In this article, we provide and overview of what we consider to be some of the most pressing research questions facing the fields of artificial intelligence (AI) and computational intelligence (CI); with the latter focusing on algorithms that are inspired by various natural phenomena. We demarcate these questions using five unique Rs - namely, (i) rationalizability, (ii) resilience, (iii) reproducibility, (iv) realism, and (v) responsibility. Notably, just as air serves as the basic element of biological life, the term AIR5 - cumulatively referring to the five aforementioned Rs - is introduced herein to mark some of the basic elements of artificial life (supporting the sustained growth of AI and CI). A brief summary of each of the Rs is presented, highlighting their relevance as pillars of future research in this arena.

Today's Technology world is improving day by day and therefore, we hear about numbers of Latest Technologies coming into the Tech World with much more benefits which makes our living life and our Business life much more easier than ever. Regarding this, today we are going to learn a little about AI (Artificial Intelligence). It is a Noun; the theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages. What does AI (Artificial Intelligence) Mean? The modern definition of artificial intelligence (or AI) is "the study and design of intelligent agents" where an intelligent agent is a system that perceives its environment and takes actions which maximizes its chances of success.

Japan is launching multiple missions to explore the mysteries of the solar system in the coming years, joining hands with the European Union and countries such as India to compete with space superpowers such as the United States and Russia. The ultimate goal of space exploration is "to expand the areas of activities for humans and find another habitable planet. I believe there is a possibility that we can colonize Mars," said Hitoshi Kuninaka, a vice president of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). In 2018, Japan made history by landing two small rovers from the space probe Hayabusa2 on the surface of an asteroid 300 million kilometers from Earth. Hayabusa2's touchdown on the Ryugu asteroid is expected in late January this year.

Since the birth of the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers worked on creating ever capable machines, but with recent success in multiple subdomains of AI [1-7] safety and security of such systems and predicted future superintelligences [8, 9] has become paramount [10, 11]. While many diverse safety mechanisms are being investigated [12, 13], the ultimate goal is to align AI with goals, values and preferences of its users which is likely to include all of humanity. Value alignment problem [14], can be decomposed into three sub-problems, namely: personal value extraction from individual persons, combination of such personal preferences in a way, which is acceptable to all, and finally production of an intelligent system, which implements combined values of humanity. A number of approaches for extracting values [15-17] from people have been investigated, including inverse reinforcement learning [18, 19], brain scanning [20], value learning from literature [21], and understanding of human cognitive limitations [22]. Assessment of potential for success for particular techniques of value extraction is beyond the scope of this paper and we simply assume that one of the current methods, their combination, or some future approach will allow us to accurately learn values of given people. Likewise, we will not directly address how, once learned, such values can be represented/encoded in computer systems for storage and processing.

Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix games. Recently, multi-agent reinforcement learning has been applied to generalize social dilemma problems to temporally and spatially extended Markov games. However, this has not yet generated an agent that learns to cooperate in social dilemmas as humans do. A key insight is that many, but not all, human individuals have inequity averse social preferences. This promotes a particular resolution of the matrix game social dilemma wherein inequity-averse individuals are personally pro-social and punish defectors. Here we extend this idea to Markov games and show that it promotes cooperation in several types of sequential social dilemma, via a profitable interaction with policy learnability. In particular, we find that inequity aversion improves temporal credit assignment for the important class of intertemporal social dilemmas. These results help explain how large-scale cooperation may emerge and persist.

Interactive partially observable Markov decision processes (I-POMDPs) provide a principled framework for planning and acting in a partially observable, stochastic and multi-agent environment. It extends POMDPs to multi-agent settings by including models of other agents in the state space and forming a hierarchical belief structure. In order to predict other agents' actions using I-POMDPs, we propose an approach that effectively uses Bayesian inference and sequential Monte Carlo sampling to learn others' intentional models which ascribe to them beliefs, preferences and rationality in action selection. Empirical results show that our algorithm accurately learns models of the other agent and has superior performance than methods that use subintentional models. Our approach serves as a generalized Bayesian learning algorithm that learns other agents' beliefs, strategy levels, and transition, observation and reward functions.

A fundamental challenge in imperfect-information games is that states do not have well-defined values. As a result, depth-limited search algorithms used in single-agent settings and perfect-information games do not apply. This paper introduces a principled way to conduct depth-limited solving in imperfect-information games by allowing the opponent to choose among a number of strategies for the remainder of the game at the depth limit. Each one of these strategies results in a different set of values for leaf nodes. This forces an agent to be robust to the different strategies an opponent may employ. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach by building a master-level heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em poker AI that defeats two prior top agents using only a 4-core CPU and 16 GB of memory. Developing such a powerful agent would have previously required a supercomputer.

We consider a game-theoretical multi-agent learning problem where the feedback information can be lost during the learning process and rewards are given by a broad class of games known as variationally stable games. We propose a simple variant of the classical online gradient descent algorithm, called reweighted online gradient descent (ROGD) and show that in variationally stable games, if each agent adopts ROGD, then almost sure convergence to the set of Nash equilibria is guaranteed, even when the feedback loss is asynchronous and arbitrarily corrrelated among agents. We then extend the framework to deal with unknown feedback loss probabilities by using an estimator (constructed from past data) in its replacement. Finally, we further extend the framework to accomodate both asynchronous loss and stochastic rewards and establish that multi-agent ROGD learning still converges to the set of Nash equilibria in such settings. Together, these results contribute to the broad lanscape of multi-agent online learning by significantly relaxing the feedback information that is required to achieve desirable outcomes.

Progress in machine learning is measured by careful evaluation on problems of outstanding common interest. However, the proliferation of benchmark suites and environments, adversarial attacks, and other complications has diluted the basic evaluation model by overwhelming researchers with choices. Deliberate or accidental cherry picking is increasingly likely, and designing well-balanced evaluation suites requires increasing effort. In this paper we take a step back and propose Nash averaging. The approach builds on a detailed analysis of the algebraic structure of evaluation in two basic scenarios: agent-vs-agent and agent-vs-task. The key strength of Nash averaging is that it automatically adapts to redundancies in evaluation data, so that results are not biased by the incorporation of easy tasks or weak agents. Nash averaging thus encourages maximally inclusive evaluation -- since there is no harm (computational cost aside) from including all available tasks and agents.

There has been tremendous recent progress on equilibrium-finding algorithms for zero-sum imperfect-information extensive-form games, but there has been a puzzling gap between theory and practice. First-order methods have significantly better theoretical convergence rates than any counterfactual-regret minimization (CFR) variant. Despite this, CFR variants have been favored in practice. Experiments with first-order methods have only been conducted on small- and medium-sized games because those methods are complicated to implement in this setting, and because CFR variants have been enhanced extensively for over a decade they perform well in practice. In this paper we show that a particular first-order method, a state-of-the-art variant of the excessive gap technique---instantiated with the dilated entropy distance function---can efficiently solve large real-world problems competitively with CFR and its variants. We show this on large endgames encountered by the Libratus poker AI, which recently beat top human poker specialist professionals at no-limit Texas hold'em. We show experimental results on our variant of the excessive gap technique as well as a prior version. We introduce a numerically friendly implementation of the smoothed best response computation associated with first-order methods for extensive-form game solving. We present, to our knowledge, the first GPU implementation of a first-order method for extensive-form games. We present comparisons of several excessive gap technique and CFR variants.