Abstract--We study cluster assignment in multi-agent networks. The process of reaching an agreement between agents is In this work we focus on homogeneous networks, that is one of the fundamental tasks for a multi-agent system (MAS). The problem we aim to solve is how to design graphs computation [1], robotics [2], biochemical systems [3], and that ensure the networked system will converge to a prescribed sensor networks [4]. A natural extension to the agreement cluster configuration, i.e., specifying the number of clusters problem is the cluster agreement problem, which seeks to and the number of agents within each cluster. Employing tools drive agents into groups. All the agents within the same group from group theory, we show that it is possible to design an should then reach an agreement.

The spontaneous formation and subsequent growth, dissolution, merger and competition of social groups bears similarities to physical phase transitions in metastable finite systems. We examine three different scenarios, percolation, spinodal decomposition and nucleation, to describe the formation of social groups of varying size and density. In our agent-based model, we use a feedback between the opinions of agents and their ability to establish links. Groups can restrict further link formation, but agents can also leave if costs exceed the group benefits. We identify the critical parameters for costs/benefits and social influence to obtain either one large group or the stable coexistence of several groups with different opinions. Analytic investigations allow to derive different critical densities that control the formation and coexistence of groups. Our novel approach sheds new light on the early stage of network growth and the emergence of large connected components.

This is the third article in our series on the personhood of autonomous systems. We followed this discussion by talking about Kant's concept of autonomy in the second article. Here, we will make an attempt to understand how autonomy is perceived in the computer science domain. You will often see individuals correlating autonomy with automation. However, both of these mechanisms can be performed separately without human interference.

We present a scalable tree search planning algorithm for large multi-agent sequential decision problems that require dynamic collaboration. Teams of agents need to coordinate decisions in many domains, but naive approaches fail due to the exponential growth of the joint action space with the number of agents. We circumvent this complexity through an approach that allows us to trade computation for approximation quality and dynamically coordinate actions. Our algorithm comprises three elements: online planning with Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), factored representations of local agent interactions with coordination graphs, and the iterative Max-Plus method for joint action selection. We evaluate our approach on the benchmark SysAdmin domain with static coordination graphs and achieve comparable performance with much lower computation cost than our MCTS baselines. We also introduce a multi-drone delivery domain with dynamic coordination graphs, and demonstrate how our approach scales to large problems on this domain that are intractable for other MCTS methods.

This paper describes the heuristics used by the Shadoks team for the CG:SHOP 2021 challenge. This year's problem is to coordinate the motion of multiple robots in order to reach their targets without collisions and minimizing the makespan. It is a classical multi agent path finding problem with the specificity that the instances are highly dense in an unbounded grid. Using the heuristics outlined in this paper, our team won first place with the best solution to 202 out of 203 instances and optimal solutions to at least 105 of them. The main ingredients include several different strategies to compute initial solutions coupled with a heuristic called Conflict Optimizer to reduce the makespan of existing solutions.

Natural selection driven by interspecific and intraspecific competition is a fundamental evolutionary mechanism that has led to the wide diversity and complexity of species inhabiting Earth. The process is mirrored to a degree in contemporary AI research, where competitive multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) environments have enabled machines to reach superhuman performance. Designing multi-agent RL environments with conditions conducive to the development of interesting and useful agent skills can however be a time-consuming and laborious process. A common approach in single-agent settings is domain randomization, where the agent is trained on a wide distribution of randomized environments. Recent works have improved this process via automatic environment curricula techniques that adapt environment distribution during training to maximize the number of environments that produce better and more robust skills.

Before going further, you'll need to understand the concept of game theory. Game theory is basically a branch of applied mathematics. In-game theories (How Game Theory Strategy Improves Decision Making), there are different available tools with the help of which different situations are analyzed. There are parties in-game theories mostly referred to as players and the decision they have taken are interdependent. This is a kind of playing chess in which the turn of one player is associated with the future strategy of the opponent player.

Designing a distribution of environments in which RL agents can learn interesting and useful skills is a challenging and poorly understood task, for multi-agent environments the difficulties are only exacerbated. One approach is to train a second RL agent, called a teacher, who samples environments that are conducive for the learning of student agents. However, most previous proposals for teacher rewards do not generalize straightforwardly to the multi-agent setting. We examine a set of intrinsic teacher rewards derived from prediction problems that can be applied in multi-agent settings and evaluate them in Mujoco tasks such as multi-agent Hide and Seek as well as a diagnostic single-agent maze task. Of the intrinsic rewards considered we found value disagreement to be most consistent across tasks, leading to faster and more reliable emergence of advanced skills in Hide and Seek and the maze task. Another candidate intrinsic reward considered, value prediction error, also worked well in Hide and Seek but was susceptible to noisy-TV style distractions in stochastic environments. Policy disagreement performed well in the maze task but did not speed up learning in Hide and Seek. Our results suggest that intrinsic teacher rewards, and in particular value disagreement, are a promising approach for automating both single and multi-agent environment design.

Training agents in cooperative settings offers the promise of AI agents able to interact effectively with humans (and other agents) in the real world. Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has the potential to achieve this goal, demonstrating success in a series of challenging problems. However, whilst these advances are significant, the vast majority of focus has been on the self-play paradigm. This often results in a coordination problem, caused by agents learning to make use of arbitrary conventions when playing with themselves. This means that even the strongest self-play agents may have very low cross-play with other agents, including other initializations of the same algorithm. In this paper we propose to solve this problem by adapting agent strategies on the fly, using a posterior belief over the other agents' strategy. Concretely, we consider the problem of selecting a strategy from a finite set of previously trained agents, to play with an unknown partner. We propose an extension of the classic statistical technique, Gibbs sampling, to update beliefs about other agents and obtain close to optimal ad-hoc performance. Despite its simplicity, our method is able to achieve strong cross-play with unseen partners in the challenging card game of Hanabi, achieving successful ad-hoc coordination without knowledge of the partner's strategy a priori.

Not too long ago, AI was its own field: a separate walled garden working towards automation and machine intelligence. We hadn't crossed the bridge to a personal data economy, and AI made us think of Hollywood and its sentient machines. Sometimes it was killer robots, and others it was an omniscient jar of swirling smoke sent to save humanity. Big names of tech wrote op-eds rallying around or decrying AI; more specifically, development and how it could lead to a machine superintelligence. However, between 2016 and now, AI came to mean something very different: no longer is it an exciting/terrifying superintelligence.