such as if a situation is the result of a program execution, not for mu-calculus verification.

Preventive maintenance is essential for the smooth operation of any equipment. Still, people occasionally do not maintain their equipment adequately. Maintenance alert systems attempt to remind people to perform maintenance. However, most of these systems do not provide alerts at the optimal timing, and nor do they take into account the time required for maintenance or compute the optimal timing for a specific user. We model the problem of maintenance performance, assuming maintenance is time consuming. We solve the optimal policy for the user, i.e., the optimal timing for a user to perform maintenance. This optimal strategy depends on the value of user's time, and thus it may vary from user to user and may change over time. %We present a game Based on the solved optimal strategy we present a personalized maintenance agent, which, depending on the value of user's time, provides alerts to the user when she should perform maintenance. In an experiment using a spaceship computer game, we show that receiving alerts from the personalized alert agent significantly improves user performance.