Human trust in automation plays an essential role in interactions between humans and automation. While a lack of trust can lead to a human's disuse of automation, over-trust can result in a human trusting a faulty autonomous system which could have negative consequences for the human. Therefore, human trust should be calibrated to optimize human-machine interactions with respect to context-specific performance objectives. In this article, we present a probabilistic framework to model and calibrate a human's trust and workload dynamics during his/her interaction with an intelligent decision-aid system. This calibration is achieved by varying the automation's transparency--the amount and utility of information provided to the human. The parameterization of the model is conducted using behavioral data collected through human-subject experiments, and three feedback control policies are experimentally validated and compared against a non-adaptive decision-aid system. The results show that human-automation team performance can be optimized when the transparency is dynamically updated based on the proposed control policy. This framework is a first step toward widespread design and implementation of real-time adaptive automation for use in human-machine interactions. Automation has become prevalent in the everyday lives of humans. However, despite significant technological advancements, human supervision and intervention are still necessary in almost all sectors of automation, ranging from manufacturing and transportation to disaster-management and healthcare [1]. Therefore, we expect that the future will be built around human-agent collectives [2] that will require efficient and successful interaction and coordination between humans and machines. It is well established that to achieve this coordination, human trust in automation plays a central role [3]-[5]. For example, the benefits of automation are lost when humans override automation due to a fundamental lack of trust [3], [5], and accidents may occur due to human mistrust in such systems [6]. Therefore, trust should be appropriately calibrated to avoid disuse or misuse of automation [4].

In this paper, we present a reinforcement learning approach to designing a control policy for a "leader'' agent that herds a swarm of "follower'' agents, via repulsive interactions, as quickly as possible to a target probability distribution over a strongly connected graph. The leader control policy is a function of the swarm distribution, which evolves over time according to a mean-field model in the form of an ordinary difference equation. The dependence of the policy on agent populations at each graph vertex, rather than on individual agent activity, simplifies the observations required by the leader and enables the control strategy to scale with the number of agents. Two Temporal-Difference learning algorithms, SARSA and Q-Learning, are used to generate the leader control policy based on the follower agent distribution and the leader's location on the graph. A simulation environment corresponding to a grid graph with 4 vertices was used to train and validate the control policies for follower agent populations ranging from 10 to 100. Finally, the control policies trained on 100 simulated agents were used to successfully redistribute a physical swarm of 10 small robots to a target distribution among 4 spatial regions.

In the present study, six meta-heuristic schemes are hybridized with artificial neural network (ANN), adaptive neuro-fuzzy interface system (ANFIS), and support vector machine (SVM), to predict monthly groundwater level (GWL), evaluate uncertainty analysis of predictions and spatial variation analysis. The six schemes, including grasshopper optimization algorithm (GOA), cat swarm optimization (CSO), weed algorithm (WA), genetic algorithm (GA), krill algorithm (KA), and particle swarm optimization (PSO), were used to hybridize for improving the performance of ANN, SVM, and ANFIS models. Groundwater level (GWL) data of Ardebil plain (Iran) for a period of 144 months were selected to evaluate the hybrid models. The pre-processing technique of principal component analysis (PCA) was applied to reduce input combinations from monthly time series up to 12-month prediction intervals. The results showed that the ANFIS-GOA was superior to the other hybrid models for predicting GWL in the first piezometer and third piezometer in the testing stage. The performance of hybrid models with optimization algorithms was far better than that of classical ANN, ANFIS, and SVM models without hybridization. The percent of improvements in the ANFIS-GOA versus standalone ANFIS in piezometer 10 were 14.4%, 3%, 17.8%, and 181% for RMSE, MAE, NSE, and PBIAS in the training stage and 40.7%, 55%, 25%, and 132% in testing stage, respectively. The improvements for piezometer 6 in train step were 15%, 4%, 13%, and 208% and in the test step were 33%, 44.6%, 16.3%, and 173%, respectively, that clearly confirm the superiority of developed hybridization schemes in GWL modeling. Uncertainty analysis showed that ANFIS-GOA and SVM had, respectively, the best and worst performances among other models. In general, GOA enhanced the accuracy of the ANFIS, ANN, and SVM models.

I am listing some of the (Artificial Intelligence) AI Agent Interview Questions. These questions are picked from Chapter 2 of the Russell and Norvig book. When I went through this book, I thought of answering these questions so that it will help others. Answers to these questions are based on my experience working in this domain. Find the following sentences true or false. Reason: The agent that sense partial information can be a rational agent.

An approach of mobile multi-agent pursuit based on application of self-organizing feature map (SOFM) and along with that reinforcement learning based on agent group role membership function (AGRMF) model is proposed. This method promotes dynamic organization of the pursuers' groups and also makes pursuers' group evader according to their desire based on SOFM and AGRMF techniques. This helps to overcome the shortcomings of the pursuers that they cannot fully reorganize when the goal is too independent in process of AGRMF models operation. Besides, we also discuss a new reward function. After the formation of the group, reinforcement learning is applied to get the optimal solution for each agent. The results of each step in capturing process will finally affect the AGR membership function to speed up the convergence of the competitive neural network. The experiments result shows that this approach is more effective for the mobile agents to capture evaders.

Adaptive thermodynamic systems -- such as a biological organism attempting to gain survival advantage, an autonomous robot performing a functional task, or a motor protein transporting intracellular nutrients -- can improve their performance by effectively modeling the regularities and stochasticity in their environments. Analogously, but in a purely computational realm, machine learning algorithms seek to estimate models that capture predictable structure and identify irrelevant noise in training data by optimizing performance measures, such as a model's log-likelihood of having generated the data. Is there a sense in which these computational models are physically preferred? For adaptive physical systems we introduce the organizing principle that thermodynamic work is the most relevant performance measure of advantageously modeling an environment. Specifically, a physical agent's model determines how much useful work it can harvest from an environment. We show that when such agents maximize work production they also maximize their environmental model's log-likelihood, establishing an equivalence between thermodynamics and learning. In this way, work maximization appears as an organizing principle that underlies learning in adaptive thermodynamic systems.

Reinforcement learning algorithms usually assume that all actions are always available to an agent. However, both people and animals understand the general link between the features of their environment and the actions that are feasible. Gibson (1977) coined the term "affordances" to describe the fact that certain states enable an agent to do certain actions, in the context of embodied agents. In this paper, we develop a theory of affordances for agents who learn and plan in Markov Decision Processes. Affordances play a dual role in this case. On one hand, they allow faster planning, by reducing the number of actions available in any given situation. On the other hand, they facilitate more efficient and precise learning of transition models from data, especially when such models require function approximation. We establish these properties through theoretical results as well as illustrative examples. We also propose an approach to learn affordances and use it to estimate transition models that are simpler and generalize better.

Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games---in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite---is far more challenging. Nonetheless, many real-world domains have continuous action spaces, e.g., where actions refer to an amount of time, money, or other resource that is naturally modeled as being real-valued as opposed to integral. We present a new algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium strategies in continuous games. In addition to two-player zero-sum games, our algorithm also applies to multiplayer games and games of imperfect information. We experiment with our algorithm on a continuous imperfect-information Blotto game, in which two players distribute resources over multiple battlefields. Blotto games have frequently been used to model national security scenarios and have also been applied to electoral competition and auction theory. Experiments show that our algorithm is able to quickly compute close approximations of Nash equilibrium strategies for this game.

A method for counterfactual explanation of machine learning survival models is proposed. One of the difficulties of solving the counterfactual explanation problem is that the classes of examples are implicitly defined through outcomes of a machine learning survival model in the form of survival functions. A condition that establishes the difference between survival functions of the original example and the counterfactual is introduced. This condition is based on using a distance between mean times to event. It is shown that the counterfactual explanation problem can be reduced to a standard convex optimization problem with linear constraints when the explained black-box model is the Cox model. For other black-box models, it is proposed to apply the well-known Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm. A lot of numerical experiments with real and synthetic data demonstrate the proposed method.

We study regret minimization problems in a two-sided matching market where uniformly valued demand side agents (a.k.a. agents) continuously compete for getting matched with supply side agents (a.k.a. arms) with unknown and heterogeneous valuations. Such markets abstract online matching platforms (for e.g. UpWork, TaskRabbit) and falls within the purview of matching bandit models introduced in Liu et al. \cite{matching_bandits}. The uniform valuation in the demand side admits a unique stable matching equilibrium in the system. We design the first decentralized algorithm - \fullname\; (\name), for matching bandits under uniform valuation that does not require any knowledge of reward gaps or time horizon, and thus partially resolves an open question in \cite{matching_bandits}. \name\; works in phases of exponentially increasing length. In each phase $i$, an agent first deletes dominated arms -- the arms preferred by agents ranked higher than itself. Deletion follows dynamic explore-exploit using UCB algorithm on the remaining arms for $2^i$ rounds. {Finally, the preferred arm is broadcast in a decentralized fashion to other agents through {\em pure exploitation} in $(N-1)K$ rounds with $N$ agents and $K$ arms.} Comparing the obtained reward with respect to the unique stable matching, we show that \name\; achieves $O(\log(T)/\Delta^2)$ regret in $T$ rounds, where $\Delta$ is the minimum gap across all agents and arms. We provide a (orderwise) matching regret lower-bound.