Effective understanding of dynamically evolving multiagent interactions is crucial to capturing the underlying behavior of agents in social systems. It is usually challenging to observe these interactions directly, and therefore modeling the latent interactions is essential for realizing the complex behaviors. Recent work on Dynamic Neural Relational Inference (DNRI) captures explicit inter-agent interactions at every step. However, prediction at every step results in noisy interactions and lacks intrinsic interpretability without post-hoc inspection. Moreover, it requires access to ground truth annotations to analyze the predicted interactions, which are hard to obtain. This paper introduces DIDER, Discovering Interpretable Dynamically Evolving Relations, a generic end-to-end interaction modeling framework with intrinsic interpretability. DIDER discovers an interpretable sequence of inter-agent interactions by disentangling the task of latent interaction prediction into sub-interaction prediction and duration estimation. By imposing the consistency of a sub-interaction type over an extended time duration, the proposed framework achieves intrinsic interpretability without requiring any post-hoc inspection. We evaluate DIDER on both synthetic and real-world datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that modeling disentangled and interpretable dynamic relations improves performance on trajectory forecasting tasks.

This paper presents a signal-free intersection control system for CAVs by combination of a pixel reservation algorithm and a Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) decision-making logic, followed by a corridor-level impact assessment of the proposed model. The pixel reservation algorithm detects potential colliding maneuvers and the DRL logic optimizes vehicles' movements to avoid collision and minimize the overall delay at the intersection. The proposed control system is called Decentralized Sparse Coordination System (DSCLS) since each vehicle has its own control logic and interacts with other vehicles in coordinated states only. Due to the chain impact of taking random actions in the DRL's training course, the trained model can deal with unprecedented volume conditions, which poses the main challenge in intersection management. The performance of the developed model is compared with conventional and CAV-based control systems, including fixed traffic lights, actuated traffic lights, and the Longest Queue First (LQF) control system under three volume regimes in a corridor of four intersections in VISSIM software. The simulation result revealed that the proposed model reduces delay by 50%, 29%, and 23% in moderate, high, and extreme volume regimes compared to the other CAV-based control system. Improvements in travel time, fuel consumption, emission, and Surrogate Safety Measures (SSM) are also noticeable.

Designing and implementing explainable systems is seen as the next step towards increasing user trust in, acceptance of and reliance on Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. While explaining choices made by black-box algorithms such as machine learning and deep learning has occupied most of the limelight, systems that attempt to explain decisions (even simple ones) in the context of social choice are steadily catching up. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey of explainability in mechanism design, a domain characterized by economically motivated agents and often having no single choice that maximizes all individual utility functions. We discuss the main properties and goals of explainability in mechanism design, distinguishing them from those of Explainable AI in general. This discussion is followed by a thorough review of the challenges one may face when working on Explainable Mechanism Design and propose a few solution concepts to those.

The value alignment problem is concerned with the design of systems that provably abide by our human values. One approach to this challenge is through the leverage of prescriptive norms that, if carefully designed, are able to steer a multiagent system away from harmful outcomes and towards more beneficial ones. In this work, we first present a general methodology for the automated synthesis of value aligned normative systems, based on a consequentialist view of values. In the second part, we provide analytical tools to examine such value aligned normative systems, namely the Shapley value of individual norms and the compatibility of several values under a fixed set of norms. We illustrate all of our contributions with a running example of a society of agents where taxes are collected and redistributed according to a set of parametrised norms.

This manuscript was a pleasure to discover, and a pleasure to read -- a broad, but succinct, overview of work in computational cooperative game theory. I will certainly use this text with my own students, both within courses and to provide comprehensive background for students in my research group. The authors have made a substantial contribution to the multiagent systems and algorithmic game theory communities.

The security issue of mobile robots has attracted considerable attention in recent years. In this paper, we propose an intelligent physical attack to trap mobile robots into a preset position by learning the obstacle-avoidance mechanism from external observation. The salient novelty of our work lies in revealing the possibility that physical-based attacks with intelligent and advanced design can present real threats, while without prior knowledge of the system dynamics or access to the internal system. This kind of attack cannot be handled by countermeasures in traditional cyberspace security. To practice, the cornerstone of the proposed attack is to actively explore the complex interaction characteristic of the victim robot with the environment, and learn the obstacle-avoidance knowledge exhibited in the limited observations of its behaviors. Then, we propose shortest-path and hands-off attack algorithms to find efficient attack paths from the tremendous motion space, achieving the driving-to-trap goal with low costs in terms of path length and activity period, respectively. The convergence of the algorithms is proved and the attack performance bounds are further derived. Extensive simulations and real-life experiments illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack, beckoning future investigation for the new physical threats and defense on robotic systems.

We study the Improving Multi-Armed Bandit (IMAB) problem, where the reward obtained from an arm increases with the number of pulls it receives. This model provides an elegant abstraction for many real-world problems in domains such as education and employment, where decisions about the distribution of opportunities can affect the future capabilities of communities and the disparity between them. A decision-maker in such settings must consider the impact of her decisions on future rewards in addition to the standard objective of maximizing her cumulative reward at any time. In many of these applications, the time horizon is unknown to the decision-maker beforehand, which motivates the study of the IMAB problem in the technically more challenging horizon-unaware setting. We study the tension that arises between two seemingly conflicting objectives in the horizon-unaware setting: a) maximizing the cumulative reward at any time based on current rewards of the arms, and b) ensuring that arms with better long-term rewards get sufficient opportunities even if they initially have low rewards. We show that, surprisingly, the two objectives are aligned with each other in this setting. Our main contribution is an anytime algorithm for the IMAB problem that achieves the best possible cumulative reward while ensuring that the arms reach their true potential given sufficient time. Our algorithm mitigates the initial disparity due to lack of opportunity and continues pulling an arm till it stops improving. We prove the optimality of our algorithm by showing that a) any algorithm for the IMAB problem, no matter how utilitarian, must suffer $\Omega(T)$ policy regret and $\Omega(k)$ competitive ratio with respect to the optimal offline policy, and b) the competitive ratio of our algorithm is $O(k)$.

This paper presents the network load balancing problem, a challenging real-world task for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods. Traditional heuristic solutions like Weighted-Cost Multi-Path (WCMP) and Local Shortest Queue (LSQ) are less flexible to the changing workload distributions and arrival rates, with a poor balance among multiple load balancers. The cooperative network load balancing task is formulated as a Dec-POMDP problem, which naturally induces the MARL methods. To bridge the reality gap for applying learning-based methods, all methods are directly trained and evaluated on an emulation system from moderate-to large-scale. Experiments on realistic testbeds show that the independent and "selfish" load balancing strategies are not necessarily the globally optimal ones, while the proposed MARL solution has a superior performance over different realistic settings. Additionally, the potential difficulties of MARL methods for network load balancing are analysed, which helps to draw the attention of the learning and network communities to such challenges.

In games, as in and many other domains, design validation and testing is a huge challenge as systems are growing in size and manual testing is becoming infeasible. This paper proposes a new approach to automated game validation and testing. Our method leverages a data-driven imitation learning technique, which requires little effort and time and no knowledge of machine learning or programming, that designers can use to efficiently train game testing agents. We investigate the validity of our approach through a user study with industry experts. The survey results show that our method is indeed a valid approach to game validation and that data-driven programming would be a useful aid to reducing effort and increasing quality of modern playtesting. The survey also highlights several open challenges. With the help of the most recent literature, we analyze the identified challenges and propose future research directions suitable for supporting and maximizing the utility of our approach.

Stackelberg games are a canonical model for strategic principal-agent interactions. Consider a defense system that distributes its security resources across high-risk targets prior to attacks being executed; or a tax policymaker who sets rules on when audits are triggered prior to seeing filed tax reports; or a seller who chooses a price prior to knowing a customer's proclivity to buy. In each of these scenarios, a principal first selects an action X and then an agent reacts with an action Y, where X and Y are the principal's and agent's action spaces, respectively. In the examples above, agent actions correspond to which target to attack, how much tax to pay to evade an audit, and how much to purchase, respectively. Typically, the principal wants an that maximizes their payoff when the agent plays a best response = br(); such a pair (,) is a Stackelberg equilibrium. By committing to a strategy, the principal can guarantee they achieve a higher payoff than in the fixed point equilibrium of the corresponding simultaneous-play game. However, finding such a strategy requires knowledge of the agent's payoff function. When faced with unknown agent payoffs, the principal can attempt to learn a best response via repeated interactions with the agent. If a (naïve) agent is unaware that such learning occurs and always plays a best response, the principal can use classical online learning approaches to optimize their own payoff in the stage game.