Values are things that are important to us. Actions activate values - they either go against our values or they promote our values. Values themselves can either be conforming or conflicting depending on the action that is taken. In this short paper, we argue that values may be classified as one of two types - conflicting and inherently conflicting values. They are distinguished by the fact that the latter in some sense can be thought of as being independent of actions. This allows us to do two things: i) check whether a set of values is consistent and ii) check whether it is in conflict with other sets of values.

We study agents communicating over an underlying network by exchanging messages, in order to optimize their individual regret in a common nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problem. We derive regret minimization algorithms that guarantee for each agent $v$ an individual expected regret of \[ \widetilde{O}\left(\sqrt{\left(1+\frac{K}{\left|\mathcal{N}\left(v\right)\right|}\right)T}\right), \] where $T$ is the number of time steps, $K$ is the number of actions and $\mathcal{N}\left(v\right)$ is the set of neighbors of agent $v$ in the communication graph. We present algorithms both for the case that the communication graph is known to all the agents, and for the case that the graph is unknown. When the graph is unknown, each agent knows only the set of its neighbors and an upper bound on the total number of agents. The individual regret between the models differs only by a logarithmic factor. Our work resolves an open problem from [Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2019b].

Recently, there has been increasing interest in developing distributed machine learning algorithms. Notable examples include distributed linear regression [1], multi-arm bandit [2], reinforcement learning (RL) [3], and deep learning [4]. Such algorithms have promising applications in large-scale networks, such as social platforms, online economic networks, cyber-physical systems, and Internet of Things, primarily because in such a complex network, it is impossible to collect all the information at the same point and each component of the network may not be willing to share its private information due to privacy issues. Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) problems have recently received increasing attention. In general, MARL problems are investigated in settings that are either collaborative, competitive, or a mixture of the two. For collaborative MARL, the most rudimentary framework is the canonical multi-agent Markov decision process [5, 6], where the agents share a common reward function that is determined by the joint actions of all agents. Another notable framework for collaborative MARL is the team Markov game model, also with a shared reward function among agents [7, 8]. These two frameworks were then extended to the setting where agents are allowed to have heterogeneous reward functions[3,9-12], collaborating with the goal of maximizing the long-term return corresponding to the team averaged reward.

Experience Management studies AI systems that automatically adapt interactive experiences such as games to tailor to specific players and to fulfill design goals. Although it has been explored for several decades, existing work in experience management has mostly focused on single-player experiences. This paper is a first attempt at identifying the main challenges to expand EM to multi-player/multi-user games or experiences. We also make connections to related areas where solutions for similar problems have been proposed (especially group recommender systems) and discusses the potential impact and applications of multi-player EM.

The theory of Mean Field Games (MFG) allows characterizing the Nash equilibria of an infinite number of identical players, and provides a convenient and relevant mathematical framework for the study of games with a large number of agents in interaction. Until very recently, the literature only considered Nash equilibria between fully informed players. In this paper, we focus on the realistic setting where agents with no prior information on the game learn their best response policy through repeated experience. We study the convergence to a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a fictitious play iterative learning scheme where the best response is approximately computed, typically by a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm. Notably, we show for the first time convergence of model free learning algorithms towards non-stationary MFG equilibria, relying only on classical assumptions on the MFG dynamics. We illustrate our theoretical results with a numerical experiment in continuous action-space setting, where the best response of the iterative fictitious play scheme is computed with a deep RL algorithm.

Recent work in decentralized, schedule-driven traffic control has demonstrated the ability to improve the efficiency of traffic flow in complex urban road networks. In this approach, a scheduling agent is associated with each intersection. Each agent senses the traffic approaching its intersection and in real-time constructs a schedule that minimizes the cumulative wait time of vehicles approaching the intersection over the current look-ahead horizon. In order to achieve network level coordination in a scalable manner, scheduling agents communicate only with their direct neighbors. Each time an agent generates a new intersection schedule it communicates its expected outflows to its downstream neighbors as a prediction of future demand and these outflows are appended to the downstream agent's locally perceived demand. In this paper, we extend this basic coordination algorithm to additionally incorporate the complementary flow of information reflective of an intersection's current congestion level to its upstream neighbors. We present an asynchronous decentralized algorithm for updating intersection schedules and congestion level estimates based on these bi-directional information flows. By relating this algorithm to the self-optimized decision making of the basic operation, we are able to approach network-wide optimality and reduce inefficiency due to strictly self-interested intersection control decisions.

Continual learning refers to the ability of a biological or artificial system to seamlessly learn from continuous streams of information while preventing catastrophic forgetting, i.e., a condition in which new incoming information strongly interferes with previously learned representations. Since it is unrealistic to provide artificial agents with all the necessary prior knowledge to effectively operate in real-world conditions, they must exhibit a rich set of learning capabilities enabling them to interact in complex environments with the aim to process and make sense of continuous streams of (often uncertain) information. While the vast majority of continual learning models are designed to alleviate catastrophic forgetting on simplified classification tasks, here we focus on continual learning for autonomous agents and robots required to operate in much more challenging experimental settings. In particular, we discuss well-established biological learning factors such as developmental and curriculum learning, transfer learning, and intrinsic motivation and their computational counterparts for modeling the progressive acquisition of increasingly complex knowledge and skills in a continual fashion.

The key for effective interaction in many multiagent applications is to reason explicitly about the behaviour of other agents, in the form of a hypothesised behaviour. While there exist several methods for the construction of a behavioural hypothesis, there is currently no universal theory which would allow an agent to contemplate the correctness of a hypothesis. In this work, we present a novel algorithm which decides this question in the form of a frequentist hypothesis test. The algorithm allows for multiple metrics in the construction of the test statistic and learns its distribution during the interaction process, with asymptotic correctness guarantees. We present results from a comprehensive set of experiments, demonstrating that the algorithm achieves high accuracy and scalability at low computational costs.

A novel approach is provided for evaluating the benefits and burdens from vehicle modularity in fleets/units through the analysis of a game theoretical model of the competition between autonomous vehicle fleets in an attacker-defender game. We present an approach to obtain the heuristic operational strategies through fitting a decision tree on high-fidelity simulation results of an intelligent agent-based model. A multi-stage game theoretical model is also created for decision making considering military resources and impacts of past decisions. Nash equilibria of the operational strategy are revealed, and their characteristics are explored. The benefits of fleet modularity are also analyzed by comparing the results of the decision making process under diverse operational situations.

The recent success of single-agent reinforcement learning (RL) encourages the exploration of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), which is more challenging due to the interactions among different agents. In this paper, we consider a voting-based MARL problem, in which the agents vote to make group decisions and the goal is to maximize the globally averaged returns. To this end, we formulate the MARL problem based on the linear programming form of the policy optimization problem and propose a distributed primal-dual algorithm to obtain the optimal solution. We also propose a voting mechanism through which the distributed learning achieves the same sub-linear convergence rate as centralized learning. In other words, the distributed decision making does not slow down the global consensus to optimal. We also verify the convergence of our proposed algorithm with numerical simulations and conduct case studies in practical multi-agent systems.