The Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) method is a ubiquitous meta-algorithm that works as follows: A distribution is maintained on a certain set, and at each step the probability assigned to action $\gamma$ is multiplied by $(1 -\epsilon C(\gamma))>0$ where $C(\gamma)$ is the ``cost" of action $\gamma$ and then rescaled to ensure that the new values form a distribution. We analyze MWU in congestion games where agents use \textit{arbitrary admissible constants} as learning rates $\epsilon$ and prove convergence to \textit{exact Nash equilibria}. Interestingly, this convergence result does not carry over to the nearly homologous MWU variant where at each step the probability assigned to action $\gamma$ is multiplied by $(1 -\epsilon)^{C(\gamma)}$ even for the simplest case of two-agent, two-strategy load balancing games, where such dynamics can provably lead to limit cycles or even chaotic behavior.

One of the main challenges in reinforcement learning (RL) is generalisation. In typical deep RL methods this is achieved by approximating the optimal value function with a low-dimensional representation using a deep network. While this approach works well in many domains, in domains where the optimal value function cannot easily be reduced to a low-dimensional representation, learning can be very slow and unstable. This paper contributes towards tackling such challenging domains, by proposing a new method, called Hybrid Reward Architecture (HRA). HRA takes as input a decomposed reward function and learns a separate value function for each component reward function. Because each component typically only depends on a subset of all features, the corresponding value function can be approximated more easily by a low-dimensional representation, enabling more effective learning. We demonstrate HRA on a toy-problem and the Atari game Ms. Pac-Man, where HRA achieves above-human performance.

Aggregative games provide a rich abstraction to model strategic multi-agent interactions. We focus on learning local aggregative games, where the payoff of each player is a function of its own action and the aggregate behavior of its neighbors in a connected digraph. We show the existence of a pure strategy epsilon-Nash equilibrium in such games when the payoff functions are convex or sub-modular. We prove an information theoretic lower bound, in a value oracle model, on approximating the structure of the digraph with non-negative monotone sub-modular cost functions on the edge set cardinality. We also introduce gamma-aggregative games that generalize local aggregative games, and admit epsilon-Nash equilibrium that are stable with respect to small changes in some specified graph property. Moreover, we provide estimation algorithms for the game theoretic model that can meaningfully recover the underlying structure and payoff functions from real voting data.

Dealing with sparse rewards is one of the biggest challenges in Reinforcement Learning (RL). We present a novel technique called Hindsight Experience Replay which allows sample-efficient learning from rewards which are sparse and binary and therefore avoid the need for complicated reward engineering. It can be combined with an arbitrary off-policy RL algorithm and may be seen as a form of implicit curriculum. We demonstrate our approach on the task of manipulating objects with a robotic arm. In particular, we run experiments on three different tasks: pushing, sliding, and pick-and-place, in each case using only binary rewards indicating whether or not the task is completed. Our ablation studies show that Hindsight Experience Replay is a crucial ingredient which makes training possible in these challenging environments. We show that our policies trained on a physics simulation can be deployed on a physical robot and successfully complete the task. The video presenting our experiments is available at https://goo.gl/SMrQnI.

Decentralized (PO)MDPs provide an expressive framework for sequential decision making in a multiagent system. Given their computational complexity, recent research has focused on tractable yet practical subclasses of Dec-POMDPs. We address such a subclass called CDec-POMDP where the collective behavior of a population of agents affects the joint-reward and environment dynamics. Our main contribution is an actor-critic (AC) reinforcement learning method for optimizing CDec-POMDP policies. Vanilla AC has slow convergence for larger problems. To address this, we show how a particular decomposition of the approximate action-value function over agents leads to effective updates, and also derive a new way to train the critic based on local reward signals. Comparisons on a synthetic benchmark and a real world taxi fleet optimization problem show that our new AC approach provides better quality solutions than previous best approaches.

There has been a resurgence of interest in multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL), due partly to the recent success of deep neural networks. The simplest form of MARL is independent reinforcement learning (InRL), where each agent treats all of its experience as part of its (non stationary) environment. In this paper, we first observe that policies learned using InRL can overfit to the other agents' policies during training, failing to sufficiently generalize during execution. We introduce a new metric, joint-policy correlation, to quantify this effect. We describe a meta-algorithm for general MARL, based on approximate best responses to mixtures of policies generated using deep reinforcement learning, and empirical game theoretic analysis to compute meta-strategies for policy selection. The meta-algorithm generalizes previous algorithms such as InRL, iterated best response, double oracle, and fictitious play. Then, we propose a scalable implementation which reduces the memory requirement using decoupled meta-solvers. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of the resulting policies in three partially observable settings: gridworld coordination problems, emergent language games, and poker.

Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems. Abstract models of common-pool resource appropriation based on non-cooperative game theory predict that self-interested agents will generally fail to find socially positive equilibria---a phenomenon called the tragedy of the commons. However, in reality, human societies are sometimes able to discover and implement stable cooperative solutions. Decades of behavioral game theory research have sought to uncover aspects of human behavior that make this possible. Most of that work was based on laboratory experiments where participants only make a single choice: how much to appropriate. Recognizing the importance of spatial and temporal resource dynamics, a recent trend has been toward experiments in more complex real-time video game-like environments. However, standard methods of non-cooperative game theory can no longer be used to generate predictions for this case. Here we show that deep reinforcement learning can be used instead. To that end, we study the emergent behavior of groups of independently learning agents in a partially observed Markov game modeling common-pool resource appropriation. Our experiments highlight the importance of trial-and-error learning in common-pool resource appropriation and shed light on the relationship between exclusion, sustainability, and inequality.

The paper addresses the classical network tomography problem of inferring local traffic given origin-destination observations. Focusing on large complex public transportation systems, we build a scalable model that exploits input-output information toestimate the unobserved link/station loads and the users' path preferences. Based on the reconstruction of the users' travel time distribution, the model is flexible enough to capture possible different path-choice strategies and correlations between users travelling on similar paths at similar times. The corresponding likelihood function is intractable for medium or large-scale networks and we propose twodistinct strategies, namely the exact maximum-likelihood inference of an approximate but tractable model and the variational inference of the original intractable model. As an application of our approach, we consider the emblematic case of the London underground network, where a tap-in/tap-out system tracks the starting/exit time and location of all journeys in a day. A set of synthetic simulations and real data provided by Transport For London are used to validate and test the model on the predictions of observable and unobservable quantities.

Learning cooperative policies for multi-agent systems is often challenged by partial observability and a lack of coordination. In some settings, the structure of a problem allows a distributed solution with limited communication. Here, we consider a scenario where no communication is available, and instead we learn local policies for all agents that collectively mimic the solution to a centralized multi-agent static optimization problem. Our main contribution is an information theoretic framework based on rate distortion theory which facilitates analysis of how well the resulting fully decentralized policies are able to reconstruct the optimal solution. Moreover, this framework provides a natural extension that addresses which nodes an agent should communicate with to improve the performance of its individual policy.

Multi-agent predictive modeling is an essential step for understanding physical, social and team-play systems. Recently, Interaction Networks (INs) were proposed for the task of modeling multi-agent physical systems. One of the drawbacks of INs is scaling with the number of interactions in the system (typically quadratic or higher order in the number of agents). In this paper we introduce VAIN, a novel attentional architecture for multi-agent predictive modeling that scales linearly with the number of agents. We show that VAIN is effective for multi-agent predictive modeling. Our method is evaluated on tasks from challenging multi-agent prediction domains: chess and soccer, and outperforms competing multi-agent approaches.