Imitation learning algorithms can be used to learn a policy from expert demonstrations without access to a reward signal. However, most existing approaches are not applicable in multi-agent settings due to the existence of multiple (Nash) equilibria and non-stationary environments. We propose a new framework for multi-agent imitation learning for general Markov games, where we build upon a generalized notion of inverse reinforcement learning. We further introduce a practical multi-agent actor-critic algorithm with good empirical performance. Our method can be used to imitate complex behaviors in high-dimensional environments with multiple cooperative or competing agents.

Communication could potentially be an effective way for multi-agent cooperation. However, information sharing among all agents or in predefined communication architectures that existing methods adopt can be problematic. When there is a large number of agents, agents cannot differentiate valuable information that helps cooperative decision making from globally shared information. Therefore, communication barely helps, and could even impair the learning of multi-agent cooperation. Predefined communication architectures, on the other hand, restrict communication among agents and thus restrain potential cooperation. To tackle these difficulties, in this paper, we propose an attentional communication model that learns when communication is needed and how to integrate shared information for cooperative decision making. Our model leads to efficient and effective communication for large-scale multi-agent cooperation. Empirically, we show the strength of our model in a variety of cooperative scenarios, where agents are able to develop more coordinated and sophisticated strategies than existing methods.

Interactive partially observable Markov decision processes (I-POMDPs) provide a principled framework for planning and acting in a partially observable, stochastic and multi-agent environment. It extends POMDPs to multi-agent settings by including models of other agents in the state space and forming a hierarchical belief structure. In order to predict other agents' actions using I-POMDPs, we propose an approach that effectively uses Bayesian inference and sequential Monte Carlo sampling to learn others' intentional models which ascribe to them beliefs, preferences and rationality in action selection. Empirical results show that our algorithm accurately learns models of the other agent and has superior performance than methods that use subintentional models. Our approach serves as a generalized Bayesian learning algorithm that learns other agents' beliefs, strategy levels, and transition, observation and reward functions.

We consider a game-theoretical multi-agent learning problem where the feedback information can be lost during the learning process and rewards are given by a broad class of games known as variationally stable games. We propose a simple variant of the classical online gradient descent algorithm, called reweighted online gradient descent (ROGD) and show that in variationally stable games, if each agent adopts ROGD, then almost sure convergence to the set of Nash equilibria is guaranteed, even when the feedback loss is asynchronous and arbitrarily corrrelated among agents. We then extend the framework to deal with unknown feedback loss probabilities by using an estimator (constructed from past data) in its replacement. Finally, we further extend the framework to accomodate both asynchronous loss and stochastic rewards and establish that multi-agent ROGD learning still converges to the set of Nash equilibria in such settings. Together, these results contribute to the broad lanscape of multi-agent online learning by significantly relaxing the feedback information that is required to achieve desirable outcomes.

Nash equilibrium strategies have the known weakness that they do not prescribe rational play in situations that are reached with zero probability according to the strategies themselves, for example, if players have made mistakes. Trembling-hand refinements---such as extensive-form perfect equilibria and quasi-perfect equilibria---remedy this problem in sound ways. Despite their appeal, they have not received attention in practice since no known algorithm for computing them scales beyond toy instances. In this paper, we design an exact polynomial-time algorithm for finding trembling-hand equilibria in zero-sum extensive-form games. It is several orders of magnitude faster than the best prior ones, numerically stable, and quickly solves game instances with tens of thousands of nodes in the game tree. It enables, for the first time, the use of trembling-hand refinements in practice.

Direct democracy, where each voter casts one vote, fails when the average voter competence falls below 50%. This happens in noisy settings when voters have limited information. Representative democracy, where voters choose representatives to vote, can be an elixir in both these situations. We introduce a mathematical model for studying representative democracy, in particular understanding the parameters of a representative democracy that gives maximum decision making capability. Our main result states that under general and natural conditions, 1. for fixed voting cost, the optimal number of representatives is linear; 2. for polynomial cost, the optimal number of representatives is logarithmic.

Optimization of parameterized policies for reinforcement learning (RL) is an important and challenging problem in artificial intelligence. Among the most common approaches are algorithms based on gradient ascent of a score function representing discounted return. In this paper, we examine the role of these policy gradient and actor-critic algorithms in partially-observable multiagent environments. We show several candidate policy update rules and relate them to a foundation of regret minimization and multiagent learning techniques for the one-shot and tabular cases, leading to previously unknown convergence guarantees. We apply our method to model-free multiagent reinforcement learning in adversarial sequential decision problems (zero-sum imperfect information games), using RL-style function approximation. We evaluate on commonly used benchmark Poker domains, showing performance against fixed policies and empirical convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in self-play with rates similar to or better than a baseline model-free algorithm for zero-sum games, without any domain-specific state space reductions.

Progress in machine learning is measured by careful evaluation on problems of outstanding common interest. However, the proliferation of benchmark suites and environments, adversarial attacks, and other complications has diluted the basic evaluation model by overwhelming researchers with choices. Deliberate or accidental cherry picking is increasingly likely, and designing well-balanced evaluation suites requires increasing effort. In this paper we take a step back and propose Nash averaging. The approach builds on a detailed analysis of the algebraic structure of evaluation in two basic scenarios: agent-vs-agent and agent-vs-task. The key strength of Nash averaging is that it automatically adapts to redundancies in evaluation data, so that results are not biased by the incorporation of easy tasks or weak agents. Nash averaging thus encourages maximally inclusive evaluation -- since there is no harm (computational cost aside) from including all available tasks and agents.

We study the problem of off-policy policy evaluation (OPPE) in RL. In contrast to prior work, we consider how to estimate both the individual policy value and average policy value accurately. We draw inspiration from recent work in causal reasoning, and propose a new finite sample generalization error bound for value estimates from MDP models. Using this upper bound as an objective, we develop a learning algorithm of an MDP model with a balanced representation, and show that our approach can yield substantially lower MSE in common synthetic benchmarks and a HIV treatment simulation domain.

In multiagent domains, coping with non-stationary agents that change behaviors from time to time is a challenging problem, where an agent is usually required to be able to quickly detect the other agent's policy during online interaction, and then adapt its own policy accordingly. This paper studies efficient policy detecting and reusing techniques when playing against non-stationary agents in Markov games. We propose a new deep BPR+ algorithm by extending the recent BPR+ algorithm with a neural network as the value-function approximator. To detect policy accurately, we propose the \textit{rectified belief model} taking advantage of the \textit{opponent model} to infer the other agent's policy from reward signals and its behaviors. Instead of directly storing individual policies as BPR+, we introduce \textit{distilled policy network} that serves as the policy library in BPR+, using policy distillation to achieve efficient online policy learning and reuse. Deep BPR+ inherits all the advantages of BPR+ and empirically shows better performance in terms of detection accuracy, cumulative rewards and speed of convergence compared to existing algorithms in complex Markov games with raw visual inputs.