Goto

Collaborating Authors

 Agents


On the Complexity of Multi-Agent Decision Making: From Learning in Games to Partial Monitoring

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

A central problem in the theory of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is to understand what structural conditions and algorithmic principles lead to sample-efficient learning guarantees, and how these considerations change as we move from few to many agents. We study this question in a general framework for interactive decision making with multiple agents, encompassing Markov games with function approximation and normal-form games with bandit feedback. We focus on equilibrium computation, in which a centralized learning algorithm aims to compute an equilibrium by controlling multiple agents that interact with an unknown environment. Our main contributions are: - We provide upper and lower bounds on the optimal sample complexity for multi-agent decision making based on a multi-agent generalization of the Decision-Estimation Coefficient, a complexity measure introduced by Foster et al. (2021) in the single-agent counterpart to our setting. Compared to the best results for the single-agent setting, our bounds have additional gaps. We show that no "reasonable" complexity measure can close these gaps, highlighting a striking separation between single and multiple agents. - We show that characterizing the statistical complexity for multi-agent decision making is equivalent to characterizing the statistical complexity of single-agent decision making, but with hidden (unobserved) rewards, a framework that subsumes variants of the partial monitoring problem. As a consequence, we characterize the statistical complexity for hidden-reward interactive decision making to the best extent possible. Building on this development, we provide several new structural results, including 1) conditions under which the statistical complexity of multi-agent decision making can be reduced to that of single-agent, and 2) conditions under which the so-called curse of multiple agents can be avoided.


Heterogeneous Social Value Orientation Leads to Meaningful Diversity in Sequential Social Dilemmas

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

In social psychology, Social Value Orientation (SVO) describes an individual's propensity to allocate resources between themself and others. In reinforcement learning, SVO has been instantiated as an intrinsic motivation that remaps an agent's rewards based on particular target distributions of group reward. Prior studies show that groups of agents endowed with heterogeneous SVO learn diverse policies in settings that resemble the incentive structure of Prisoner's dilemma. Our work extends this body of results and demonstrates that (1) heterogeneous SVO leads to meaningfully diverse policies across a range of incentive structures in sequential social dilemmas, as measured by task-specific diversity metrics; and (2) learning a best response to such policy diversity leads to better zero-shot generalization in some situations. We show that these best-response agents learn policies that are conditioned on their co-players, which we posit is the reason for improved zero-shot generalization results.


ADVISE: AI-accelerated Design of Evidence Synthesis for Global Development

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

When designing evidence-based policies and programs, decision-makers must distill key information from a vast and rapidly growing literature base. Identifying relevant literature from raw search results is time and resource intensive, and is often done by manual screening. In this study, we develop an AI agent based on a bidirectional encoder representations from transformers (BERT) model and incorporate it into a human team designing an evidence synthesis product for global development. We explore the effectiveness of the human-AI hybrid team in accelerating the evidence synthesis process. To further improve team efficiency, we enhance the human-AI hybrid team through active learning (AL). Specifically, we explore different sampling strategies, including random sampling, least confidence (LC) sampling, and highest priority (HP) sampling, to study their influence on the collaborative screening process. Results show that incorporating the BERT-based AI agent into the human team can reduce the human screening effort by 68.5% compared to the case of no AI assistance and by 16.8% compared to the case of using a support vector machine (SVM)-based AI agent for identifying 80% of all relevant documents. When we apply the HP sampling strategy for AL, the human screening effort can be reduced even more: by 78.3% for identifying 80% of all relevant documents compared to no AI assistance. We apply the AL-enhanced human-AI hybrid teaming workflow in the design process of three evidence gap maps (EGMs) for USAID and find it to be highly effective. These findings demonstrate how AI can accelerate the development of evidence synthesis products and promote timely evidence-based decision making in global development in a human-AI hybrid teaming context.


Strategic Resource Selection with Homophilic Agents

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then depends on the number of agents using the same resources. This implies that there is no distinction between the agents, i.e., they are anonymous. We depart from this very general setting by proposing Resource Selection Games with heterogeneous agents that strive for joint resource usage with similar agents. So, instead of the number of other users of a given resource, our model considers agents with different types and the decisive feature is the fraction of same-type agents among the users. More precisely, similarly to Schelling Games, there is a tolerance threshold $\tau \in [0,1]$ which specifies the agents' desired minimum fraction of same-type agents on a resource. Agents strive to select resources where at least a $\tau$-fraction of those resources' users have the same type as themselves. For $\tau=1$, our model generalizes Hedonic Diversity Games with a peak at $1$. For our general model, we consider the existence and quality of equilibria and the complexity of maximizing social welfare. Additionally, we consider a bounded rationality model, where agents can only estimate the utility of a resource, since they only know the fraction of same-type agents on a given resource, but not the exact numbers. Thus, they cannot know the impact a strategy change would have on a target resource. Interestingly, we show that this type of bounded rationality yields favorable game-theoretic properties and specific equilibria closely approximate equilibria of the full knowledge setting.


Exposure-Based Multi-Agent Inspection of a Tumbling Target Using Deep Reinforcement Learning

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

As space becomes more congested, on orbit inspection is an increasingly relevant activity whether to observe a defunct satellite for planning repairs or to de-orbit it. However, the task of on orbit inspection itself is challenging, typically requiring the careful coordination of multiple observer satellites. This is complicated by a highly nonlinear environment where the target may be unknown or moving unpredictably without time for continuous command and control from the ground. There is a need for autonomous, robust, decentralized solutions to the inspection task. To achieve this, we consider a hierarchical, learned approach for the decentralized planning of multi-agent inspection of a tumbling target. Our solution consists of two components: a viewpoint or high-level planner trained using deep reinforcement learning and a navigation planner handling point-to-point navigation between pre-specified viewpoints. We present a novel problem formulation and methodology that is suitable not only to reinforcement learning-derived robust policies, but extendable to unknown target geometries and higher fidelity information theoretic objectives received directly from sensor inputs. Operating under limited information, our trained multi-agent high-level policies successfully contextualize information within the global hierarchical environment and are correspondingly able to inspect over 90% of non-convex tumbling targets, even in the absence of additional agent attitude control.


Know your audience: specializing grounded language models with listener subtraction

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Effective communication requires adapting to the idiosyncrasies of each communicative context--such as the common ground shared with each partner. Humans demonstrate this ability to specialize to their audience in many contexts, such as the popular game Dixit. We take inspiration from Dixit to formulate a multi-agent image reference game where a (trained) speaker model is rewarded for describing a target image such that one (pretrained) listener model can correctly identify it among distractors, but another listener cannot. To adapt, the speaker must exploit differences in the knowledge it shares with the different listeners. We show that finetuning an attention-based adapter between a CLIP vision encoder and a large language model in this contrastive, multi-agent setting gives rise to context-dependent natural language specialization from rewards only, without direct supervision. Through controlled experiments, we show that training a speaker with two listeners that perceive differently, using our method, allows the speaker to adapt to the idiosyncracies of the listeners. Furthermore, we show zero-shot transfer of the specialization to real-world data. Our experiments demonstrate a method for specializing grounded language models without direct supervision and highlight the interesting research challenges posed by complex multi-agent communication.


AI-Assisted Ethics? Considerations of AI Simulation for the Ethical Assessment and Design of Assistive Technologies

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Current ethical debates on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in health care treat AI as a product of technology in three ways: First, by assessing risks and potential benefits of currently developed AI-enabled products with ethical checklists; second, by proposing ex ante lists of ethical values seen as relevant for the design and development of assisting technology, and third, by promoting AI technology to use moral reasoning as part of the automation process. Subsequently, we propose a fourth approach to AI, namely as a methodological tool to assist ethical reflection. We provide a concept of an AI-simulation informed by three separate elements: 1) stochastic human behavior models based on behavioral data for simulating realistic settings, 2) qualitative empirical data on value statements regarding internal policy, and 3) visualization components that aid in understanding the impact of changes in these variables. The potential of this approach is to inform an interdisciplinary field about anticipated ethical challenges or ethical trade-offs in concrete settings and, hence, to spark a re-evaluation of design and implementation plans. This may be particularly useful for applications that deal with extremely complex values and behavior or with limitations on the communication resources of affected persons (e.g., persons with dementia care or for care of persons with cognitive impairment). Simulation does not replace ethical reflection but does allow for detailed, context-sensitive analysis during the design process and prior to implementation. Finally, we discuss the inherently quantitative methods of analysis afforded by stochastic simulations as well as the potential for ethical discussions and how simulations with AI can improve traditional forms of thought experiments and future-oriented technology assessment.


Guaranteed Evader Detection in Multi-Agent Search Tasks using Pincer Trajectories

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Assume that inside an initial planar area there are smart mobile evaders attempting to avoid detection by a team of sweeping searching agents. All sweepers detect evaders with fan-shaped sensors, modeling the field of view of real cameras. Detection of all evaders is guaranteed with cooperative sweeping strategies, by setting requirements on sweepers' speed, and by carefully designing their trajectories. Assume the smart evaders have an upper limit on their speed which is a-priori known to the sweeping team. An easier task for the team of sweepers is to confine evaders to the domain in which they are initially located. The sweepers accomplish the confinement task if they move sufficiently fast and detect evaders by applying an appropriate search strategy. Any given search strategy results in a minimal sweeper's speed in order to be able to detect all evaders. The minimal speed guarantees the ability of the sweeping team to confine evaders to their original domain, and if the sweepers move faster they are able to detect all evaders that are present in the region. We present results on the total search time for a novel pincer-movement based search protocol that utilizes complementary trajectories along with adaptive sensor geometries for any even number of pursuers.


Defining Replicability of Prediction Rules

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

In this article I propose an approach for defining replicability for prediction rules. Motivated by a recent NAS report, I start from the perspective that replicability is obtaining consistent results across studies suitable to address the same prediction question, each of which has obtained its own data. I then discuss concept and issues in defining key elements of this statement. I focus specifically on the meaning of "consistent results" in typical utilization contexts, and propose a multi-agent framework for defining replicability, in which agents are neither partners nor adversaries. I recover some of the prevalent practical approaches as special cases. I hope to provide guidance for a more systematic assessment of replicability in machine learning.


Space-Time Conflict Spheres for Constrained Multi-Agent Motion Planning

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Multi-agent motion planning (MAMP) is a critical challenge in applications such as connected autonomous vehicles and multi-robot systems. In this paper, we propose a space-time conflict resolution approach for MAMP. We formulate the problem using a novel, flexible sphere-based discretization for trajectories. Our approach leverages a depth-first conflict search strategy to provide the scalability of decoupled approaches while maintaining the computational guarantees of coupled approaches. We compose procedures for evading discretization error and adhering to kinematic constraints in generated solutions. Theoretically, we prove the continuous-time feasibility and formulation-space completeness of our algorithm. Experimentally, we demonstrate that our algorithm matches the performance of the current state of the art with respect to both runtime and solution quality, while expanding upon the abilities of current work through accommodation for both static and dynamic obstacles. We evaluate our algorithm in various unsignalized traffic intersection scenarios using CARLA, an open-source vehicle simulator. Results show significant success rate improvement in spatially constrained settings, involving both connected and non-connected vehicles. Furthermore, we maintain a reasonable suboptimality ratio that scales well among increasingly complex scenarios.