This work proposes a framework that incorporates trust in an ad hoc teamwork scenario with human-agent teams, where an agent must collaborate with a human to perform a task. During the task, the agent must infer, through interactions and observations, how much the human trusts it and adapt its behaviour to maximize the team's performance. To achieve this, we propose collecting data from human participants in experiments to define different settings (based on trust levels) and learning optimal policies for each of them. Then, we create a module to infer the current setting (depending on the amount of trust). Finally, we validate this framework in a real-world scenario and analyse how this adaptable behaviour affects trust.

In multi-agent coverage control problems, agents navigate their environment to reach locations that maximize the coverage of some density. In practice, the density is rarely known $\textit{a priori}$, further complicating the original NP-hard problem. Moreover, in many applications, agents cannot visit arbitrary locations due to $\textit{a priori}$ unknown safety constraints. In this paper, we aim to efficiently learn the density to approximately solve the coverage problem while preserving the agents' safety. We first propose a conditionally linear submodular coverage function that facilitates theoretical analysis. Utilizing this structure, we develop MacOpt, a novel algorithm that efficiently trades off the exploration-exploitation dilemma due to partial observability, and show that it achieves sublinear regret. Next, we extend results on single-agent safe exploration to our multi-agent setting and propose SafeMac for safe coverage and exploration. We analyze SafeMac and give first of its kind results: near optimal coverage in finite time while provably guaranteeing safety. We extensively evaluate our algorithms on synthetic and real problems, including a bio-diversity monitoring task under safety constraints, where SafeMac outperforms competing methods.

We study the decentralized optimization problem where a network of $n$ agents seeks to minimize the average of a set of heterogeneous non-convex cost functions distributedly. State-of-the-art decentralized algorithms like Exact Diffusion~(ED) and Gradient Tracking~(GT) involve communicating every iteration. However, communication is expensive, resource intensive, and slow. In this work, we analyze a locally updated GT method (LU-GT), where agents perform local recursions before interacting with their neighbors. While local updates have been shown to reduce communication overhead in practice, their theoretical influence has not been fully characterized. We show LU-GT has the same communication complexity as the Federated Learning setting but allows arbitrary network topologies. In addition, we prove that the number of local updates does not degrade the quality of the solution achieved by LU-GT. Numerical examples reveal that local updates can lower communication costs in certain regimes (e.g., well-connected graphs).

In risk-averse reinforcement learning (RL), the goal is to optimize some risk measure of the returns. A risk measure often focuses on the worst returns out of the agent's experience. As a result, standard methods for risk-averse RL often ignore high-return strategies. We prove that under certain conditions this inevitably leads to a local-optimum barrier, and propose a soft risk mechanism to bypass it. We also devise a novel Cross Entropy module for risk sampling, which (1) preserves risk aversion despite the soft risk; (2) independently improves sample efficiency. By separating the risk aversion of the sampler and the optimizer, we can sample episodes with poor conditions, yet optimize with respect to successful strategies. We combine these two concepts in CeSoR - Cross-entropy Soft-Risk optimization algorithm - which can be applied on top of any risk-averse policy gradient (PG) method. We demonstrate improved risk aversion in maze navigation, autonomous driving, and resource allocation benchmarks, including in scenarios where standard risk-averse PG completely fails.

We tackle the communication efficiency challenge of learning kernelized contextual bandits in a distributed setting. Despite the recent advances in communication-efficient distributed bandit learning, existing solutions are restricted to simple models like multi-armed bandits and linear bandits, which hamper their practical utility. In this paper, instead of assuming the existence of a linear reward mapping from the features to the expected rewards, we consider non-linear reward mappings, by letting agents collaboratively search in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS). This introduces significant challenges in communication efficiency as distributed kernel learning requires the transfer of raw data, leading to a communication cost that grows linearly w.r.t. time horizon $T$. We addresses this issue by equipping all agents to communicate via a common Nystr\"{o}m embedding that gets updated adaptively as more data points are collected. We rigorously proved that our algorithm can attain sub-linear rate in both regret and communication cost.

We propose an AI-based pilot trainer to help students learn how to fly aircraft. First, an AI agent uses behavioral cloning to learn flying maneuvers from qualified flight instructors. Later, the system uses the agent's decisions to detect errors made by students and provide feedback to help students correct their errors. This paper presents an instantiation of the pilot trainer. We focus on teaching straight and level flying maneuvers by automatically providing formative feedback to the human student.

Revision game is a very new model formulating the real-time situation where players dynamically prepare and revise their actions in advance before a deadline when payoffs are realized. It is at the cutting edge of dynamic game theory and can be applied in many real-world scenarios, such as eBay auction, stock market, election, online games, crowdsourcing, etc. In this work, we novelly identify a class of strategies for revision games which are called Limited Retaliation strategies. An limited retaliation strategy stipulates that, (1) players first follow a recommended cooperative plan; (2) if anyone deviates from the plan, the limited retaliation player retaliates by using the defection action for a limited duration; (3) after the retaliation, the limited retaliation player returns to the cooperative plan. A limited retaliation strategy has three key features. It is cooperative, sustaining a high level of social welfare. It is vengeful, deterring the opponent from betrayal by threatening with a future retaliation. It is yet forgiving, since it resumes cooperation after a proper retaliation. The cooperativeness and vengefulness make it constitute cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium, while the forgiveness makes it tolerate occasional mistakes. limited retaliation strategies show significant advantages over Grim Trigger, which is currently the only known strategy for revision games. Besides its contribution as a new robust and welfare-optimizing equilibrium strategy, our results about limited retaliation strategy can also be used to explain how easy cooperation can happen, and why forgiveness emerges in real-world multi-agent interactions. In addition, limited retaliation strategies are simple to derive and computationally efficient, making it easy for algorithm design and implementation in many multi-agent systems.

This paper aims to investigate the mechanisms that contribute to propagation of competence in an Agile Scrum team. This study seeks to challenge the traditional view of bounded rationality (BR). An Agile Scrum team (Team) is expected to build problem solving competence quickly as the expected ramp up time continues to shrink. But the team has a mixture of expertise, competence and sociability levels that affect out-of-the-box performance. The objective is to expand BR into the social realm and see how teams can self-organize and reconfigure to allow effective problem solving. Studies have shown that agent-based computational simulation is an appropriate technique to explore this point from a theoretical perspective. The first step is to define the problem, discuss how senior team members exhibit high curiosity and apply sociability and cognitive resources to develop overall team competence. This dynamic is modeled and simulated in NetLogoR and the results are analyzed. Finally, some key findings are presented and discussed.

We propose the first regret-based approach to the Graphical Bilinear Bandits problem, where $n$ agents in a graph play a stochastic bilinear bandit game with each of their neighbors. This setting reveals a combinatorial NP-hard problem that prevents the use of any existing regret-based algorithm in the (bi-)linear bandit literature. In this paper, we fill this gap and present the first regret-based algorithm for graphical bilinear bandits using the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty. Theoretical analysis of this new method yields an upper bound of $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ on the $\alpha$-regret and evidences the impact of the graph structure on the rate of convergence. Finally, we show through various experiments the validity of our approach.

This paper studies multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games, with the goal of learning Nash equilibria or coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) sample-optimally. All prior results suffer from at least one of the two obstacles: the curse of multiple agents and the barrier of long horizon, regardless of the sampling protocol in use. We take a step towards settling this problem, assuming access to a flexible sampling mechanism: the generative model. Focusing on non-stationary finite-horizon Markov games, we develop a fast learning algorithm called \myalg~and an adaptive sampling scheme that leverage the optimism principle in online adversarial learning (particularly the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) method). Our algorithm learns an $\varepsilon$-approximate CCE in a general-sum Markov game using $$ \widetilde{O}\bigg( \frac{H^4 S \sum_{i=1}^m A_i}{\varepsilon^2} \bigg) $$ samples, where $m$ is the number of players, $S$ indicates the number of states, $H$ is the horizon, and $A_i$ denotes the number of actions for the $i$-th player. This is minimax-optimal (up to log factor) when the number of players is fixed. When applied to two-player zero-sum Markov games, our algorithm provably finds an $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium with minimal samples. Along the way, we derive a refined regret bound for FTRL that makes explicit the role of variance-type quantities, which might be of independent interest.