As one of Bayesian analysis tools, Hidden Markov Model (HMM) has been used to in extensive applications. Most HMMs are solved by Baum-Welch algorithm (BWHMM) to predict the model parameters, which is difficult to find global optimal solutions. This paper proposes an optimized Hidden Markov Model with Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm and so is called PSOHMM. In order to overcome the statistical constraints in HMM, the paper develops re-normalization and re-mapping mechanisms to ensure the constraints in HMM. The experiments have shown that PSOHMM can search better solution than BWHMM, and has faster convergence speed.

Bribery in election (or computational social choice in general) is an important problem that has received a considerable amount of attention. In the classic bribery problem, the briber (or attacker) bribes some voters in attempting to make the briber's designated candidate win an election. In this paper, we introduce a novel variant of the bribery problem, "Election with Bribed Voter Uncertainty" or BVU for short, accommodating the uncertainty that the vote of a bribed voter may or may not be counted. This uncertainty occurs either because a bribed voter may not cast its vote in fear of being caught, or because a bribed voter is indeed caught and therefore its vote is discarded. As a first step towards ultimately understanding and addressing this important problem, we show that it does not admit any multiplicative $O(1)$-approximation algorithm modulo standard complexity assumptions. We further show that there is an approximation algorithm that returns a solution with an additive-$\epsilon$ error in FPT time for any fixed $\epsilon$.

-- a group of intelligent agents which fulfill a set of tasks in parallel is represented first by the tensor multiplication of corresponding processes in a linear logic game category. An optimal itinerary in the configuration space of the group states is defined as a play with maximal total reward in the category. New moments also are: the reward is represented as a degree of certainty (visibility) of an agent goal, and the system goals are chosen by the greatest value corresponding to these processes in the system goal lattice. The artificial intelligence is represented in the Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) approach as an information processor which consumes and gives out information. Investigations in the field are focused on systems which act rationally. A formal description of the most intelligent agent (AIXI) behavior, in the sense of some intelligence measure, is suggested in AGI framework [1].

Optimization of parameterized policies for reinforcement learning (RL) is an important and challenging problem in artificial intelligence. Among the most common approaches are algorithms based on gradient ascent of a score function representing discounted return. In this paper, we examine the role of these policy gradient and actor-critic algorithms in partially-observable multiagent environments. We show several candidate policy update rules and relate them to a foundation of regret minimization and multiagent learning techniques for the one-shot and tabular cases, leading to previously unknown convergence guarantees. We apply our method to model-free multiagent reinforcement learning in adversarial sequential decision problems (zero-sum imperfect information games), using RL-style function approximation. We evaluate on commonly used benchmark Poker domains, showing performance against fixed policies and empirical convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in self-play with rates similar to or better than a baseline model-free algorithm for zero-sum games, without any domain-specific state space reductions.

We consider a fair division setting in which $m$ indivisible items are to be allocated among $n$ agents, where the agents have additive utilities and the agents' utilities for individual items are independently sampled from a distribution. Previous work has shown that an envy-free allocation is likely to exist when $m=\Omega(n\log n)$ but not when $m=n+o(n)$, and left open the question of determining where the phase transition from non-existence to existence occurs. We show that, surprisingly, there is in fact no universal point of transition---instead, the transition is governed by the divisibility relation between $m$ and $n$. On the one hand, if $m$ is divisible by $n$, an envy-free allocation exists with high probability as long as $m\geq 2n$. On the other hand, if $m$ is not "almost" divisible by $n$, an envy-free allocation is unlikely to exist even when $m=\Theta(n\log n/\log\log n)$.

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this paper we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the paper is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, centralised policies can only be executed if agents have access to either the global state or an instantaneous communication channel. An alternative approach that circumvents this limitation is to use centralised training of a set of decentralised policies. However, such policies severely limit the agents' ability to coordinate. We propose multi-agent common knowledge reinforcement learning (MACKRL), which strikes a middle ground between these two extremes. Our approach is based on the insight that, even in partially observable settings, subsets of agents often have some common knowledge that they can exploit to coordinate their behaviour. Common knowledge can arise, e.g., if all agents can reliably observe things in their own field of view and know the field of view of other agents. Using this additional information, it is possible to find a centralised policy that conditions only on agents' common knowledge and that can be executed in a decentralised fashion. A resulting challenge is then to determine at what level agents should coordinate. While the common knowledge shared among all agents may not contain much valuable information, there may be subgroups of agents that share common knowledge useful for coordination. MACKRL addresses this challenge using a hierarchical approach: at each level, a controller can either select a joint action for the agents in a given subgroup, or propose a partition of the agents into smaller subgroups whose actions are then selected by controllers at the next level. While action selection involves sampling hierarchically, learning updates are based on the probability of the joint action, calculated by marginalising across the possible decisions of the hierarchy. We show promising results on both a proof-of-concept matrix game and a multi-agent version of StarCraft II Micromanagement.

When observing the actions of others, humans carry out inferences about why the others acted as they did, and what this implies about their view of the world. Humans also use the fact that their actions will be interpreted in this manner when observed by others, allowing them to act informatively and thereby communicate efficiently with others. Although learning algorithms have recently achieved superhuman performance in a number of two-player, zero-sum games, scalable multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms that can discover effective strategies and conventions in complex, partially observable settings have proven elusive. We present the Bayesian action decoder (BAD), a new multi-agent learning method that uses an approximate Bayesian update to obtain a public belief that conditions on the actions taken by all agents in the environment. Together with the public belief, this Bayesian update effectively defines a new Markov decision process, the public belief MDP, in which the action space consists of deterministic partial policies, parameterised by deep neural networks, that can be sampled for a given public state. It exploits the fact that an agent acting only on this public belief state can still learn to use its private information if the action space is augmented to be over partial policies mapping private information into environment actions. The Bayesian update is also closely related to the theory of mind reasoning that humans carry out when observing others' actions. We first validate BAD on a proof-of-principle two-step matrix game, where it outperforms traditional policy gradient methods. We then evaluate BAD on the challenging, cooperative partial-information card game Hanabi, where in the two-player setting the method surpasses all previously published learning and hand-coded approaches.

It has become commonplace to assert that autonomous agents will have to be built to follow human rules of behavior-social norms and laws. But human laws and norms are complex and culturally varied systems; in many cases agents will have to learn the rules. This requires autonomous agents to have models of how human rule systems work so that they can make reliable predictions about rules. In this paper we contribute to the building of such models by analyzing an overlooked distinction between important rules and what we call silly rules --rules with no discernible direct impact on welfare. We show that silly rules render a normative system both more robust and more adaptable in response to shocks to perceived stability. They make normativity more legible for humans, and can increase legibility for AI systems as well. For AI systems to integrate into human normative systems, we suggest, it may be important for them to have models that include representations of silly rules.

We present an intelligent virtual interviewer that engages with a user in a text-based conversation and automatically infers the user's psychological traits, such as personality. We investigate how the personality of a virtual interviewer influences a user's behavior from two perspectives: the user's willingness to confide in, and listen to, a virtual interviewer. We have developed two virtual interviewers with distinct personalities and deployed them in a real-world recruiting event. We present findings from completed interviews with 316 actual job applicants. Notably, users are more willing to confide in and listen to a virtual interviewer with a serious, assertive personality. Moreover, users' personality traits, inferred from their chat text, influence their perception of a virtual interviewer, and their willingness to confide in and listen to a virtual interviewer. Finally, we discuss the implications of our work on building hyper-personalized, intelligent agents based on user traits.