The rapid advancement of chat-based language models has led to remarkable progress in complex task-solving. However, their success heavily relies on human input to guide the conversation, which can be challenging and time-consuming. This paper explores the potential of building scalable techniques to facilitate autonomous cooperation among communicative agents, and provides insight into their "cognitive" processes. To address the challenges of achieving autonomous cooperation, we propose a novel communicative agent framework named role-playing . Our approach involves using inception prompting to guide chat agents toward task completion while maintaining consistency with human intentions. We showcase how role-playing can be used to generate conversational data for studying the behaviors and capabilities of a society of agents, providing a valuable resource for investigating conversational language models. In particular, we conduct comprehensive studies on instruction-following cooperation in multi-agent settings. Our contributions include introducing a novel communicative agent framework, offering a scalable approach for studying the cooperative behaviors and capabilities of multi-agent systems, and open-sourcing our library to support research on communicative agents and beyond: https://github.com/camel-ai/camel.

The ability of Language Models (LMs) to understand natural language makes them a powerful tool for parsing human instructions into task plans for autonomous robots. Unlike traditional planning methods that rely on domain-specific knowledge and handcrafted rules, LMs generalize from diverse data and adapt to various tasks with minimal tuning, acting as a compressed knowledge base.

We study collaborative normal mean estimation, where $m$ strategic agents collect i.i.d samples from a normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$ at a cost. They all wish to estimate the mean $\mu$. By sharing data with each other, agents can obtain better estimates while keeping the cost of data collection small. To facilitate this collaboration, we wish to design mechanisms that encourage agents to collect a sufficient amount of data and share it truthfully, so that they are all better off than working alone. In naive mechanisms, such as simply pooling and sharing all the data, an individual agent might find it beneficial to under-collect and/or fabricate data, which can lead to poor social outcomes. We design a novel mechanism that overcomes these challenges via two key techniques: first, when sharing the others' data with an agent, the mechanism corrupts this dataset proportional to how much the data reported by the agent differs from the others; second, we design minimax optimal estimators for the corrupted dataset. Our mechanism, which is Nash incentive compatible and individually rational, achieves a social penalty (sum of all agents' estimation errors and data collection costs) that is at most a factor 2 of the global minimum. When applied to high dimensional (non-Gaussian) distributions with bounded variance, this mechanism retains these three properties, but with slightly weaker results. Finally, in two special cases where we restrict the strategy space of the agents, we design mechanisms that essentially achieve the global minimum.

Grouping is ubiquitous in natural systems and is essential for promoting efficiency in team coordination. This paper proposes a novel formulation of Group-oriented Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (GoMARL), which learns automatic grouping without domain knowledge for efficient cooperation. In contrast to existing approaches that attempt to directly learn the complex relationship between the joint action-values and individual utilities, we empower subgroups as a bridge to model the connection between small sets of agents and encourage cooperation among them, thereby improving the learning efficiency of the whole team. In particular, we factorize the joint action-values as a combination of group-wise values, which guide agents to improve their policies in a fine-grained fashion. We present an automatic grouping mechanism to generate dynamic groups and group action-values. We further introduce a hierarchical control for policy learning that drives the agents in the same group to specialize in similar policies and possess diverse strategies for various groups. Experiments on the StarCraft II micromanagement tasks and Google Research Football scenarios verify our method's effectiveness. Extensive component studies show how grouping works and enhances performance.

In the realm of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), achieving high performance is crucial for a successful multi-agent system.Meanwhile, the ability to avoid unsafe actions is becoming an urgent and imperative problem to solve for real-life applications. Whereas, it is still challenging to develop a safety-aware method for multi-agent systems in MARL. In this work, we introduce a novel approach called Multi-Agent First Order Constrained Optimization in Policy Space (MAFOCOPS), which effectively addresses the dual objectives of attaining satisfactory performance and enforcing safety constraints. Using data generated from the current policy, MAFOCOPS first finds the optimal update policy by solving a constrained optimization problem in the nonparameterized policy space. Then, the update policy is projected back into the parametric policy space to achieve a feasible policy. Notably, our method is first-order in nature, ensuring the ease of implementation, and exhibits an approximate upper bound on the worst-case constraint violation. Empirical results show that our approach achieves remarkable performance while satisfying safe constraints on several safe MARL benchmarks.

We consider the problem of using logged data to make predictions about what would happen if we changed the `rules of the game' in a multi-agent system. This task is difficult because in many cases we observe actions individuals take but not their private information or their full reward functions. In addition, agents are strategic, so when the rules change, they will also change their actions.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning often requires decentralised policies, which severely limit the agents' ability to coordinate their behaviour. In this paper, we show that common knowledge between agents allows for complex decentralised coordination. Common knowledge arises naturally in a large number of decentralised cooperative multi-agent tasks, for example, when agents can reconstruct parts of each others' observations. Since agents can independently agree on their common knowledge, they can execute complex coordinated policies that condition on this knowledge in a fully decentralised fashion. We propose multi-agent common knowledge reinforcement learning (MACKRL), a novel stochastic actor-critic algorithm that learns a hierarchical policy tree. Higher levels in the hierarchy coordinate groups of agents by conditioning on their common knowledge, or delegate to lower levels with smaller subgroups but potentially richer common knowledge. The entire policy tree can be executed in a fully decentralised fashion. As the lowest policy tree level consists of independent policies for each agent, MACKRL reduces to independently learnt decentralised policies as a special case. We demonstrate that our method can exploit common knowledge for superior performance on complex decentralised coordination tasks, including a stochastic matrix game and challenging problems in StarCraft II unit micromanagement.

The availability of challenging benchmarks has played a key role in the recent progress of machine learning. In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning, the StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge (SMAC) has become a popular testbed for centralised training with decentralised execution. However, after years of sustained improvement on SMAC, algorithms now achieve near-perfect performance. In this work, we conduct new analysis demonstrating that SMAC lacks the stochasticity and partial observability to require complex policies. In particular, we show that an policy conditioned only on the timestep can achieve non-trivial win rates for many SMAC scenarios.

We study a new class of Markov games, \textit{(multi-player) zero-sum Markov Games} with {\it Networked separable interactions} (zero-sum NMGs), to model the local interaction structure in non-cooperative multi-agent sequential decision-making. We define a zero-sum NMG as a model where {the payoffs of the auxiliary games associated with each state are zero-sum and} have some separable (i.e., polymatrix) structure across the neighbors over some interaction network. We first identify the necessary and sufficient conditions under which an MG can be presented as a zero-sum NMG, and show that the set of Markov coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) collapses to the set of Markov Nash equilibrium (NE) in these games, in that the {product of} per-state marginalization of the former for all players yields the latter. Furthermore, we show that finding approximate Markov \emph{stationary} CCE in infinite-horizon discounted zero-sum NMGs is \texttt{PPAD}-hard, unless the underlying network has a ``star topology''. Then, we propose fictitious-play-type dynamics, the classical learning dynamics in normal-form games, for zero-sum NMGs, and establish convergence guarantees to Markov stationary NE under a star-shaped network structure. Finally, in light of the hardness result, we focus on computing a Markov \emph{non-stationary} NE and provide finite-iteration guarantees for a series of value-iteration-based algorithms. We also provide numerical experiments to corroborate our theoretical results.

We investigate safe multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents seek to collectively maximize an aggregate sum of local objectives while satisfying their own safety constraints. The objective and constraints are described by general utilities, i.e., nonlinear functions of the long-term state-action occupancy measure, which encompass broader decision-making goals such as risk, exploration, or imitations. The exponential growth of the state-action space size with the number of agents presents challenges for global observability, further exacerbated by the global coupling arising from agents' safety constraints. To tackle this issue, we propose a primal-dual method utilizing shadow reward and $\kappa$-hop neighbor truncation under a form of correlation decay property, where $\kappa$ is the communication radius. In the exact setting, our algorithm converges to a first-order stationary point (FOSP) at the rate of $\mathcal{O}\left(T^{-2/3}\right)$. In the sample-based setting, we demonstrate that, with high probability, our algorithm requires $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\epsilon^{-3.5}\right)$