I assume here that this is a worthy research program, and that anybody reading this has a minimal degree of interest in it. Lazaridou and Baroni [2020] provide a recent overview of the area. Both on the phylogenetic and on the ontogenetic scale, human language does not appear all at once in fully-formed garb. Most linguists agree that, as a species, we went through a protolanguage stage involving a small set of simple constructions (Bickerton [2014], Brentari and Goldin-Meadow [2017], Hurford [2014], Jackendoff and Wittenberg [2014]). Children definitely pass through fairly systematic protolanguage phases, such as the "two-word" stage (Bloom

Interest in the field of Explainable Artificial Intelligence has been growing for decades, and has accelerated recently. As Artificial Intelligence models have become more complex, and often more opaque, with the incorporation of complex machine learning techniques, explainability has become more critical. Recently, researchers have been investigating and tackling explainability with a user-centric focus, looking for explanations to consider trustworthiness, comprehensibility, explicit provenance, and context-awareness. In this chapter, we leverage our survey of explanation literature in Artificial Intelligence and closely related fields and use these past efforts to generate a set of explanation types that we feel reflect the expanded needs of explanation for today's artificial intelligence applications. We define each type and provide an example question that would motivate the need for this style of explanation. We believe this set of explanation types will help future system designers in their generation and prioritization of requirements and further help generate explanations that are better aligned to users' and situational needs.

The coordination and cooperation of all the stakeholders involved is a decisive point for the control and the resolution of problems. In the insecurity events, the resolution should refer to a plan that defines a general framework of the procedures to be undertaken and the instructions to be complied with; also, a more precise process must be defined by the actors to deal with the case represented by the particular problem of the current situation. Indeed, this process has to cope with a dynamic, unstable and unpredictable environment, due to the heterogeneity and multiplicity of stakeholders, and finally due to their possible geographical distribution. In this article, we will present the first steps of validation of a collaborative decision-making approach in the context of crisis situations such as road accidents. This approach is based on ontologies and multi-agent systems.

For effective matching of resources (e.g., taxis, food, bikes, shopping items) to customer demand, aggregation systems have been extremely successful. In aggregation systems, a central entity (e.g., Uber, Food Panda, Ofo) aggregates supply (e.g., drivers, delivery personnel) and matches demand to supply on a continuous basis (sequential decisions). Due to the objective of the central entity to maximize its profits, individual suppliers get sacrificed thereby creating incentive for individuals to leave the system. In this paper, we consider the problem of learning approximate equilibrium solutions (win-win solutions) in aggregation systems, so that individuals have an incentive to remain in the aggregation system. Unfortunately, such systems have thousands of agents and have to consider demand uncertainty and the underlying problem is a (Partially Observable) Stochastic Game. Given the significant complexity of learning or planning in a stochastic game, we make three key contributions: (a) To exploit infinitesimally small contribution of each agent and anonymity (reward and transitions between agents are dependent on agent counts) in interactions, we represent this as a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) problem that builds on insights from non-atomic congestion games model; (b) We provide a novel variance reduction mechanism for moving joint solution towards Nash Equilibrium that exploits the infinitesimally small contribution of each agent; and finally (c) We provide detailed results on three different domains to demonstrate the utility of our approach in comparison to state-of-the-art methods.

Multi-agent path finding (MAPF) algorithms are offline methods intended to find conflict-free paths for more than one agent. However, for many real-life applications, this problem description is inadequate for representing the needs of the domain. To address this issue we worked on a lifelong variation in which agents can have more than one ordered destination. New destinations can be inserted into the system anytime after the initial job-assignment has been made, and these new destinations must also be assigned to agents, and the time of visiting the new destination must also be determined. We called this Lifelong Multi-Agent Path Finding with Multiple Delivery Locations (MAPF-MD). To solve this problem we introduced the Multiple Delivery Conflict-Based Search algorithm (MD-DCBS). We used D*-lite in the low-level search of CBS to benefit from the D*-lite's incremental nature in achieving a performance increase in the CBS search. To handle multiple delivery locations we define multiple D*-lite instances for each agent. The aggregations of all of the paths produced by the D*-lite instances constitute the path of that agent. After that we run CBS on aggregated paths. In this problem we introduced the Multiple Delivery Conflict-Based Search algorithm (MD-DCBS). We used D*-lite in the low-level search of CBS to benefit from the D*-lite's incremental nature in achieving a performance increase in the CBS search. To handle multiple delivery locations we define multiple D*-lite instances for each agent. The aggregations of all of the paths produced by the D*-lite instances constitute the path of that agent. After that we run CBS on aggregated paths. We have shown that this version solves MAPF-MD instances correctly. We also proposed multiple job-assignment heuristics to generate low-total-cost solutions and determined the best performing method amongst them.

Artificial intelligence (AI) may play an increasingly essentialFootnote 1 role in criminal acts in the future. Criminal acts are defined here as any act (or omission) constituting an offence punishable under English criminal law,Footnote 2 without loss of generality to jurisdictions that similarly define crime. Evidence of "AI-Crime" (AIC) is provided by two (theoretical) research experiments. In the first one, two computational social scientists (Seymour and Tully 2016) used AI as an instrument to convince social media users to click on phishing links within mass-produced messages. Because each message was constructed using machine learning techniques applied to users' past behaviours and public profiles, the content was tailored to each individual, thus camouflaging the intention behind each message. If the potential victim had clicked on the phishing link and filled in the subsequent web-form, then (in real-world circumstances) a criminal would have obtained personal and private information that could be used for theft and fraud. AI-fuelled crime may also impact commerce. In the second experiment, three computer scientists (Martínez-Miranda et al. 2016) simulated a market and found that trading agents could learn and execute a "profitable" market manipulation campaign comprising a set of deceitful false-orders. These two experiments show that AI provides a feasible and fundamentally novel threat, in the form of AIC. The importance of AIC as a distinct phenomenon has not yet been acknowledged. The literature on AI's ethical and social implications focuses on regulating and controlling AI's civil uses, rather than considering its possible role in crime (Kerr 2004).

Decentralized multiagent planning raises many challenges, such as adaption to changing environments inexplicable by the agent's own behavior, coordination from noisy sensor inputs like lidar, cooperation without knowing other agents' intents. To address these challenges, we present hierarchical predictive planning (HPP) for decentralized multiagent navigation tasks. HPP learns prediction models for itself and other teammates, and uses the prediction models to propose and evaluate navigation goals that complete the cooperative task without explicit coordination. To learn the prediction models, HPP observes other agents' behavior and learns to maps own sensors to predicted locations of other agents. HPP then uses the cross-entropy method to iteratively propose, evaluate, and improve navigation goals, under assumption that all agents in the team share a common objective. HPP removes the need for a centralized operator (i.e. robots determine their own actions without coordinating their beliefs or plans) and can be trained and easily transferred to real world environments. The results show that HPP generalizes to new environments including real-world robot team. It is also 33x more sample efficient and performs better in complex environments compared to a baseline. The video and website for this paper can be found at https://youtu.be/-LqgfksqNH8 and https://sites.google.com/view/multiagent-hpp.

We explore deep reinforcement learning methods for multi-agent domains. We begin by analyzing the difficulty of traditional algorithms in the multi-agent case: Q-learning is challenged by an inherent non-stationarity of the environment, while policy gradient suffers from a variance that increases as the number of agents grows. We then present an adaptation of actor-critic methods that considers action policies of other agents and is able to successfully learn policies that require complex multi-agent coordination. Additionally, we introduce a training regimen utilizing an ensemble of policies for each agent that leads to more robust multi-agent policies. We show the strength of our approach compared to existing methods in cooperative as well as competitive scenarios, where agent populations are able to discover various physical and informational coordination strategies.

The European Parliament's proposal to create a new legal status for artificial intelligence (AI) and robots brought into focus the idea of electronic legal personhood. This discussion, however, is hugely controversial. While some scholars argue that the proposed status could contribute to the coherence of the legal system, others say that it is neither beneficial nor desirable. Notwithstanding this prospect, we conducted a survey (N=3315) to understand online users' perceptions of the legal personhood of AI and robots. We observed how the participants assigned responsibility, awareness, and punishment to AI, robots, humans, and various entities that could be held liable under existing doctrines. We also asked whether the participants thought that punishing electronic agents fulfills the same legal and social functions as human punishment. The results suggest that even though people do not assign any mental state to electronic agents and are not willing to grant AI and robots physical independence or assets, which are the prerequisites of criminal or civil liability, they do consider them responsible for their actions and worthy of punishment. The participants also did not think that punishment or liability of these entities would achieve the primary functions of punishment, leading to what we define as the punishment gap. Therefore, before we recognize electronic legal personhood, we must first discuss proper methods of satisfying the general population's demand for punishment.

AlphaZero has been very successful in many games. Unfortunately, it still consumes a huge amount of computing resources, the majority of which is spent in self-play. Hyperparameter tuning exacerbates the training cost since each hyperparameter configuration requires its own time to train one run, during which it will generate its own self-play records. As a result, multiple runs are usually needed for different hyperparameter configurations. This paper proposes using population based training (PBT) to help tune hyperparameters dynamically and improve strength during training time. Another significant advantage is that this method requires a single run only, while incurring a small additional time cost, since the time for generating self-play records remains unchanged though the time for optimization is increased following the AlphaZero training algorithm. In our experiments for 9x9 Go, the PBT method is able to achieve a higher win rate for 9x9 Go than the baselines, each with its own hyperparameter configuration and trained individually. For 19x19 Go, with PBT, we are able to obtain improvements in playing strength. Specifically, the PBT agent can obtain up to 74% win rate against ELF OpenGo, an open-source state-of-the-art AlphaZero program using a neural network of a comparable capacity. This is compared to a saturated non-PBT agent, which achieves a win rate of 47% against ELF OpenGo under the same circumstances.