We consider the problem of detecting norm violations in open multi-agent systems (MAS). We show how, using ideas from scrip systems, we can design mechanisms where the agents comprising the MAS are incentivised to monitor the actions of other agents for norm violations. The cost of providing the incentives is not borne by the MAS and does not come from fines charged for norm violations (fines may be impossible to levy in a system where agents are free to leave and rejoin again under a different identity). Instead, monitoring incentives come from (scrip) fees for accessing the services provided by the MAS. In some cases, perfect monitoring (and hence enforcement) can be achieved: no norms will be violated in equilibrium. In other cases, we show that, while it is impossible to achieve perfect enforcement, we can get arbitrarily close; we can make the probability of a norm violation in equilibrium arbitrarily small. We show using simulations that our theoretical results, which apply to systems with a large number of agents, hold for multi-agent systems with as few as 1000 agents--the system rapidly converges to the steady-state distribution of scrip tokens necessary to ensure monitoring and then remains close to the steady state.

How can one detect friendly and adversarial behavior from raw data? Detecting whether an environment is a friend, a foe, or anything in between, remains a poorly understood yet desirable ability for safe and robust agents. This paper proposes a definition of these environmental "attitudes" based on an characterization of the environment's ability to react to the agent's private strategy. We define an objective function for a one-shot game that allows deriving the environment's probability distribution under friendly and adversarial assumptions alongside the agent's optimal strategy. Furthermore, we present an algorithm to compute these equilibrium strategies, and show experimentally that both friendly and adversarial environments possess non-trivial optimal strategies.

Interpretability of the underlying AI representations is a key raison d'\^{e}tre for Open Learner Modelling (OLM) -- a branch of Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) research. OLMs provide tools for 'opening' up the AI models of learners' cognition and emotions for the purpose of supporting human learning and teaching. Over thirty years of research in ITS (also known as AI in Education) produced important work, which informs about how AI can be used in Education to best effects and, through the OLM research, what are the necessary considerations to make it interpretable and explainable for the benefit of learning. We argue that this work can provide a valuable starting point for a framework of interpretable AI, and as such is of relevance to the application of both knowledge-based and machine learning systems in other high-stakes contexts, beyond education.

In recent years, multi-agent epistemic planning has received attention from both dynamic logic and planning communities. Existing implementations of multi-agent epistemic planning are based on compilation into classical planning and suffer from various limitations, such as generating only linear plans, restriction to public actions, and incapability to handle disjunctive beliefs. In this paper, we propose a general representation language for multi-agent epistemic planning where the initial KB and the goal, the preconditions and effects of actions can be arbitrary multi-agent epistemic formulas, and the solution is an action tree branching on sensing results. To support efficient reasoning in the multi-agent KD45 logic, we make use of a normal form called alternating cover disjunctive formulas (ACDFs). We propose basic revision and update algorithms for ACDFs. We also handle static propositional common knowledge, which we call constraints. Based on our reasoning, revision and update algorithms, adapting the PrAO algorithm for contingent planning from the literature, we implemented a multi-agent epistemic planner called MEPK. Our experimental results show the viability of our approach.

The Library of Babel --- Jorge Luis Borges 10. to google: transitive verb that means using the Google search engine to obtain information from the Web. Nominal Forms Infinitive: to google Participle: googled Gerund: googling Indicative Present I google you google he googles we google you google they google Perfect I have googled you have googled he has googled we have googled you have googled they have googled Past I googled you googled he googled we googled you googled they googled Pluperfect I had googled you had googled he had googled we had googled you had googled they had googled Future I will google you will google he will google we will google you will google they will google Future perfect I will have googled you will have googled he will have googled we will have googled you will have googled they will have googled Subjunctive Present I google you google he google we google you google they google Perfect I have googled you have googled he have googled we have googled you have ...

Epistemic logics are a primary formalism for multi-agent systems but major reasoning tasks in such epistemic logics are intractable, which impedes applications of multi-agent epistemic logics in automatic planning. Knowledge compilation provides a promising way of resolving the intractability by identifying expressive fragments of epistemic logics that are tractable for important reasoning tasks such as satisfiability and forgetting. The property of logical separability allows to decompose a formula into some of its subformulas and thus modular algorithms for various reasoning tasks can be developed. In this paper, by employing logical separability, we propose an approach to knowledge compilation for the logic Kn by defining a normal form SDNF. Among several novel results, we show that every epistemic formula can be equivalently compiled into a formula in SDNF, major reasoning tasks in SDNF are tractable, and formulas in SDNF enjoy the logical separability. Our results shed some lights on modular approaches to knowledge compilation. Furthermore, we apply our results in the multi-agent epistemic planning. Finally, we extend the above result to the logic K45n that is Kn extended by introspection axioms 4 and 5.

This paper discusses technology challenges and opportunities to embrace artificial intelligence (AI) era in the design of wireless networks. We aim to provide readers with motivation and general methodology for adoption of AI in the context of next-generation networks. First, we discuss the rise of network intelligence and then, we introduce a brief overview of AI with machine learning (ML) and their relationship to self-organization designs. Finally, we discuss design of intelligent agent and it's functions to enable knowledge-driven wireless networks with AI.

Have you put a bet on the FIFA World Cup? If yes, the chances are you've made a pretty educated guess, right? You know which team has the strongest players or most favourable odds. Or maybe you've put some cash on your country's team, (which normally I'd avoid England, but given their recent performance, I could be wrong to!) Either way, you might be best casting your bets in line with San Francisco based Unanimous AI. They use a technology called Swarm AI - algorithms modelled on swarms in nature that amplifies human intelligence. By using human intelligence and artificial intelligence together, they can predict outcomes better than humans or AI acting alone.

This paper addresses the problem of multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning (MIRL) in a two-player general-sum stochastic game framework. Five variants of MIRL are considered: uCS-MIRL, advE-MIRL, cooE-MIRL, uCE-MIRL, and uNE-MIRL, each distinguished by its solution concept. Problem uCS-MIRL is a cooperative game in which the agents employ cooperative strategies that aim to maximize the total game value. In problem uCE-MIRL, agents are assumed to follow strategies that constitute a correlated equilibrium while maximizing total game value. Problem uNE-MIRL is similar to uCE-MIRL in total game value maximization, but it is assumed that the agents are playing a Nash equilibrium. Problems advE-MIRL and cooE-MIRL assume agents are playing an adversarial equilibrium and a coordination equilibrium, respectively. We propose novel approaches to address these five problems under the assumption that the game observer either knows or is able to accurate estimate the policies and solution concepts for players. For uCS-MIRL, we first develop a characteristic set of solutions ensuring that the observed bi-policy is a uCS and then apply a Bayesian inverse learning method. For uCE-MIRL, we develop a linear programming problem subject to constraints that define necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed policies to be correlated equilibria. The objective is to choose a solution that not only minimizes the total game value difference between the observed bi-policy and a local uCS, but also maximizes the scale of the solution. We apply a similar treatment to the problem of uNE-MIRL. The remaining two problems can be solved efficiently by taking advantage of solution uniqueness and setting up a convex optimization problem. Results are validated on various benchmark grid-world games.

Social conventions - arbitrary ways to organize group behavior - are an important part of social life. Any agent that wants to enter an existing society must be able to learn its conventions (e.g. which side of the road to drive on, which language to speak) from relatively few observations or risk being unable to coordinate with everyone else. We consider the game theoretic framework of David Lewis which views the selection of a social convention as the selection of an equilibrium in a coordination game. We ask how to construct reinforcement learning based agents that can solve the convention learning task in the self-play paradigm: at training time the agent has access to a good model of the environment and a small amount of observations about how individuals in society act. The agent then has to construct a policy that is compatible with the test-time social convention. We study three environments from the literature which have multiple conventions: traffic, communication, and risky coordination. In each of these we observe that adding a small amount of imitation learning during self-play training greatly increases the probability that the strategy found by self-play fits well with the social convention the agent will face at test time. We show that this works even in an environment where standard independent multi-agent RL very rarely finds the correct test-time equilibrium.