Investigating cooperativity of interlocutors is central in studying pragmatics of dialogue. Models of conversation that only assume cooperative agents fail to explain the dynamics of strategic conversations. Thus, we investigate the ability of agents to identify non-cooperative interlocutors while completing a concurrent visual-dialogue task. Within this novel setting, we study the optimality of communication strategies for achieving this multi-task objective. We use the tools of learning theory to develop a theoretical model for identifying non-cooperative interlocutors and apply this theory to analyze different communication strategies. We also introduce a corpus of non-cooperative conversations about images in the GuessWhat?! dataset proposed by De Vries et al. (2017). We use reinforcement learning to implement multiple communication strategies in this context and find empirical results validate our theory.

Online trajectory planners enable quadrotors to safely and smoothly navigate in unknown cluttered environments. However, tuning parameters is challenging since modern planners have become too complex to mathematically model and predict their interaction with unstructured environments. This work takes humans out of the loop by proposing a planner parameter adaptation framework that formulates objectives into two complementary categories and optimizes them asynchronously. Objectives evaluated with and without trajectory execution are optimized using Bayesian Optimization (BayesOpt) and Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), respectively. By combining two kinds of objectives, the total convergence rate of the black-box optimization is accelerated while the dimension of optimized parameters can be increased. Benchmark comparisons demonstrate its superior performance over other strategies. Tests with changing obstacle densities validate its real-time environment adaption, which is difficult for prior manual tuning. Real-world flights with different drone platforms, environments, and planners show the proposed framework's scalability and effectiveness.

To safely navigate in various complex traffic scenarios, autonomous driving systems are generally equipped with a motion forecasting module to provide vital information for the downstream planning module. For the real-world onboard applications, both accuracy and latency of a motion forecasting model are essential. In this report, we present an effective and efficient solution, which ranks the 3rd place [1] in the Argoverse 2 Motion Forecasting Challenge 2022.

In competitive two-agent environments, deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods based on the \emph{Double Oracle (DO)} algorithm, such as \emph{Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO)} and \emph{Anytime PSRO (APSRO)}, iteratively add RL best response policies to a population. Eventually, an optimal mixture of these population policies will approximate a Nash equilibrium. However, these methods might need to add all deterministic policies before converging. In this work, we introduce \emph{Self-Play PSRO (SP-PSRO)}, a method that adds an approximately optimal stochastic policy to the population in each iteration. Instead of adding only deterministic best responses to the opponent's least exploitable population mixture, SP-PSRO also learns an approximately optimal stochastic policy and adds it to the population as well. As a result, SP-PSRO empirically tends to converge much faster than APSRO and in many games converges in just a few iterations.

The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in real situations, the strategic environment varies as a result of past agent choices. Unfortunately, the analysis techniques that enabled a rich characterization of the emergent behavior in static environment games fail to cope with dynamic environment games. To address this, we develop a general framework using probabilistic couplings to extend the analysis of static environment games to dynamic ones. Using this approach, we obtain sufficient conditions under which traditional characterizations of Nash equilibria with best response dynamics and stochastic stability with log-linear learning can be extended to dynamic environment games. As a case study, we pose a model of cyber threat intelligence sharing between firms and a simple dynamic game-theoretic model of social precautions in an epidemic, both of which feature dynamic environments. For both examples, we obtain conditions under which the emergent behavior is characterized in the dynamic game by performing the traditional analysis on a reference static environment game.

Interactions among multiple self-interested agents may not necessarily yield socially desirable behaviors. While static games offer a pragmatic model for such interactions, and modifying the utilities of the agents in such games provides a means toward achieving socially desirable behavior, manipulating the utilities is hard-if not impossible-after the system is deployed. We investigate an alternative means where each agent incorporates others' utilities into its own utility based on a relationship network, which characterizes how much one agent cares about another and hence the extent of their utility incorporation. We introduce the notion of a relationship game, a static game with a set of weighted relationship networks and a social cost function. The main problem we study is the design of the weight vector on the relationships such that the Nash equilibrium of the associated game is socially desirable. We propose an ordering-based exact method and a gradient-based approximate method to solve this problem. We show theoretically that the exact solution scales exponentially with the number of players. Empirical results show both methods are effective and scale exponentially, with the runtime of gradient-based solution growing slower.

In this work, we integrate `social' interactions into the MARL setup through a user-defined relational network and examine the effects of agent-agent relations on the rise of emergent behaviors. Leveraging insights from sociology and neuroscience, our proposed framework models agent relationships using the notion of Reward-Sharing Relational Networks (RSRN), where network edge weights act as a measure of how much one agent is invested in the success of (or `cares about') another. We construct relational rewards as a function of the RSRN interaction weights to collectively train the multi-agent system via a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm. The performance of the system is tested for a 3-agent scenario with different relational network structures (e.g., self-interested, communitarian, and authoritarian networks). Our results indicate that reward-sharing relational networks can significantly influence learned behaviors. We posit that RSRN can act as a framework where different relational networks produce distinct emergent behaviors, often analogous to the intuited sociological understanding of such networks.

Fully cooperative, partially observable multi-agent problems are ubiquitous in the real world. In this paper, we focus on a specific subclass of coordination problems in which humans are able to discover self-explaining deviations (SEDs). SEDs are actions that deviate from the common understanding of what reasonable behavior would be in normal circumstances. They are taken with the intention of causing another agent or other agents to realize, using theory of mind, that the circumstance must be abnormal. We first motivate SED with a real world example and formalize its definition. Next, we introduce a novel algorithm, improvement maximizing self-explaining deviations (IMPROVISED), to perform SEDs. Lastly, we evaluate IMPROVISED both in an illustrative toy setting and the popular benchmark setting Hanabi, where it is the first method to produce so called finesse plays, which are regarded as one of the more iconic examples of human theory of mind.

As the competition among machine learning (ML) predictors is widespread in practice, it becomes increasingly important to understand the impact and biases arising from such competition. One critical aspect of ML competition is that ML predictors are constantly updated by acquiring additional data during the competition. Although this active data acquisition can largely affect the overall competition environment, it has not been well-studied before. In this paper, we study what happens when ML predictors can purchase additional data during the competition. We introduce a new environment in which ML predictors use active learning algorithms to effectively acquire labeled data within their budgets while competing against each other. We empirically show that the overall performance of an ML predictor improves when predictors can purchase additional labeled data. Surprisingly, however, the quality that users experience--i.e., the accuracy of the predictor selected by each user--can decrease even as the individual predictors get better. We demonstrate that this phenomenon naturally arises due to a trade-off whereby competition pushes each predictor to specialize in a subset of the population while data purchase has the effect of making predictors more uniform. With comprehensive experiments, we show that our findings are robust against different modeling assumptions.

This primer is an attempt to provide a detailed summary of the different facets of lifelong learning. We start with Chapter 2 which provides a high-level overview of lifelong learning systems. In this chapter, we discuss prominent scenarios in lifelong learning (Section 2.4), provide 8 Introduction a high-level organization of different lifelong learning approaches (Section 2.5), enumerate the desiderata for an ideal lifelong learning system (Section 2.6), discuss how lifelong learning is related to other learning paradigms (Section 2.7), describe common metrics used to evaluate lifelong learning systems (Section 2.8). This chapter is more useful for readers who are new to lifelong learning and want to get introduced to the field without focusing on specific approaches or benchmarks. The remaining chapters focus on specific aspects (either learning algorithms or benchmarks) and are more useful for readers who are looking for specific approaches or benchmarks. Chapter 3 focuses on regularization-based approaches that do not assume access to any data from previous tasks. Chapter 4 discusses memory-based approaches that typically use a replay buffer or an episodic memory to save subset of data across different tasks. Chapter 5 focuses on different architecture families (and their instantiations) that have been proposed for training lifelong learning systems. Following these different classes of learning algorithms, we discuss the commonly used evaluation benchmarks and metrics for lifelong learning (Chapter 6) and wrap up with a discussion of future challenges and important research directions in Chapter 7.