This paper establishes a dual theory about knowledge and argumentation. Our idea is rooted at both epistemic logic and argumentation theory, and we aim to merge these two fields, not just in a superficial way but to thoroughly disclose the intrinsic relevance between knowledge and argumentation. Specifically, we define epistemic Kripke models and argument Kripke models as a dual pair, and then work out a two-way generation method between these two types of Kripke models. Such generation is rigorously justified by a duality theorem on modal formulae's invariance. We also provide realistic examples to demonstrate our generation, through which our framework's practical utility gets strongly advocated. We finally propose a philosophical thesis that knowledge is essentially dynamic, and we draw certain connection to Maxwell's demon as well as the well-known proverb "knowledge is power".

We present a new method based on episodic Knowledge Graphs (eKGs) for evaluating (multimodal) conversational agents in open domains. This graph is generated by interpreting raw signals during conversation and is able to capture the accumulation of knowledge over time. We apply structural and semantic analysis of the resulting graphs and translate the properties into qualitative measures. We compare these measures with existing automatic and manual evaluation metrics commonly used for conversational agents. Our results show that our Knowledge-Graph-based evaluation provides more qualitative insights into interaction and the agent's behavior.

Embodied agents need to be able to interact in natural language understanding task descriptions and asking appropriate follow up questions to obtain necessary information to be effective at successfully accomplishing tasks for a wide range of users. In this work, we propose a set of dialog acts for modelling such dialogs and annotate the TEACh dataset that includes over 3,000 situated, task oriented conversations (consisting of 39.5k utterances in total) with dialog acts. TEACh-DA is one of the first large scale dataset of dialog act annotations for embodied task completion. Furthermore, we demonstrate the use of this annotated dataset in training models for tagging the dialog acts of a given utterance, predicting the dialog act of the next response given a dialog history, and use the dialog acts to guide agent's non-dialog behaviour. In particular, our experiments on the TEACh Execution from Dialog History task where the model predicts the sequence of low level actions to be executed in the environment for embodied task completion, demonstrate that dialog acts can improve end task success rate by up to 2 points compared to the system without dialog acts.

Game-theoretic motion planners are a potent solution for controlling systems of multiple highly interactive robots. Most existing game-theoretic planners unrealistically assume a priori objective function knowledge is available to all agents. To address this, we propose a fault-tolerant receding horizon game-theoretic motion planner that leverages inter-agent communication with intention hypothesis likelihood. Specifically, robots communicate their objective function incorporating their intentions. A discrete Bayesian filter is designed to infer the objectives in real-time based on the discrepancy between observed trajectories and the ones from communicated intentions. In simulation, we consider three safety-critical autonomous driving scenarios of overtaking, lane-merging and intersection crossing, to demonstrate our planner's ability to capitalize on alternative intention hypotheses to generate safe trajectories in the presence of faulty transmissions in the communication network.

Communication helps agents to obtain information about others so that better coordinated behavior can be learned. Some existing work communicates predicted future trajectory with others, hoping to get clues about what others would do for better coordination. However, circular dependencies sometimes can occur when agents are treated synchronously so it is hard to coordinate decision-making. In this paper, we propose a novel communication scheme, Sequential Communication (SeqComm). SeqComm treats agents asynchronously (the upper-level agents make decisions before the lower-level ones) and has two communication phases. In negotiation phase, agents determine the priority of decision-making by communicating hidden states of observations and comparing the value of intention, which is obtained by modeling the environment dynamics. In launching phase, the upper-level agents take the lead in making decisions and communicate their actions with the lower-level agents. Theoretically, we prove the policies learned by SeqComm are guaranteed to improve monotonically and converge. Empirically, we show that SeqComm outperforms existing methods in various multi-agent cooperative tasks.

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We develop a resilient binary hypothesis testing framework for decision making in adversarial multi-robot crowdsensing tasks. This framework exploits stochastic trust observations between robots to arrive at tractable, resilient decision making at a centralized Fusion Center (FC) even when i) there exist malicious robots in the network and their number may be larger than the number of legitimate robots, and ii) the FC uses one-shot noisy measurements from all robots. We derive two algorithms to achieve this. The first is the Two Stage Approach (2SA) that estimates the legitimacy of robots based on received trust observations, and provably minimizes the probability of detection error in the worst-case malicious attack. Here, the proportion of malicious robots is known but arbitrary. For the case of an unknown proportion of malicious robots, we develop the Adversarial Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (A-GLRT) that uses both the reported robot measurements and trust observations to estimate the trustworthiness of robots, their reporting strategy, and the correct hypothesis simultaneously. We exploit special problem structure to show that this approach remains computationally tractable despite several unknown problem parameters. We deploy both algorithms in a hardware experiment where a group of robots conducts crowdsensing of traffic conditions on a mock-up road network similar in spirit to Google Maps, subject to a Sybil attack. We extract the trust observations for each robot from actual communication signals which provide statistical information on the uniqueness of the sender. We show that even when the malicious robots are in the majority, the FC can reduce the probability of detection error to 30.5% and 29% for the 2SA and the A-GLRT respectively.

We study a decision-maker's problem of finding optimal monetary incentive schemes when faced with agents whose participation decisions (stochastically) depend on the incentive they receive. Our focus is on policies constrained to fulfill two fairness properties that preclude outcomes wherein different groups of agents experience different treatment on average. We formulate the problem as a high-dimensional stochastic optimization problem, and study it through the use of a closely related deterministic variant. We show that the optimal static solution to this deterministic variant is asymptotically optimal for the dynamic problem under fairness constraints. Though solving for the optimal static solution gives rise to a non-convex optimization problem, we uncover a structural property that allows us to design a tractable, fast-converging heuristic policy. Traditional schemes for stakeholder retention ignore fairness constraints; indeed, the goal in these is to use differentiation to incentivize repeated engagement with the system. Our work (i) shows that even in the absence of explicit discrimination, dynamic policies may unintentionally discriminate between agents of different types by varying the type composition of the system, and (ii) presents an asymptotically optimal policy to avoid such discriminatory outcomes.

The paper addresses the problem of multi-agent communication in networks with regular directed ring structure. These can be viewed as hierarchical extensions of the classical cyclic pursuit topology. We show that the spectra of the corresponding Laplacian matrices allow exact localization on the complex plane. Furthermore, we derive a general form of the characteristic polynomial of such matrices, analyze the algebraic curves its roots belong to, and propose a way to obtain their closed-form equations. In combination with frequency domain consensus criteria for high-order SISO linear agents, these curves enable one to analyze the feasibility of consensus in networks with varying number of agents.

In this paper, the graph based condition for the controllability of game based control system is presented when the control of regulator is not zero. A control framework which can describe realism well expressed as the game based control system (GBCS), was obtained in 2019, which, unfortunately, is not graph theoretically verifiable, and the regulator control input is assumed to be zero. However, based on a new established notion, strategy matrix, we propose a graph theory condition to judge the controllability of GBCS, instead of using algebraic conditions for complex mathematical calculations. More specifically, to tackle these issues, one needs to study the expression of Nash equilibrium actions when regulators control is not zero first. Based on this expression, the general formula of game controllability matrix is obtained, which provides theoretical support for studying the essential influence of topology on game based control system. The general formula is always affected by the specific matrix strategy matrix, composed of Nash equilibrium actions, and the matrix can not only be obtained by matrix calculation, but also can be directly written through the topology, which is the specific influence of the topology on the GBCS. Finally, we obtain the result of judging the controllability of the system directly according to the topological structure, and put forward the conjecture that there is no limitation of equivalent partition in GBCS. Arguably, this is a surprising conjecture on the equivalent partition of graphs, because only the limitation of equivalent partition in fivenode graphs has been solved so far