To ensure we do not forget relevant aspects of AI, we The field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is fertile: it is at the present some key works which have already focused on same time the root of the dreams and deceptions of many defining (artificial) intelligence in Section 2. We then highlight people, a common feature in science fiction, and various the potential lack of cross-fertilisation they may be subject technical projects in many domains of application. Although to in Section 3 and consider the definition of human we may appreciate the rich emotions and ideas brought by expertise to draw a definition of human intelligence in Section a concept such as AI, some people are seriously working on 4. Next, we generalise these definitions to cover also artificial it in an attempt to produce autonomous agents able to meet agents in Section 5 and provide more details about the the various needs of different users. These projects, however, domain-generic data and processes of our definition of intelligence have faced several troubles and unfulfilled promises in in Section 6. We rely further on the expertise field in the history of the field, leading to shortenings of funding Section 7 by describing three kinds of measures of expertise, and years of research efforts lost (Franklin 2014). Despite mapping them to existing measures of intelligence, and suggesting the presence of "intrepid researchers" to advance the field, directions to investigate. Finally, Section 8 expands from an industrial point of view such projects were abandoned the discussion to a novel conception of the field of AI as a and considered as failures.

The Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) has drawn extensive attention recently in several security domains, which optimizes the defender's random allocation of limited security resources. However, the SSE concept neglects the advantage of defender's strategic revelation of her private information, and overestimates the observation ability of the adversaries. In this paper, we overcome these restrictions and analyze the tradeoff between strategic secrecy and commitment in security games. We propose a Disguised-resource Security Game (DSG) where the defender strategically disguises some of her resources. We compare strategic information revelation with public commitment and formally show that they have different advantages depending the payoff structure. To compute the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), several novel approaches are provided, including basic MILP formulations with mixed defender strategy and compact representation, a novel algorithm based on support set enumeration, and an approximation algorithm for epsilon-PBE. Extensive experimental evaluation shows that both strategic secrecy and Stackelberg commitment are critical measures in security domain, and our approaches can solve PBE for realistic-sized problems with good enough and robust solution quality.

Unlike perfect-information games, imperfect-information games cannot be decomposed into subgames that are solved independently. Thus more computationally intensive equilibrium-finding techniques are used, and abstraction---in which a smaller version of the game is generated and solved---is essential. Endgame solving is the process of computing a (presumably) better strategy for just an endgame than what can be computationally afforded for the full game. Endgame solving has many benefits, such as being able to 1) solve the endgame in a finer information abstraction than what is computationally feasible for the full game, and 2) incorporate into the endgame actions that an opponent took that were not included in the action abstraction used to solve the full game. We introduce an endgame solving technique that outperforms prior methods both in theory and practice. We also show how to adapt it, and past endgame-solving techniques, to respond to opponent actions that are outside the original action abstraction; this significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art approach, action translation. Finally, we show that endgame solving can be repeated as the game progresses down the tree, leading to significantly lower exploitability. All of the techniques are evaluated in terms of exploitability; to our knowledge, this is the first time that exploitability of endgame-solving techniques has been measured in large imperfect-information games.

Demand-side management (DSM) in the smart grid allows customers to make autonomous decisions on their energy consumption, helping energy providers to reduce the peaks in load demand. The automated scheduling of smart devices in residential and commercial buildings plays a key role in DSM. Due to data privacy and user autonomy, such an approach is best implemented through distributed multi-agent systems. This paper makes the following contributions: (i) It introduces the Smart Home Device Scheduling (SHDS) problem, which formalizes the device scheduling and coordination problem across multiple smart homes as a multi-agent system; (ii) It describes a mapping of this problem to a distributed constraint optimization problem; (iii) It proposes a distributed algorithm for the SHDS problem; and (iv) It presents empirical results from a physically distributed system of Raspberry Pis, each capable of controlling smart devices through hardware interfaces.

Recently a large attention has been devoted to the ethical issues arising around the design and the implementation of artificial agents. This is due to the fact that humans and machines more and more often need to collaborate to decide on actions to take or decisions to make. Such decisions should be not only correct and optimal from the point of view of the overall goal to be reached, but should also agree to some form of moral values which are aligned to the human ones. Examples of such scenarios can be seen in autonomous vehicles, medical diagnosis support systems, and many other domains, where humans and artificial intelligent systems cooperate. One of the main issues arising in this context regards ways to model and reason with moral values. In this paper we discuss the possible use of AI compact preference models as a promising approach to model, reason, and embed moral values in decision support systems.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate thepotential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn thes ystem off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead.  Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

The generality of decision and game theory has enabled domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this conclusion.

Title: What are the phenomena to be explained?

The interactive computation paradigm is reviewed and a particular example is extended to form the stochastic analog of a computational process via a transcription of a minimal Turing Machine into an equivalent asynchronous Cellular Automaton with an exponential waiting times distribution of effective transitions. Furthermore, a special toolbox for analytic derivation of recursive relations of important statistical and other quantities is introduced in the form of an Inductive Combinatorial Hierarchy.