Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

We consider the problem of multiple agents sensing and acting in environments with the goal of maximising their shared utility. In these environments, agents must learn communication protocols in order to share information that is needed to solve the tasks. By embracing deep neural networks, we are able to demonstrate end-to-end learning of protocols in complex environments inspired by communication riddles and multi-agent computer vision problems with partial observability. We propose two approaches for learning in these domains: Reinforced Inter-Agent Learning (RIAL) and Differentiable Inter-Agent Learning (DIAL). The former uses deep Q-learning, while the latter exploits the fact that, during learning, agents can backpropagate error derivatives through (noisy) communication channels. Hence, this approach uses centralised learning but decentralised execution. Our experiments introduce new environments for studying the learning of communication protocols and present a set of engineering innovations that are essential for success in these domains.

Aggregative games provide a rich abstraction to model strategic multi-agent interactions. We focus on learning local aggregative games, where the payoff of each player is a function of its own action and the aggregate behavior of its neighbors in a connected digraph. We show the existence of a pure strategy epsilon-Nash equilibrium in such games when the payoff functions are convex or sub-modular. We prove an information theoretic lower bound, in a value oracle model, on approximating the structure of the digraph with non-negative monotone sub-modular cost functions on the edge set cardinality. We also introduce gamma-aggregative games that generalize local aggregative games, and admit epsilon-Nash equilibrium that are stable with respect to small changes in some specified graph property. Moreover, we provide estimation algorithms for the game theoretic model that can meaningfully recover the underlying structure and payoff functions from real voting data.

We consider cooperative multi-agent consensus optimization problems over an undirected network of agents, where only those agents connected by an edge can directly communicate. The objective is to minimize the sum of agent-specific composite convex functions over agent-specific private conic constraint sets; hence, the optimal consensus decision should lie in the intersection of these private sets. We provide convergence rates in sub-optimality, infeasibility and consensus violation; examine the effect of underlying network topology on the convergence rates of the proposed decentralized algorithms; and show how to extend these methods to handle time-varying communication networks.

There has been a resurgence of interest in multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL), due partly to the recent success of deep neural networks. The simplest form of MARL is independent reinforcement learning (InRL), where each agent treats all of its experience as part of its (non stationary) environment. In this paper, we first observe that policies learned using InRL can overfit to the other agents' policies during training, failing to sufficiently generalize during execution. We introduce a new metric, joint-policy correlation, to quantify this effect. We describe a meta-algorithm for general MARL, based on approximate best responses to mixtures of policies generated using deep reinforcement learning, and empirical game theoretic analysis to compute meta-strategies for policy selection.

Many tasks in AI require the collaboration of multiple agents. Typically, the communication protocol between agents is manually specified and not altered during training. In this paper we explore a simple neural model, called CommNet, that uses continuous communication for fully cooperative tasks. The model consists of multiple agents and the communication between them is learned alongside their policy. We apply this model to a diverse set of tasks, demonstrating the ability of the agents to learn to communicate amongst themselves, yielding improved performance over non-communicative agents and baselines. In some cases, it is possible to interpret the language devised by the agents, revealing simple but effective strategies for solving the task at hand.

Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems. Abstract models of common-pool resource appropriation based on non-cooperative game theory predict that self-interested agents will generally fail to find socially positive equilibria---a phenomenon called the tragedy of the commons. However, in reality, human societies are sometimes able to discover and implement stable cooperative solutions. Decades of behavioral game theory research have sought to uncover aspects of human behavior that make this possible.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Claire chatted to Kevin McAleer from kevsrobots about how to get started building robots at home. Kevin McAleer is a hobbyist robotics fanatic who likes to build robots, share videos about them on YouTube and teach people how to do the same. Kev has been building robots since 2019, when he got his first 3d printer and wanted to make more interesting builds. Kev has a degree in Computer Science, and because his day job is relatively hands-off, this hobby allows his creativity to have an outlet. Kev is a huge fan of Python and Micropython for embedded devices, and has a website - kevsrobots.com

Submodular functions can be efficiently minimized and are consequently heavily applied in machine learning. There are many cases, however, in which we do not know the function we aim to optimize, but rather have access to training data that is used to learn it.