A shrinking market is a ubiquitous challenge faced by various industries. In this paper we formulate the first formal model of shrinking markets in multi-item settings, and study how mechanism design and machine learning can help preserve revenue in an uncertain, shrinking market. Via a sample-based learning mechanism, we prove the first guarantees on how much revenue can be preserved by truthful multi-item, multi-bidder auctions (for limited supply) when only a random unknown fraction of the population participates in the market. We first present a general reduction that converts any sufficiently rich auction class into a randomized auction robust to market shrinkage. Our main technique is a novel combinatorial construction called a winner diagram that concisely represents all possible executions of an auction on an uncertain set of bidders. Via a probabilistic analysis of winner diagrams, we derive a general possibility result: a sufficiently rich class of auctions always contains an auction that is robust to market shrinkage and market uncertainty. Our result has applications to important practically-constrained settings such as auctions with a limited number of winners. We then show how to efficiently learn an auction that is robust to market shrinkage by leveraging practically-efficient routines for solving the winner determination problem.

Biases in existing datasets used to train algorithmic decision rules can raise ethical and economic concerns due to the resulting disparate treatment of different groups. We propose an algorithm for sequentially debiasing such datasets through adaptive and bounded exploration in a classification problem with costly and censored feedback. Exploration in this context means that at times, and to a judiciouslychosen extent, the decision maker deviates from its (current) loss-minimizing rule, and instead accepts some individuals that would otherwise be rejected, so as to reduce statistical data biases. Our proposed algorithm includes parameters that can be used to balance between the ultimate goal of removing data biases - which will in turn lead to more accurate and fair decisions, and the exploration risks incurred to achieve this goal. We analytically show that such exploration can help debias data in certain distributions. We further investigate how fairness criteria can work in conjunction with our data debiasing algorithm. We illustrate the performance of our algorithm using experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets.

We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria and mechanisms via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated, communication, and certification equilibria. We observe that optimal equilibria are minimax equilibrium strategies of a player in an extensiveform zero-sum game. This reformulation allows us to apply techniques for learning in zero-sum games, yielding the first learning dynamics that converge to optimal equilibria, not only in empirical averages, but also in iterates. We demonstrate the practical scalability and flexibility of our approach by attaining state-of-the-art performance in benchmark tabular games, and by computing an optimal mechanism for a sequential auction design problem using deep reinforcement learning.

Despite the success of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms, most of them focus on a single team composition, which prevents them from being used in more realistic scenarios where dynamic team composition is possible. While some studies attempt to solve this problem via multi-task learning in a fixed set of team compositions, there is still a risk of overfitting to the training set, which may lead to catastrophic performance when facing dramatically varying team compositions during execution. To address this problem, we propose to use mutual information (MI) as an augmented reward to prevent individual policies from relying too much on team-related information and encourage agents to learn policies that are robust in different team compositions. Optimizing this MI-augmented objective in an off-policy manner can be intractable due to the existence of dynamic marginal distribution. To alleviate this problem, we first propose a multi-agent policy iteration algorithm with a fixed marginal distribution and prove its convergence and optimality. Then, we propose to employ the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm and an imaginary team composition distribution for optimization with approximate marginal distribution as the practical implementation. Empirically, our method demonstrates strong zero-shot generalization to dynamic team compositions in complex cooperative tasks.

Lewis signaling games are a class of simple communication games for simulating the emergence of language. In these games, two agents must agree on a communication protocol in order to solve a cooperative task. Previous work has shown that agents trained to play this game with reinforcement learning tend to develop languages that display undesirable properties from a linguistic point of view (lack of generalization, lack of compositionality, etc). In this paper, we aim to provide better understanding of this phenomenon by analytically studying the learning problem in Lewis games. As a core contribution, we demonstrate that the standard objective in Lewis games can be decomposed in two components: a co-adaptation loss and an information loss. This decomposition enables us to surface two potential sources of overfitting, which we show may undermine the emergence of a structured communication protocol. In particular, when we control for overfitting on the co-adaptation loss, we recover desired properties in the emergent languages: they are more compositional and generalize better.

Deceptive agents are a challenge for the safety, trustworthiness, and cooperation of AI systems. We focus on the problem that agents might deceive in order to achieve their goals (for instance, in our experiments with language models, the goal of being evaluated as truthful). There are a number of existing definitions of deception in the literature on game theory and symbolic AI, but there is no overarching theory of deception for learning agents in games. We introduce a formal definition of deception in structural causal games, grounded in the philosophy literature, and applicable to real-world machine learning systems. Several examples and results illustrate that our formal definition aligns with the philosophical and commonsense meaning of deception. Our main technical result is to provide graphical criteria for deception. We show, experimentally, that these results can be used to mitigate deception in reinforcement learning agents and language models.

Decentralized optimization is an emerging paradigm in distributed learning in which agents achieve network-wide solutions by peer-to-peer communication without the central server. Since communication tends to be slower than computation, when each agent communicates with only a few neighboring agents per iteration, they can complete iterations faster than with more agents or a central server. However, the total number of iterations to reach a network-wide solution is affected by the speed at which the agents' information is "mixed" by communication. We found that popular communication topologies either have large maximum degrees (such as stars and complete graphs) or are ineffective at mixing information (such as rings and grids). To address this problem, we propose a new family of topologies, EquiTopo, which has an (almost) constant degree and a network-size-independent consensus rate that is used to measure the mixing efficiency. In the proposed family, EquiStatic has a degree of Θ(ln(n)), where nis the network size, and a series of time-dependent one-peer topologies, EquiDyn, has a constant degree of 1. We generate EquiDyn through a certain random sampling procedure. Both of them achieve an n-independent consensus rate. We apply them to decentralized SGD and decentralized gradient tracking and obtain faster communication and better convergence, theoretically and empirically.