It has been argued that one role of social constructs, such as institutions, trust and norms, is to coordinate the expectations of autonomous entities in order to resolve collective action situations (such as collective risk dilemmas) through the coordination of behaviour. While much work has addressed the formal representation of these social constructs, in this paper we focus specifically on the formal representation of, and associated reasoning with, the expectations themselves. In particular, we investigate how explicit reasoning about expectations can be used to encode both traditional game theory solution concepts and social mechanisms for the social dilemma situation. We use the Collective Action Simulation Platform (CASP) to model a collective risk dilemma based on a flood plain scenario and show how using expectations in the reasoning mechanisms of the agents making decisions supports the choice of cooperative behaviour.

AI - Artificial Intelligence AGI - Artificial General Intelligence ANN - Artificial Neural Network ANOVA - Analysis of Variance ANT - Actor Network Theory API - Application Programming Interface APX - Amsterdam Power Exchange AVE - Average Variance Extracted BU - Business Unit CART - Classification and Regression Tree CBMV - Crowd-based Business Model Validation CR - Composite Reliability CT - Computed Tomography CVC - Corporate Venture Capital DR - Design Requirement DP - Design Principle DSR - Design Science Research DSS - Decision Support System EEX - European Energy Exchange FsQCA - Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis GUI - Graphical User Interface HI-DSS - Hybrid Intelligence Decision Support System HIT - Human Intelligence Task IoT - Internet of Things IS - Information System IT - Information Technology MCC - Matthews Correlation Coefficient ML - Machine Learning OCT - Opportunity Creation Theory OGEMA 2.0 - Open Gateway Energy Management 2.0 OS - Operating System R&D - Research & Development RE - Renewable Energies RQ - Research Question SVM - Support Vector Machine SSD - Solid-State Drive SDK - Software Development Kit TCP/IP - Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol TCT - Transaction Cost Theory UI - User Interface VaR - Value at Risk VC - Venture Capital VPP - Virtual Power Plant Chapter I

Bolstering multi-agent learning algorithms to tackle complex coordination and control tasks has been a long-standing challenge of on-going research. Numerous methods have been proposed to help reduce the effects of non-stationarity and unscalability. In this work, we investigate a novel approach to decentralized multi-agent learning and planning that attempts to address these two challenges. In particular, this method is inspired by the cohesion, coordination, and behavior of ant colonies. As a result, these algorithms are designed to be naturally scalable to systems with numerous agents. While no optimality is guaranteed, the method is intended to work well in practice and scale better in efficacy with the number of agents present than others. The approach combines single-agent RL and an ant-colony-inspired decentralized, stigmergic algorithm for multi-agent path planning and environment modification. Specifically, we apply this algorithm in a setting where agents must navigate to a goal location, learning to push rectangular boxes into holes to yield new traversable pathways. It is shown that while the approach yields promising success in this particular environment, it may not be as easily generalized to others. The algorithm designed is notably scalable to numerous agents but is limited in its performance due to its relatively simplistic, rule-based approach. Furthermore, the composability of RL-trained policies is called into question, where, while policies are successful in their training environments, applying trained policies to a larger-scale, multi-agent framework results in unpredictable behavior.

The manpower scheduling problem is a critical research field in the resource management area. Based on the existing studies on scheduling problem solutions, this paper transforms the manpower scheduling problem into a combinational optimization problem under multi-constraint conditions from a new perspective. It also uses logical paradigms to build a mathematical model for problem solution and an improved multi-dimensional evolution algorithm for solving the model. Moreover, the constraints discussed in this paper basically cover all the requirements of human resource coordination in modern society and are supported by our experiment results. In the discussion part, we compare our model with other heuristic algorithms or linear programming methods and prove that the model proposed in this paper makes a 25.7% increase in efficiency and a 17% increase in accuracy at most. In addition, to the numerical solution of the manpower scheduling problem, this paper also studies the algorithm for scheduling task list generation and the method of displaying scheduling results. As a result, we not only provide various modifications for the basic algorithm to solve different condition problems but also propose a new algorithm that increases at least 28.91% in time efficiency by comparing with different baseline models.

This paper investigates the model-based methods in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). We specify the dynamics sample complexity and the opponent sample complexity in MARL, and conduct a theoretic analysis of return discrepancy upper bound. To reduce the upper bound with the intention of low sample complexity during the whole learning process, we propose a novel decentralized model-based MARL method, named Adaptive Opponent-wise Rollout Policy Optimization (AORPO). In AORPO, each agent builds its multi-agent environment model, consisting of a dynamics model and multiple opponent models, and trains its policy with the adaptive opponent-wise rollout. We further prove the theoretic convergence of AORPO under reasonable assumptions. Empirical experiments on competitive and cooperative tasks demonstrate that AORPO can achieve improved sample efficiency with comparable asymptotic performance over the compared MARL methods.

Deep reinforcement learning methods have shown great performance on many challenging cooperative multi-agent tasks. Two main promising research directions are multi-agent value function decomposition and multi-agent policy gradients. In this paper, we propose a new decomposed multi-agent soft actor-critic (mSAC) method, which effectively combines the advantages of the aforementioned two methods. The main modules include decomposed Q network architecture, discrete probabilistic policy and counterfactual advantage function (optinal). Theoretically, mSAC supports efficient off-policy learning and addresses credit assignment problem partially in both discrete and continuous action spaces. Tested on StarCraft II micromanagement cooperative multiagent benchmark, we empirically investigate the performance of mSAC against its variants and analyze the effects of the different components. Experimental results demonstrate that mSAC significantly outperforms policy-based approach COMA, and achieves competitive results with SOTA value-based approach Qmix on most tasks in terms of asymptotic perfomance metric. In addition, mSAC achieves pretty good results on large action space tasks, such as 2c vs 64zg and MMM2.

A huddle at the 2017 United Nations Climate Change Conference, where attendees cooperated on mutually beneficial joint actions on climate.Credit: Sean Gallup/Getty Artificial-intelligence assistants and recommendation algorithms interact with billions of people every day, influencing lives in myriad ways, yet they still have little understanding of humans. Self-driving vehicles controlled by artificial intelligence (AI) are gaining mastery of their interactions with the natural world, but they are still novices when it comes to coordinating with other cars and pedestrians or collaborating with their human operators. The state of AI applications reflects that of the research field. It has long been steeped in a kind of methodological individualism. As is evident from introductory textbooks, the canonical AI problem is that of a solitary machine confronting a non-social environment. Historically, this was a sensible starting point.

The rapid progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning has opened unprecedented analytics possibilities in various team and individual sports, including baseball, basketball, and tennis. More recently, AI techniques have been applied to football, due to a huge increase in data collection by professional teams, increased computational power, and advances in machine learning, with the goal of better addressing new scientific challenges involved in the analysis of both individual players' and coordinated teams' behaviors. The research challenges associated with predictive and prescriptive football analytics require new developments and progress at the intersection of statistical learning, game theory, and computer vision. In this paper, we provide an overarching perspective highlighting how the combination of these fields, in particular, forms a unique microcosm for AI research, while offering mutual benefits for professional teams, spectators, and broadcasters in the years to come. We illustrate that this duality makes football analytics a game changer of tremendous value, in terms of not only changing the game of football itself, but also in terms of what this domain can mean for the field of AI. We review the state-of-the-art and exemplify the types of analysis enabled by combining the aforementioned fields, including illustrative examples of counterfactual analysis using predictive models, and the combination of game-theoretic analysis of penalty kicks with statistical learning of player attributes. We conclude by highlighting envisioned downstream impacts, including possibilities for extensions to other sports (real and virtual).

To realize autonomous collaborative robots, it is important to increase the trust that users have in them. Toward this goal, this paper proposes an algorithm which endows an autonomous agent with the ability to explain the transition from the current state to the target state in a Markov decision process (MDP). According to cognitive science, to generate an explanation that is acceptable to humans, it is important to present the minimum information necessary to sufficiently understand an event. To meet this requirement, this study proposes a framework for identifying important elements in the decision-making process using a prediction model for the world and generating explanations based on these elements. To verify the ability of the proposed method to generate explanations, we conducted an experiment using a grid environment. It was inferred from the result of a simulation experiment that the explanation generated using the proposed method was composed of the minimum elements important for understanding the transition from the current state to the target state. Furthermore, subject experiments showed that the generated explanation was a good summary of the process of state transition, and that a high evaluation was obtained for the explanation of the reason for an action.

This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an incomplete-information Markov game, in which each agent first selects one environmental signal from multiple signal sources as additional payoff-relevant information and then takes an action. There is a rational information designer (principal) who possesses one signal source and aims to control the equilibrium behaviors of the agents by designing the information structure of her signals sent to the agents. An obedient principle is established which states that it is without loss of generality to focus on the direct information design when the information design incentivizes each agent to select the signal sent by the principal, such that the design process avoids the predictions of the agents' strategic selection behaviors. Based on the obedient principle, we introduce the design protocol given a goal of the principal referred to as obedient implementability (OIL) and study a Myersonian information design that characterizes the OIL in a class of obedient sequential Markov perfect Bayesian equilibria (O-SMPBE). A framework is proposed based on an approach which we refer to as the fixed-point alignment that incentivizes the agents to choose the signal sent by the principal, makes sure that the agents' policy profile of taking actions is the policy component of an O-SMPBE, and the principal's goal is achieved. The proposed approach can be applied to elicit desired behaviors of multi-agent systems in competing as well as cooperating settings and be extended to heterogeneous stochastic games in the complete- and the incomplete-information environments.