Matching markets are often organized in a multi-stage and decentralized manner. Moreover, participants in real-world matching markets often have uncertain preferences. This article develops a framework for learning optimal strategies in such settings, based on a nonparametric statistical approach and variational analysis. We propose an efficient algorithm, built upon concepts of "lower uncertainty bound" and "calibrated decentralized matching," for maximizing the participants' expected payoff. We show that there exists a welfare-versus-fairness trade-off that is characterized by the uncertainty level of acceptance. Participants will strategically act in favor of a low uncertainty level to reduce competition and increase expected payoff. We study signaling mechanisms that help to clear the congestion in such decentralized markets and find that the effects of signaling are heterogeneous, showing a dependence on the participants and matching stages. We prove that participants can be better off with multi-stage matching compared to single-stage matching. The deferred acceptance procedure assumes no limit on the number of stages and attains efficiency and fairness but may make some participants worse off than multi-stage matching. We demonstrate aspects of the theoretical predictions through simulations and an experiment using real data from college admissions.

We present a novel interactive learning protocol that enables training request-fulfilling agents by verbally describing their activities. Our protocol gives rise to a new family of interactive learning algorithms that offer complementary advantages against traditional algorithms like imitation learning (IL) and reinforcement learning (RL). We develop an algorithm that practically implements this protocol and employ it to train agents in two challenging request-fulfilling problems using purely language-description feedback. Empirical results demonstrate the strengths of our algorithm: compared to RL baselines, it is more sample-efficient; compared to IL baselines, it achieves competitive success rates while not requiring feedback providers to have agent-specific expertise. We also provide theoretical guarantees of the algorithm under certain assumptions on the teacher and the environment.

Agents operating in unstructured environments often produce negative side effects (NSE), which are difficult to identify at design time. While the agent can learn to mitigate the side effects from human feedback, such feedback is often expensive and the rate of learning is sensitive to the agent's state representation. We examine how humans can assist an agent, beyond providing feedback, and exploit their broader scope of knowledge to mitigate the impacts of NSE. We formulate this problem as a human-agent team with decoupled objectives. The agent optimizes its assigned task, during which its actions may produce NSE. The human shapes the environment through minor reconfiguration actions so as to mitigate the impacts of the agent's side effects, without affecting the agent's ability to complete its assigned task. We present an algorithm to solve this problem and analyze its theoretical properties. Through experiments with human subjects, we assess the willingness of users to perform minor environment modifications to mitigate the impacts of NSE. Empirical evaluation of our approach shows that the proposed framework can successfully mitigate NSE, without affecting the agent's ability to complete its assigned task.

Hindsight rationality is an approach to playing multi-agent, general-sum games that prescribes no-regret learning dynamics and describes jointly rational behavior with mediated equilibria. We explore the space of deviation types in extensive-form games (EFGs) and discover powerful types that are efficient to compute in games with moderate lengths. Specifically, we identify four new types of deviations that subsume previously studied types within a broader class we call partial sequence deviations. Integrating the idea of time selection regret minimization into counterfactual regret minimization (CFR), we introduce the extensive-form regret minimization (EFR) algorithm that is hindsight rational for a general and natural class of deviations in EFGs. We provide instantiations and regret bounds for EFR that correspond to each partial sequence deviation type. In addition, we present a thorough empirical analysis of EFR's performance with different deviation types in common benchmark games. As theory suggests, instantiating EFR with stronger deviations leads to behavior that tends to outperform that of weaker deviations.

The real world is awash with multi-agent problems that require collective action by self-interested agents, from the routing of packets across a computer network to the management of irrigation systems. Such systems have local incentives for individuals, whose behavior has an impact on the global outcome for the group. Given appropriate mechanisms describing agent interaction, groups may achieve socially beneficial outcomes, even in the face of short-term selfish incentives. In many cases, collective action problems possess an underlying graph structure, whose topology crucially determines the relationship between local decisions and emergent global effects. Such scenarios have received great attention through the lens of network games. However, this abstraction typically collapses important dimensions, such as geometry and time, relevant to the design of mechanisms promoting cooperation. In parallel work, multi-agent deep reinforcement learning has shown great promise in modelling the emergence of self-organized cooperation in complex gridworld domains. Here we apply this paradigm in graph-structured collective action problems. Using multi-agent deep reinforcement learning, we simulate an agent society for a variety of plausible mechanisms, finding clear transitions between different equilibria over time. We define analytic tools inspired by related literatures to measure the social outcomes, and use these to draw conclusions about the efficacy of different environmental interventions. Our methods have implications for mechanism design in both human and artificial agent systems.

Ubiquitous mobile computing have enabled ride-hailing services to collect vast amounts of behavioral data of riders and drivers and optimize supply and demand matching in real time. While these mobility service providers have some degree of control over the market by assigning vehicles to requests, they need to deal with the uncertainty arising from self-interested driver behavior since workers are usually free to drive when they are not assigned tasks. In this work, we formulate the problem of passenger-vehicle matching in a sparsely connected graph and proposed an algorithm to derive an equilibrium policy in a multi-agent environment. Our framework combines value iteration methods to estimate the optimal policy given expected state visitation and policy propagation to compute multi-agent state visitation frequencies. Furthermore, we developed a method to learn the driver's reward function transferable to an environment with significantly different dynamics from training data. We evaluated the robustness to changes in spatio-temporal supply-demand distributions and deterioration in data quality using a real-world taxi trajectory dataset; our approach significantly outperforms several baselines in terms of imitation accuracy. The computational time required to obtain an equilibrium policy shared by all vehicles does not depend on the number of agents, and even on the scale of real-world services, it takes only a few seconds on a single CPU.

Semantic web technologies have shown their effectiveness, especially when it comes to knowledge representation, reasoning, and data integrations. However, the original semantic web vision, whereby machine readable web data could be automatically actioned upon by intelligent software web agents, has yet to be realised. In order to better understand the existing technological challenges and opportunities, in this paper we examine the status quo in terms of intelligent software web agents, guided by research with respect to requirements and architectural components, coming from that agents community. We start by collating and summarising requirements and core architectural components relating to intelligent software agent. Following on from this, we use the identified requirements to both further elaborate on the semantic web agent motivating use case scenario, and to summarise different perspectives on the requirements when it comes to semantic web agent literature. Finally, we propose a hybrid semantic web agent architecture, discuss the role played by existing semantic web standards, and point to existing work in the broader semantic web community any beyond that could help us to make the semantic web agent vision a reality.

We consider systems of rational agents who act and interact in pursuit of their individual and collective objectives. We study and formalise the reasoning of an agent, or of an external observer, about the expected choices of action of the other agents based on their objectives, in order to assess the reasoner's ability, or expectation, to achieve their own objective. To formalize such reasoning we extend Pauly's Coalition Logic with three new modal operators of conditional strategic reasoning, thus introducing the Logic for Local Conditional Strategic Reasoning ConStR. We provide formal semantics for the new conditional strategic operators in concurrent game models, introduce the matching notion of bisimulation for each of them, prove bisimulation invariance and Hennessy-Milner property for each of them, and discuss and compare briefly their expressiveness. Finally, we also propose systems of axioms for each of the basic operators of ConStR and for the full logic.

We consider the two-sided matching market with bandit learners. In the standard matching problem, users and providers are matched to ensure incentive compatibility via the notion of stability. However, contrary to the core assumption of the matching problem, users and providers do not know their true preferences a priori and must learn them. To address this assumption, recent works propose to blend the matching and multi-armed bandit problems. They establish that it is possible to assign matchings that are stable (i.e., incentive-compatible) at every time step while also allowing agents to learn enough so that the system converges to matchings that are stable under the agents' true preferences. However, while some agents may incur low regret under these matchings, others can incur high regret -- specifically, $\Omega(T)$ optimal regret where $T$ is the time horizon. In this work, we incorporate costs and transfers in the two-sided matching market with bandit learners in order to faithfully model competition between agents. We prove that, under our framework, it is possible to simultaneously guarantee four desiderata: (1) incentive compatibility, i.e., stability, (2) low regret, i.e., $O(\log(T))$ optimal regret, (3) fairness in the distribution of regret among agents, and (4) high social welfare.

This paper introduces a new metamodel-based knowledge representation that significantly improves autonomous learning and adaptation. While interest in hybrid machine learning / symbolic AI systems leveraging, for example, reasoning and knowledge graphs, is gaining popularity, we find there remains a need for both a clear definition of knowledge and a metamodel to guide the creation and manipulation of knowledge. Some of the benefits of the metamodel we introduce in this paper include a solution to the symbol grounding problem, cumulative learning, and federated learning. We have applied the metamodel to problems ranging from time series analysis, computer vision, and natural language understanding and have found that the metamodel enables a wide variety of learning mechanisms ranging from machine learning, to graph network analysis and learning by reasoning engines to interoperate in a highly synergistic way. Our metamodel-based projects have consistently exhibited unprecedented accuracy, performance, and ability to generalize. This paper is inspired by the state-of-the-art approaches to AGI, recent AGI-aspiring work, the granular computing community, as well as Alfred Korzybski's general semantics. One surprising consequence of the metamodel is that it not only enables a new level of autonomous learning and optimal functioning for machine intelligences, but may also shed light on a path to better understanding how to improve human cognition.