We consider the problem of using logged data to make predictions about what would happen if we changed the `rules of the game' in a multi-agent system. This task is difficult because in many cases we observe actions individuals take but not their private information or their full reward functions. In addition, agents are strategic, so when the rules change, they will also change their actions. Existing methods (e.g. structural estimation, inverse reinforcement learning) make counterfactual predictions by constructing a model of the game, adding the assumption that agents' behavior comes from optimizing given some goals, and then inverting observed actions to learn agent's underlying utility function (a.k.a. type). Once the agent types are known, making counterfactual predictions amounts to solving for the equilibrium of the counterfactual environment. This approach imposes heavy assumptions such as rationality of the agents being observed, correctness of the analyst's model of the environment/parametric form of the agents' utility functions, and various other conditions to make point identification possible. We propose a method for analyzing the sensitivity of counterfactual conclusions to violations of these assumptions. We refer to this method as robust multi-agent counterfactual prediction (RMAC). We apply our technique to investigating the robustness of counterfactual claims for classic environments in market design: auctions, school choice, and social choice. Importantly, we show RMAC can be used in regimes where point identification is impossible (e.g. those which have multiple equilibria or non-injective maps from type distributions to outcomes).

In the light of ongoing progresses of research on artificial intelligent systems exhibiting a steadily increasing problem-solving ability, the identification of practicable solutions to the value alignment problem in AGI Safety is becoming a matter of urgency. In this context, one preeminent challenge that has been addressed by multiple researchers is the adequate formulation of utility functions or equivalents reliably capturing human ethical conceptions. However, the specification of suitable utility functions harbors the risk of "perverse instantiation" for which no final consensus on responsible proactive countermeasures has been achieved so far. Amidst this background, we propose a novel socio-technological ethical framework denoted Augmented Utilitarianism which directly alleviates the perverse instantiation problem. We elaborate on how augmented by AI and more generally science and technology, it might allow a society to craft and update ethical utility functions while jointly undergoing a dynamical ethical enhancement. Further, we elucidate the need to consider embodied simulations in the design of utility functions for AGIs aligned with human values. Finally, we discuss future prospects regarding the usage of the presented scientifically grounded ethical framework and mention possible challenges.

Epistemic planning --- planning with knowledge and belief --- is essential in many multi-agent and human-agent interaction domains. Most state-of-the-art epistemic planners solve this problem by compiling to propositional classical planning, for example, generating all possible knowledge atoms, or compiling epistemic formula to normal forms. However, these methods become computationally infeasible as problems grow. In this paper, we decompose epistemic planning by delegating reasoning about epistemic formula to an external solver. We do this by modelling the problem using \emph{functional STRIPS}, which is more expressive than standard STRIPS and supports the use of external, black-box functions within action models. Exploiting recent work that demonstrates the relationship between what an agent `sees' and what it knows, we allow modellers to provide new implementations of externals functions. These define what agents see in their environment, allowing new epistemic logics to be defined without changing the planner. As a result, it increases the capability and flexibility of the epistemic model itself, and avoids the exponential pre-compilation step. We ran evaluations on well-known epistemic planning benchmarks to compare with an existing state-of-the-art planner, and on new scenarios based on different external functions. The results show that our planner scales significantly better than the state-of-the-art planner against which we compared, and can express problems more succinctly.

We present Habitat, a new platform for research in embodied artificial intelligence (AI). Habitat enables training embodied agents (virtual robots) in highly efficient photorealistic 3D simulation, before transferring the learned skills to reality. Specifically, Habitat consists of the following: 1. Habitat-Sim: a flexible, high-performance 3D simulator with configurable agents, multiple sensors, and generic 3D dataset handling (with built-in support for SUNCG, Matterport3D, Gibson datasets). Habitat-Sim is fast -- when rendering a scene from the Matterport3D dataset, Habitat-Sim achieves several thousand frames per second (fps) running single-threaded, and can reach over 10,000 fps multi-process on a single GPU, which is orders of magnitude faster than the closest simulator. 2. Habitat-API: a modular high-level library for end-to-end development of embodied AI algorithms -- defining embodied AI tasks (e.g. navigation, instruction following, question answering), configuring and training embodied agents (via imitation or reinforcement learning, or via classic SLAM), and benchmarking using standard metrics. These large-scale engineering contributions enable us to answer scientific questions requiring experiments that were till now impracticable or `merely' impractical. Specifically, in the context of point-goal navigation (1) we revisit the comparison between learning and SLAM approaches from two recent works and find evidence for the opposite conclusion -- that learning outperforms SLAM, if scaled to total experience far surpassing that of previous investigations, and (2) we conduct the first cross-dataset generalization experiments {train, test} x {Matterport3D, Gibson} for multiple sensors {blind, RGB, RGBD, D} and find that only agents with depth (D) sensors generalize across datasets. We hope that our open-source platform and these findings will advance research in embodied AI.

We explore deep Reinforcement Learning(RL) algorithms for scalping trading and knew that there is no appropriate trading gym and agent examples. Thus we propose gym and agent like Open AI gym in finance. Not only that, we introduce new RL framework based on our hybrid algorithm which leverages between supervised learning and RL algorithm and uses meaningful observations such order book and settlement data from experience watching scalpers trading. That is very crucial information for traders behavior to be decided. To feed these data into our model, we use spatio-temporal convolution layer, called Conv3D for order book data and temporal CNN, called Conv1D for settlement data. Those are preprocessed by episode filter we developed. Agent consists of four sub agents divided to clarify their own goal to make best decision. Also, we adopted value and policy based algorithm to our framework. With these features, we could make agent mimic scalpers as much as possible. In many fields, RL algorithm has already begun to transcend human capabilities in many domains. This approach could be a starting point to beat human in the financial stock market, too and be a good reference for anyone who wants to design RL algorithm in real world domain. Finally, weexperiment our framework and gave you experiment progress.

Negotiation is a form of interaction in which a group of agents with conflicting interests and a desire to This paper introduces a new Negotiating Agent for cooperate try to reach a mutually acceptable agreement automated negotiation on continuous domains and on an object of negotiation [2]. The agents without considering a specified deadline. The agent explore solutions according to a predetermined protocol bidding strategy relies on Monte Carlo Tree Search, in order to find an acceptable agreement. Being which is a trendy method since it has been used with widely used in economic domains and with the rise of success on games with high branching factor such as e-commerce applications, the question of automating Go. It uses two opponent modeling techniques for negotiation has gained a lot of interest in the field of its bidding strategy and its utility: Gaussian process artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems.

With the development of computational intelligence [1, 2, 19, 26], nature-inspired algorithms have been shown to be effective and thus become widely used for various optimization problems [15, 17, 2]. However, there is still a significant gap between theory and practice. Though the applications of algorithms are very successful, the relevant fundamental theory lacks behind or no theory at all. For example, the bat algorithm (BA), developed by Xin-She Yang in 2010 [3, 4], has been shown to very efficient in practice, but there is no mathematical theory for analyzing this algorithm. In fact, most of the swarm intelligence based algorithms for computational intelligence have no or little theoretical analyses, except for a few algorithms, such as the well known particle swarm optimization [10, 12, 25, 27] and genetic algorithms [16, 34]. Though we know these algorithms can work well in practice, we rarely understand why they work so well and under what conditions or parameter ranges. These key challenges require further in-depth theoretical studies.

This work addresses the coordination problem of multiple robots with the goal of finding specific hazardous targets in an unknown area and dealing with them cooperatively. The desired behaviour for the robotic system entails multiple requirements, which may also be conflicting. The paper presents the problem as a constrained bi-objective optimization problem in which mobile robots must perform two specific tasks of exploration and at same time cooperation and coordination for disarming the hazardous targets. These objectives are opposed goals, in which one may be favored, but only at the expense of the other. Therefore, a good trade-off must be found. For this purpose, a nature-inspired approach and an analytical mathematical model to solve this problem considering a single equivalent weighted objective function are presented. The results of proposed coordination model, simulated in a two dimensional terrain, are showed in order to assess the behaviour of the proposed solution to tackle this problem. We have analyzed the performance of the approach and the influence of the weights of the objective function under different conditions: static and dynamic. In this latter situation, the robots may fail under the stringent limited budget of energy or for hazardous events. The paper concludes with a critical discussion of the experimental results.

Recently, there have been several high-profile achievements of agents learning to play games against humans and beat them. We consider an alternative approach that instead addresses game design for a better player experience by training human-like game agents. Specifically, we study the problem of training game agents in service of the development processes of the game developers that design, build, and operate modern games. We highlight some of the ways in which we think intelligent agents can assist game developers to understand their games, and even to build them. Our early results using the proposed agent framework mark a few steps toward addressing the unique challenges that game developers face.

Because preferences naturally arise and play an important role in many real-life decisions, they are at the backbone of various fields. In particular preferences are increasingly used in almost all matching procedures-based applications. In this work we highlight the benefit of using AI insights on preferences in a large scale application, namely the French Admission Post-Baccalaureat Platform (APB). Each year APB allocates hundreds of thousands first year applicants to universities. This is done automatically by matching applicants preferences to university seats. In practice, APB can be unable to distinguish between applicants which leads to the introduction of random selection. This has created frustration in the French public since randomness, even used as a last mean does not fare well with the republican egalitarian principle. In this work, we provide a solution to this problem. We take advantage of recent AI Preferences Theory results to show how to enhance APB in order to improve expressiveness of applicants preferences and reduce their exposure to random decisions.