Platforms are increasingly adopting Artificial Intelligence (henceforth, AI) algorithms (for example, the ChatGPT (Ouyang, Wu, Jiang, Almeida, Wainwright, Mishkin, Zhang, Agarwal, Slama, Ray, et al. (2022)) and Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin, and Rock (2023)) to intelligentize services and price their products, and this tendency is likely to be extended to other business areas, particularly contract design. In this paper, we ask whether contracting algorithms may "autonomously" learn to be incentive compatible, especially for the contracting problem with multiple sides, which we also refer to as the multi-sided contracting problem. We emphasize that AI algorithms can be used to automatically optimize the terms of a contract by taking into account the preferences of both sides and the legal and economic environment in which the agreement must be implemented. Note that this contract negotiation process is automatic, requiring very little external guidance. In light of these developments, concerns have been voiced by scholars and organizations alike, that AI algorithms may create an AI alignment problem due to differences between the specified reward function and what relevant humans (the designer, the user, others affected by the agent's behavior) actually value (see Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield (2019) and Gabriel (2020)). We highlight that this AI alignment problem has a clear analogy to the principal-agent problem (see Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield (2019)), and the analysis of incentive compatibility for the incomplete contracting via AI algorithms can provide an insightful framework for understanding the alignment among algorithms. But how real is the risk of misalignment among AI algorithms? That is a difficult question to answer, both empirically and theoretically. On the empirical side, alignment is notoriously hard to detect from market outcomes, and firms typically do not disclose details of the financial or employment contracts they have.

The chore division problem simulates the fair division of a heterogeneous undesirable resource among several agents. In the fair division problem, each agent only gains value from its own piece. Agents may, however, also be concerned with the pieces given to other agents; these externalities naturally appear in fair division situations. Branzei et ai. (Branzei et al., IJCAI 2013) generalize the classical ideas of proportionality and envy-freeness while extending the classical model to account for externalities.

This paper studies the distributed resilient output containment control of heterogeneous multiagent systems against composite attacks, including denial-of-services (DoS) attacks, false-data injection (FDI) attacks, camouflage attacks, and actuation attacks. Inspired by digital twins, a twin layer (TL) with higher security and privacy is used to decouple the above problem into two tasks: defense protocols against DoS attacks on TL and defense protocols against actuation attacks on cyber-physical layer (CPL). First, considering modeling errors of leader dynamics, we introduce distributed observers to reconstruct the leader dynamics for each follower on TL under DoS attacks. Second, distributed estimators are used to estimate follower states according to the reconstructed leader dynamics on the TL. Third, according to the reconstructed leader dynamics, we design decentralized solvers that calculate the output regulator equations on CPL. Fourth, decentralized adaptive attack-resilient control schemes that resist unbounded actuation attacks are provided on CPL. Furthermore, we apply the above control protocols to prove that the followers can achieve uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) convergence, and the upper bound of the UUB convergence is determined explicitly. Finally, two simulation examples are provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed control protocols.

We study the dynamics of belief formation on multiple interconnected topics in networks of agents with a shared belief system. We establish sufficient conditions and necessary conditions under which sustained oscillations of beliefs arise on the network in a Hopf bifurcation and characterize the role of the communication graph and the belief system graph in shaping the relative phase and amplitude patterns of the oscillations. Additionally, we distinguish broad classes of graphs that exhibit such oscillations from those that do not.

Cloud Robotics is helping to create a new generation of robots that leverage the nearly unlimited resources of large data centers (i.e., the cloud), overcoming the limitations imposed by on-board resources. Different processing power, capabilities, resource sizes, energy consumption, and so forth, make scheduling and task allocation critical components. The basic idea of task allocation and scheduling is to optimize performance by minimizing completion time, energy consumption, delays between two consecutive tasks, along with others, and maximizing resource utilization, number of completed tasks in a given time interval, and suchlike. In the past, several works have addressed various aspects of task allocation and scheduling. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive overview of task allocation and scheduling strategies and related metrics suitable for robotic network cloud systems. We discuss the issues related to allocation and scheduling methods and the limitations that need to be overcome. The literature review is organized according to three different viewpoints: Architectures and Applications, Methods and Parameters. In addition, the limitations of each method are highlighted for future research.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

The transition model is used to imagine possible outcomes of taking the action/option, which are then evaluated by the value functions to change the policies and the value functions themselves. This process is called planning. Planning, like everything else in the architecture, is expected to be continual and temporally uniform. On every step there will be some amount of planning, perhaps a series of small planning steps, but planning would typically not be complete in a single time step and thus would be slow compared to the speed of agent-environment interaction. Planning is an ongoing process that operates asynchronously, in the background, whenever it can be done without interfering with the first three components, all of which must operate on every time step and are said to run in the foreground.

Typical cooperative multi-agent systems (MASs) exchange information to coordinate their motion in proximity-based control consensus schemes to complete a common objective. However, in the event of faults or cyber attacks to on-board positioning sensors of agents, global control performance may be compromised resulting in a hijacking of the entire MAS. For systems that operate in unknown or landmark-free environments (e.g., open terrain, sea, or air) and also beyond range/proximity sensing of nearby agents, compromised agents lose localization capabilities. To maintain resilience in these scenarios, we propose a method to recover compromised agents by utilizing Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) from nearby agents (i.e., mobile landmarks) to provide reliable position measurements for localization. To minimize estimation error: i) a multilateration scheme is proposed to leverage RSSI and position information received from neighboring agents as mobile landmarks and ii) a Kalman filtering method adaptively updates the unknown RSSI-based position measurement covariance matrix at runtime that is robust to unreliable state estimates. The proposed framework is demonstrated with simulations on MAS formations in the presence of faults and cyber attacks to on-board position sensors.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states to others, the basis of human cognition. At present, there has been growing interest in the AI with cognitive abilities, for example in healthcare and the motoring industry. Beliefs, desires, and intentions are the early abilities of infants and the foundation of human cognitive ability, as well as for machine with ToM. In this paper, we review recent progress in machine ToM on beliefs, desires, and intentions. And we shall introduce the experiments, datasets and methods of machine ToM on these three aspects, summarize the development of different tasks and datasets in recent years, and compare well-behaved models in aspects of advantages, limitations and applicable conditions, hoping that this study can guide researchers to quickly keep up with latest trend in this field. Unlike other domains with a specific task and resolution framework, machine ToM lacks a unified instruction and a series of standard evaluation tasks, which make it difficult to formally compare the proposed models. We argue that, one method to address this difficulty is now to present a standard assessment criteria and dataset, better a large-scale dataset covered multiple aspects of ToM.

The deployment of Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) poses considerable challenges and unique opportunities for the design and management of future urban road infrastructure. In light of this disruptive transformation, the Right-Of-Way (ROW) composition of road space has the potential to be renewed. Design approaches and intelligent control models have been proposed to address this problem, but we lack an operational framework that can dynamically generate ROW plans for AVs and pedestrians in response to real-time demand. Based on microscopic traffic simulation, this study explores Reinforcement Learning (RL) methods for evolving ROW compositions. We implement a centralised paradigm and a distributive learning paradigm to separately perform the dynamic control on several road network configurations. Experimental results indicate that the algorithms have the potential to improve traffic flow efficiency and allocate more space for pedestrians. Furthermore, the distributive learning algorithm outperforms its centralised counterpart regarding computational cost (49.55\%), benchmark rewards (25.35\%), best cumulative rewards (24.58\%), optimal actions (13.49\%) and rate of convergence. This novel road management technique could potentially contribute to the flow-adaptive and active mobility-friendly streets in the AVs era.