Imitation learning algorithms can be used to learn a policy from expert demonstrations without access to a reward signal. However, most existing approaches are not applicable in multi-agent settings due to the existence of multiple (Nash) equilibria and non-stationary environments. We propose a new framework for multi-agent imitation learning for general Markov games, where we build upon a generalized notion of inverse reinforcement learning. We further introduce a practical multi-agent actor-critic algorithm with good empirical performance. Our method can be used to imitate complex behaviors in high-dimensional environments with multiple cooperative or competing agents.

Communication could potentially be an effective way for multi-agent cooperation. However, information sharing among all agents or in predefined communication architectures that existing methods adopt can be problematic. When there is a large number of agents, agents cannot differentiate valuable information that helps cooperative decision making from globally shared information. Therefore, communication barely helps, and could even impair the learning of multi-agent cooperation. Predefined communication architectures, on the other hand, restrict communication among agents and thus restrain potential cooperation. To tackle these difficulties, in this paper, we propose an attentional communication model that learns when communication is needed and how to integrate shared information for cooperative decision making. Our model leads to efficient and effective communication for large-scale multi-agent cooperation. Empirically, we show the strength of our model in a variety of cooperative scenarios, where agents are able to develop more coordinated and sophisticated strategies than existing methods.

Learning to cooperate with friends and compete with foes is a key component of multi-agent reinforcement learning. Typically to do so, one requires access to either a model of or interaction with the other agent(s). Here we show how to learn effective strategies for cooperation and competition in an asymmetric information game with no such model or interaction. Our approach is to encourage an agent to reveal or hide their intentions using an information-theoretic regularizer. We consider both the mutual information between goal and action given state, as well as the mutual information between goal and state. We show how to stochastically optimize these regularizers in a way that is easy to integrate with policy gradient reinforcement learning. Finally, we demonstrate that cooperative (competitive) policies learned with our approach lead to more (less) reward for a second agent in two simple asymmetric information games.

Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix games. Recently, multi-agent reinforcement learning has been applied to generalize social dilemma problems to temporally and spatially extended Markov games. However, this has not yet generated an agent that learns to cooperate in social dilemmas as humans do. A key insight is that many, but not all, human individuals have inequity averse social preferences. This promotes a particular resolution of the matrix game social dilemma wherein inequity-averse individuals are personally pro-social and punish defectors. Here we extend this idea to Markov games and show that it promotes cooperation in several types of sequential social dilemma, via a profitable interaction with policy learnability. In particular, we find that inequity aversion improves temporal credit assignment for the important class of intertemporal social dilemmas. These results help explain how large-scale cooperation may emerge and persist.

Generalization has been one of the major challenges for learning dynamics models in model-based reinforcement learning. However, previous work on action-conditioned dynamics prediction focuses on learning the pixel-level motion and thus does not generalize well to novel environments with different object layouts. In this paper, we present a novel object-oriented framework, called object-oriented dynamics predictor (OODP), which decomposes the environment into objects and predicts the dynamics of objects conditioned on both actions and object-to-object relations. It is an end-to-end neural network and can be trained in an unsupervised manner. To enable the generalization ability of dynamics learning, we design a novel CNN-based relation mechanism that is class-specific (rather than object-specific) and exploits the locality principle. Empirical results show that OODP significantly outperforms previous methods in terms of generalization over novel environments with various object layouts. OODP is able to learn from very few environments and accurately predict dynamics in a large number of unseen environments. In addition, OODP learns semantically and visually interpretable dynamics models.

Despite the success of single-agent reinforcement learning, multi-agent reinforcement learning(MARL) remains challenging due to complex interactions between agents. Motivated by decentralized applications such as sensor networks, swarm robotics, and power grids, we study policy evaluation in MARL, where agents with jointly observed state-action pairs and private local rewards collaborate to learn the value of a given policy. In this paper, we propose a double averaging scheme, where each agent iteratively performs averaging over both space and time to incorporate neighboring gradient information and local reward information, respectively. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges to the optimal solution at a global geometric rate. In particular, such an algorithm is built upon a primal-dual reformulation of the mean squared projected Bellman error minimization problem, which gives rise to a decentralized convex-concave saddle-point problem. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed double averaging primal-dual optimization algorithm is the first to achieve fast finite-time convergence on decentralized convex-concave saddle-point problems.

Recent milestones in equilibrium computation, such as the success of Libratus, show that it is possible to compute strong solutions to two-player zero-sum games in theory and practice. This is not the case for games with more than two players, which remain one of the main open challenges in computational game theory. This paper focuses on zero-sum games where a team of players faces an opponent, as is the case, for example, in Bridge, collusion in poker, and many non-recreational applications such as war, where the colluders do not have time or means of communicating during battle, collusion in bidding, where communication during the auction is illegal, and coordinated swindling in public. The possibility for the team members to communicate before game play—that is, coordinate their strategies ex ante—makes the use of behavioral strategies unsatisfactory. The reasons for this are closely related to the fact that the team can be represented as a single player with imperfect recall. We propose a new game representation, the realization form, that generalizes the sequence form but can also be applied to imperfect-recall games. Then, we use it to derive an auxiliary game that is equivalent to the original one. It provides a sound way to map the problem of finding an optimal ex-ante-correlated strategy for the team to the well-understood Nash equilibrium-finding problem in a (larger) two-player zero-sum perfect-recall game. By reasoning over the auxiliary game, we devise an anytime algorithm, fictitious team-play, that is guaranteed to converge to an optimal coordinated strategy for the team against an optimal opponent, and that is dramatically faster than the prior state-of-the-art algorithm for this problem.

Infants are experts at playing, with an amazing ability to generate novel structured behaviors in unstructured environments that lack clear extrinsic reward signals. We seek to mathematically formalize these abilities using a neural network that implements curiosity-driven intrinsic motivation. Using a simple but ecologically naturalistic simulated environment in which an agent can move and interact with objects it sees, we propose a "world-model" network that learns to predict the dynamic consequences of the agent's actions. Simultaneously, we train a separate explicit "self-model" that allows the agent to track the error map of its world-model. It then uses the self-model to adversarially challenge the developing world-model. We demonstrate that this policy causes the agent to explore novel and informative interactions with its environment, leading to the generation of a spectrum of complex behaviors, including ego-motion prediction, object attention, and object gathering. Moreover, the world-model that the agent learns supports improved performance on object dynamics prediction, detection, localization and recognition tasks. Taken together, our results are initial steps toward creating flexible autonomous agents that self-supervise in realistic physical environments.

Scaling decision theoretic planning to large multiagent systems is challenging due to uncertainty and partial observability in the environment. We focus on a multiagent planning model subclass, relevant to urban settings, where agent interactions are dependent on their ``collective influence'' on each other, rather than their identities. Unlike previous work, we address a general setting where system reward is not decomposable among agents. We develop collective actor-critic RL approaches for this setting, and address the problem of multiagent credit assignment, and computing low variance policy gradient estimates that result in faster convergence to high quality solutions. We also develop difference rewards based credit assignment methods for the collective setting. Empirically our new approaches provide significantly better solutions than previous methods in the presence of global rewards on two real world problems modeling taxi fleet optimization and multiagent patrolling, and a synthetic grid navigation domain.

A fundamental challenge in imperfect-information games is that states do not have well-defined values. As a result, depth-limited search algorithms used in single-agent settings and perfect-information games do not apply. This paper introduces a principled way to conduct depth-limited solving in imperfect-information games by allowing the opponent to choose among a number of strategies for the remainder of the game at the depth limit. Each one of these strategies results in a different set of values for leaf nodes. This forces an agent to be robust to the different strategies an opponent may employ. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach by building a master-level heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em poker AI that defeats two prior top agents using only a 4-core CPU and 16 GB of memory. Developing such a powerful agent would have previously required a supercomputer.