Implementing intelligent control of robots is a difficult task, especially when dealing with complex black-box systems, because of the lack of visibility and understanding of how these robots work internally. This paper proposes an Intelligent Social Learning (ISL) algorithm to enable intelligent control of black-box robotic systems. Inspired by mutual learning among individuals in human social groups, ISL includes learning, imitation, and self-study styles. Individuals in the learning style use the Levy flight search strategy to learn from the best performer and form the closest relationships. In the imitation style, individuals mimic the best performer with a second-level rapport by employing a random perturbation strategy. In the self-study style, individuals learn independently using a normal distribution sampling method while maintaining a distant relationship with the best performer. Individuals in the population are regarded as autonomous intelligent agents in each style. Neural networks perform strategic actions in three styles to interact with the environment and the robot and iteratively optimize the network policy. Overall, ISL builds on the principles of intelligent optimization, incorporating ideas from reinforcement learning, and possesses strong search capabilities, fast computation speed, fewer hyperparameters, and insensitivity to sparse rewards. The proposed ISL algorithm is compared with four state-of-the-art methods on six continuous control benchmark cases in MuJoCo to verify its effectiveness and advantages. Furthermore, ISL is adopted in the simulation and experimental grasping tasks of the UR3 robot for validations, and satisfactory solutions are yielded.

Interactions between road agents present a significant challenge in trajectory prediction, especially in cases involving multiple agents. Because existing diversity-aware predictors do not account for the interactive nature of multi-agent predictions, they may miss these important interaction outcomes. In this paper, we propose NashFormer, a framework for trajectory prediction that leverages game-theoretic inverse reinforcement learning to improve coverage of multi-modal predictions. We use a training-time game-theoretic analysis as an auxiliary loss resulting in improved coverage and accuracy without presuming a taxonomy of actions for the agents. We demonstrate our approach on the interactive split of the Waymo Open Motion Dataset, including four subsets involving scenarios with high interaction complexity. Experiment results show that our predictor produces accurate predictions while covering $33\%$ more potential interactions versus a baseline model.

Along with the springing up of the semantics-empowered communication (SemCom) research, it is now witnessing an unprecedentedly growing interest towards a wide range of aspects (e.g., theories, applications, metrics and implementations) in both academia and industry. In this work, we primarily aim to provide a comprehensive survey on both the background and research taxonomy, as well as a detailed technical tutorial. Specifically, we start by reviewing the literature and answering the "what" and "why" questions in semantic transmissions. Afterwards, we present the ecosystems of SemCom, including history, theories, metrics, datasets and toolkits, on top of which the taxonomy for research directions is presented. Furthermore, we propose to categorize the critical enabling techniques by explicit and implicit reasoning-based methods, and elaborate on how they evolve and contribute to modern content & channel semantics-empowered communications. Besides reviewing and summarizing the latest efforts in SemCom, we discuss the relations with other communication levels (e.g., conventional communications) from a holistic and unified viewpoint. Subsequently, in order to facilitate future developments and industrial applications, we also highlight advanced practical techniques for boosting semantic accuracy, robustness, and large-scale scalability, just to mention a few. Finally, we discuss the technical challenges that shed light on future research opportunities.

We consider a cooperative multiplayer bandit learning problem where the players are only allowed to agree on a strategy beforehand, but cannot communicate during the learning process. In this problem, each player simultaneously selects an action. Based on the actions selected by all players, the team of players receives a reward. The actions of all the players are commonly observed. However, each player receives a noisy version of the reward which cannot be shared with other players. Since players receive potentially different rewards, there is an asymmetry in the information used to select their actions. In this paper, we provide an algorithm based on upper and lower confidence bounds that the players can use to select their optimal actions despite the asymmetry in the reward information. We show that this algorithm can achieve logarithmic $O(\frac{\log T}{\Delta_{\bm{a}}})$ (gap-dependent) regret as well as $O(\sqrt{T\log T})$ (gap-independent) regret. This is asymptotically optimal in $T$. We also show that it performs empirically better than the current state of the art algorithm for this environment.

The game industry is challenged to cope with increasing growth in demand and game complexity while maintaining acceptable quality standards for released games. Classic approaches solely depending on human efforts for quality assurance and game testing do not scale effectively in terms of time and cost. Game-testing AI agents that learn by interaction with the environment have the potential to mitigate these challenges with good scalability properties on time and costs. However, most recent work in this direction depends on game state information for the agent's state representation, which limits generalization across different game scenarios. Moreover, game test engineers usually prefer exploring a game in a specific style, such as exploring the golden path. However, current game testing AI agents do not provide an explicit way to satisfy such a preference. This paper addresses these limitations by proposing an agent design that mainly depends on pixel-based state observations while exploring the environment conditioned on a user's preference specified by demonstration trajectories. In addition, we propose an imitation learning method that couples self-supervised and supervised learning objectives to enhance the quality of imitation behaviors. Our agent significantly outperforms state-of-the-art pixel-based game testing agents over exploration coverage and test execution quality when evaluated on a complex open-world environment resembling many aspects of real AAA games.

This paper presents multi-agent reinforcement learning frameworks for the low-level control of a quadrotor UAV. While single-agent reinforcement learning has been successfully applied to quadrotors, training a single monolithic network is often data-intensive and time-consuming. To address this, we decompose the quadrotor dynamics into the translational dynamics and the yawing dynamics, and assign a reinforcement learning agent to each part for efficient training and performance improvements. The proposed multi-agent framework for quadrotor low-level control that leverages the underlying structures of the quadrotor dynamics is a unique contribution. Further, we introduce regularization terms to mitigate steady-state errors and to avoid aggressive control inputs. Through benchmark studies with sim-to-sim transfer, it is illustrated that the proposed multi-agent reinforcement learning substantially improves the convergence rate of the training and the stability of the controlled dynamics.

As more non-AI experts use complex AI systems for daily tasks, there has been an increasing effort to develop methods that produce explanations of AI decision making that are understandable by non-AI experts. Towards this effort, leveraging higher-level concepts and producing concept-based explanations have become a popular method. Most concept-based explanations have been developed for classification techniques, and we posit that the few existing methods for sequential decision making are limited in scope. In this work, we first contribute a desiderata for defining "concepts" in sequential decision making settings. Additionally, inspired by the Protégé Effect which states explaining knowledge often reinforces one's self-learning, we explore how concept-based explanations of an RL agent's decision making can in turn improve the agent's learning rate, as well as improve end-user understanding of the agent's decision making. To this end, we contribute a unified framework, State2Explanation (S2E), that involves learning a joint embedding model between state-action pairs and concept-based explanations, and leveraging such learned model to both (1) inform reward shaping during an agent's training, and (2) provide explanations to end-users at deployment for improved task performance. Our experimental validations, in Connect 4 and Lunar Lander, demonstrate the success of S2E in providing a dual-benefit, successfully informing reward shaping and improving agent learning rate, as well as significantly improving end user task performance at deployment time.

This paper proposes a new notion of Markov α-potential games to study Markov games. Two important classes of practically significant Markov games, Markov congestion games and the perturbed Markov team games, are analyzed in this framework of Markov α-potential games, with explicit characterization of the upper bound for α and its relation to game parameters. Moreover, any maximizer of the α-potential function is shown to be an α-stationary Nash equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, two algorithms for the Nash regret analysis, namely the projected gradient-ascent algorithm and the sequential maximum improvement algorithm, are presented and corroborated by numerical experiments. Key words: Markov α-potential games; Markov potential games; Multi-agent reinforcement learning; Nash-regret; Markov congestion games; Perturbed Markov team games; Projected gradient-ascent algorithm; Sequential maximum improvement.

We propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning dynamics, and analyze its convergence in infinite-horizon discounted Markov potential games. We focus on the independent and decentralized setting, where players do not have knowledge of the game model and cannot coordinate. In each stage, players update their estimate of Q-function that evaluates their total contingent payoff based on the realized one-stage reward in an asynchronous manner. Then, players independently update their policies by incorporating an optimal one-stage deviation strategy based on the estimated Q-function. A key feature of the learning dynamics is that the Q-function estimates are updated at a faster timescale than the policies. We prove that the policies induced by our learning dynamics converge to the set of stationary Nash equilibria in Markov potential games with probability 1. Our results highlight the efficacy of simple learning dynamics in reaching to the set of stationary Nash equilibrium even in environments with minimal information available.

Prediction markets are long known for prediction accuracy. This study systematically explores the fundamental properties of prediction markets, addressing questions about their information aggregation process and the factors contributing to their remarkable efficacy. We propose a novel multivariate utility (MU) based mechanism that unifies several existing automated market-making schemes. Using this mechanism, we establish the convergence results for markets comprised of risk-averse traders who have heterogeneous beliefs and repeatedly interact with the market maker. We demonstrate that the resulting limiting wealth distribution aligns with the Pareto efficient frontier defined by the utilities of all market participants. With the help of this result, we establish analytical and numerical results for the limiting price in different market models. Specifically, we show that the limiting price converges to the geometric mean of agent beliefs in exponential utility-based markets. In risk-measure-based markets, we construct a family of risk measures that satisfy the convergence criteria and prove that the price can converge to a unique level represented by the weighted power mean of agent beliefs. In broader markets with Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utilities, we reveal that the limiting price can be characterized by systems of equations that encapsulate agent beliefs, risk parameters, and wealth. Despite the potential impact of traders' trading sequences on the limiting price, we establish a price invariance result for markets with a large trader population. Using this result, we propose an efficient approximation scheme for the limiting price.