Webstresser.org, a popular DDoS-for-Hire website service on Wednesday was taken down by authorities from the US, UK, Netherlands, and various other countries in a major international investigation and arrests have been made. The website is blamed for more than four million cyber attacks globally in the past three years and had over 134,000 registered users at the time of the takedown. The operation, dubbed "Operation Power OFF," targeted Webstresser.org, It involved law enforcement agencies from the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Serbia, Croatia, Spain, Italy, Germany, Australia, Hongkong, Canada, and United States of America, coordinating with Europol. The domain name was seized by the US Department of Defence.

Robots that navigate among pedestrians use collision avoidance algorithms to enable safe and efficient operation. Recent works present deep reinforcement learning as a framework to model the complex interactions and cooperation. However, they are implemented using key assumptions about other agents' behavior that deviate from reality as the number of agents in the environment increases. This work extends our previous approach to develop an algorithm that learns collision avoidance among a variety of types of dynamic agents without assuming they follow any particular behavior rules. This work also introduces a strategy using LSTM that enables the algorithm to use observations of an arbitrary number of other agents, instead of previous methods that have a fixed observation size. The proposed algorithm outperforms our previous approach in simulation as the number of agents increases, and the algorithm is demonstrated on a fully autonomous robotic vehicle traveling at human walking speed, without the use of a 3D Lidar.

We study information elicitation without verification (IEWV) and ask the following question: Can we achieve truthfulness in dominant strategy in IEWV? This paper considers two elicitation settings. The first setting is when the mechanism designer has access to a random variable that is a noisy or proxy version of the ground truth, with known biases. The second setting is the standard peer prediction setting where agents' reports are the only source of information that the mechanism designer has. We introduce surrogate scoring rules (SSR) for the first setting, which use the noisy ground truth to evaluate quality of elicited information, and show that SSR achieve truthful elicitation in dominant strategy. Built upon SSR, we develop a multi-task mechanism, dominant truth serum (DTS), to achieve truthful elicitation in dominant strategy when the mechanism designer only has access to agents' reports (the second setting). The method relies on an estimation procedure to accurately estimate the average bias in the reports of other agents. With the accurate estimation, a random peer agent's report serves as a noisy ground truth and SSR can then be applied to achieve truthfulness in dominant strategy. A salient feature of SSR and DTS is that they both quantify the quality or value of information despite lack of ground truth, just as proper scoring rules do for the with verification setting. Our work complements both the strictly proper scoring rule literature by solving the case where the mechanism designer only has access to a noisy or proxy version of the ground truth, and the peer prediction literature by achieving truthful elicitation in dominant strategy.

Linda Yeardly presents on some of the challenges of omnichannel customer service that agents have to face everyday.

We introduce and empirically evaluate two techniques aimed at enhancing the performance of multi-robot prioritized path planning. The first technique is the deterministic procedure for re-scheduling (as opposed to well-known approach based on random restarts), the second one is the heuristic procedure that modifies the search-space of the individual planner involved in the prioritized path finding.

Recently Anthony Evans, principal consultant with Computer Design & Integration, was recruited to come in halfway through what should have been a relatively straightforward project. The company wanted to deploy artificial intelligence at its customer service help desk to provide agents with a sort of "whisper agent" that would help the agents with questions about which they were unsure. Either the virtual agent would have the answer or it would escalate the question to a second tier of assistance. But something was off with the implementation pilot -- the whisper agent turned out to be only of marginal help to the desk agents. Eventually the team discovered where they went wrong, according to Evans.

Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work we concentrate on negotiation with ordinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes. We study an intuitive protocol for bilateral negotiation, where the two parties make offers alternately. We analyze the negotiation protocol under different settings. First, we assume that each party has full information about the other party's preference order. We provide elegant strategies that specify a sub-game perfect equilibrium for the agents. We further show how the studied negotiation protocol almost completely implements a known bargaining rule. Finally, we analyze the no information setting. We study several solution concepts that are distribution-free, and analyze both the case where neither party knows the preference order of the other party, and the case where only one party is uninformed.

Interpersonal ties are pivotal to individual efficacy, status and performance in an agent society. This paper explores three important and interrelated themes in social network theory: the center/periphery partition of the network; network dynamics; and social integration of newcomers. We tackle the question: How would a newcomer harness information brokerage to integrate into a dynamic network going from periphery to center? We model integration as the interplay between the newcomer and the dynamics network and capture information brokerage using a process of relationship building. We analyze theoretical guarantees for the newcomer to reach the center through tactics; proving that a winning tactic always exists for certain types of network dynamics. We then propose three tactics and show their superior performance over alternative methods on four real-world datasets and four network models. In general, our tactics place the newcomer to the center by adding very few new edges on dynamic networks with approximately 14000 nodes.

Multi-agent settings are quickly gathering importance in machine learning. This includes a plethora of recent work on deep multi-agent reinforcement learning, but also can be extended to hierarchical RL, generative adversarial networks and decentralised optimisation. In all these settings the presence of multiple learning agents renders the training problem non-stationary and often leads to unstable training or undesired final results. We present Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA), a method in which each agent shapes the anticipated learning of the other agents in the environment. The LOLA learning rule includes an additional term that accounts for the impact of one agent's policy on the anticipated parameter update of the other agents. Preliminary results show that the encounter of two LOLA agents leads to the emergence of tit-for-tat and therefore cooperation in the iterated prisoners' dilemma, while independent learning does not. In this domain, LOLA also receives higher payouts compared to a naive learner, and is robust against exploitation by higher order gradient-based methods. Applied to repeated matching pennies, LOLA agents converge to the Nash equilibrium. In a round robin tournament we show that LOLA agents can successfully shape the learning of a range of multi-agent learning algorithms from literature, resulting in the highest average returns on the IPD. We also show that the LOLA update rule can be efficiently calculated using an extension of the policy gradient estimator, making the method suitable for model-free RL. This method thus scales to large parameter and input spaces and nonlinear function approximators. We also apply LOLA to a grid world task with an embedded social dilemma using deep recurrent policies and opponent modelling. Again, by explicitly considering the learning of the other agent, LOLA agents learn to cooperate out of self-interest.

To make AI systems broadly useful for challenging real-world tasks, we need them to learn complex human goals and preferences. One approach to specifying complex goals asks humans to judge during training which agent behaviors are safe and useful, but this approach can fail if the task is too complicated for a human to directly judge. To help address this concern, we propose training agents via self play on a zero sum debate game. Given a question or proposed action, two agents take turns making short statements up to a limit, then a human judges which of the agents gave the most true, useful information. In an analogy to complexity theory, debate with optimal play can answer any question in PSPACE given polynomial time judges (direct judging answers only NP questions). In practice, whether debate works involves empirical questions about humans and the tasks we want AIs to perform, plus theoretical questions about the meaning of AI alignment. We report results on an initial MNIST experiment where agents compete to convince a sparse classifier, boosting the classifier's accuracy from 59.4% to 88.9% given 6 pixels and from 48.2% to 85.2% given 4 pixels. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical aspects of the debate model, focusing on potential weaknesses as the model scales up, and we propose future human and computer experiments to test these properties.