Natural language instruction following is paramount to enable collaboration between artificial agents and human beings. Natural language-conditioned reinforcement learning (RL) agents have shown how natural languages' properties, such as compositionality, can provide a strong inductive bias to learn complex policies. Previous architectures like HIGhER combine the benefit of language-conditioning with Hindsight Experience Replay (HER) to deal with sparse rewards environments. Yet, like HER, HIGhER relies on an oracle predicate function to provide a feedback signal highlighting which linguistic description is valid for which state. This reliance on an oracle limits its application. Additionally, HIGhER only leverages the linguistic information contained in successful RL trajectories, thus hurting its final performance and data-efficiency. Without early successful trajectories, HIGhER is no better than DQN upon which it is built. In this paper, we propose the Emergent Textual Hindsight Experience Replay (ETHER) agent, which builds on HIGhER and addresses both of its limitations by means of (i) a discriminative visual referential game, commonly studied in the subfield of Emergent Communication (EC), used here as an unsupervised auxiliary task and (ii) a semantic grounding scheme to align the emergent language with the natural language of the instruction-following benchmark. We show that the referential game's agents make an artificial language emerge that is aligned with the natural-like language used to describe goals in the BabyAI benchmark and that it is expressive enough so as to also describe unsuccessful RL trajectories and thus provide feedback to the RL agent to leverage the linguistic, structured information contained in all trajectories. Our work shows that EC is a viable unsupervised auxiliary task for RL and provides missing pieces to make HER more widely applicable.

We study a sequential decision making problem between a principal and an agent with incomplete information on both sides. In this model, the principal and the agent interact in a stochastic environment, and each is privy to observations about the state not available to the other. The principal has the power of commitment, both to elicit information from the agent and to provide signals about her own information. The principal and the agent communicate their signals to each other, and select their actions independently based on this communication. Each player receives a payoff based on the state and their joint actions, and the environment moves to a new state. The interaction continues over a finite time horizon, and both players act to optimize their own total payoffs over the horizon. Our model encompasses as special cases stochastic games of incomplete information and POMDPs, as well as sequential Bayesian persuasion and mechanism design problems. We study both computation of optimal policies and learning in our setting. While the general problems are computationally intractable, we study algorithmic solutions under a conditional independence assumption on the underlying state-observation distributions. We present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the principal's optimal policy up to an additive approximation. Additionally, we show an efficient learning algorithm in the case where the transition probabilities are not known beforehand. The algorithm guarantees sublinear regret for both players.

Communication via natural language is a key aspect of machine intelligence, and it requires computational models to learn and reason about world concepts, with varying levels of supervision. Significant progress has been made on fully-supervised non-interactive tasks, such as question-answering and procedural text understanding. Yet, various sequential interactive tasks, as in text-based games, have revealed limitations of existing approaches in terms of coherence, contextual awareness, and their ability to learn effectively from the environment. In this paper, we propose a knowledge-injection framework for improved functional grounding of agents in text-based games. Specifically, we consider two forms of domain knowledge that we inject into learning-based agents: memory of previous correct actions and affordances of relevant objects in the environment. Our framework supports two representative model classes: reinforcement learning agents and language model agents. Furthermore, we devise multiple injection strategies for the above domain knowledge types and agent architectures, including injection via knowledge graphs and augmentation of the existing input encoding strategies. We experiment with four models on the 10 tasks in the ScienceWorld text-based game environment, to illustrate the impact of knowledge injection on various model configurations and challenging task settings. Our findings provide crucial insights into the interplay between task properties, model architectures, and domain knowledge for interactive contexts.

Learning Nash equilibrium (NE) in complex zero-sum games with multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) can be extremely computationally expensive. Curriculum learning is an effective way to accelerate learning, but an under-explored dimension for generating a curriculum is the difficulty-to-learn of the subgames -- games induced by starting from a specific state. In this work, we present a novel subgame curriculum learning framework for zero-sum games. It adopts an adaptive initial state distribution by resetting agents to some previously visited states where they can quickly learn to improve performance. Building upon this framework, we derive a subgame selection metric that approximates the squared distance to NE values and further adopt a particle-based state sampler for subgame generation. Integrating these techniques leads to our new algorithm, Subgame Automatic Curriculum Learning (SACL), which is a realization of the subgame curriculum learning framework. SACL can be combined with any MARL algorithm such as MAPPO. Experiments in the particle-world environment and Google Research Football environment show SACL produces much stronger policies than baselines. In the challenging hide-and-seek quadrant environment, SACL produces all four emergent stages and uses only half the samples of MAPPO with self-play. The project website is at https://sites.google.com/view/sacl-rl.

Communication in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been proven to effectively promote cooperation among agents recently. Since communication in real-world scenarios is vulnerable to noises and adversarial attacks, it is crucial to develop robust communicative MARL technique. However, existing research in this domain has predominantly focused on passive defense strategies, where agents receive all messages equally, making it hard to balance performance and robustness. We propose an active defense strategy, where agents automatically reduce the impact of potentially harmful messages on the final decision. There are two challenges to implement this strategy, that are defining unreliable messages and adjusting the unreliable messages' impact on the final decision properly. To address them, we design an Active Defense Multi-Agent Communication framework (ADMAC), which estimates the reliability of received messages and adjusts their impact on the final decision accordingly with the help of a decomposable decision structure. The superiority of ADMAC over existing methods is validated by experiments in three communication-critical tasks under four types of attacks.

We consider a number of questions related to tradeoffs between reward and regret in repeated gameplay between two agents. To facilitate this, we introduce a notion of $\textit{generalized equilibrium}$ which allows for asymmetric regret constraints, and yields polytopes of feasible values for each agent and pair of regret constraints, where we show that any such equilibrium is reachable by a pair of algorithms which maintain their regret guarantees against arbitrary opponents. As a central example, we highlight the case one agent is no-swap and the other's regret is unconstrained. We show that this captures an extension of $\textit{Stackelberg}$ equilibria with a matching optimal value, and that there exists a wide class of games where a player can significantly increase their utility by deviating from a no-swap-regret algorithm against a no-swap learner (in fact, almost any game without pure Nash equilibria is of this form). Additionally, we make use of generalized equilibria to consider tradeoffs in terms of the opponent's algorithm choice. We give a tight characterization for the maximal reward obtainable against $\textit{some}$ no-regret learner, yet we also show a class of games in which this is bounded away from the value obtainable against the class of common "mean-based" no-regret algorithms. Finally, we consider the question of learning reward-optimal strategies via repeated play with a no-regret agent when the game is initially unknown. Again we show tradeoffs depending on the opponent's learning algorithm: the Stackelberg strategy is learnable in exponential time with any no-regret agent (and in polynomial time with any no-$\textit{adaptive}$-regret agent) for any game where it is learnable via queries, and there are games where it is learnable in polynomial time against any no-swap-regret agent but requires exponential time against a mean-based no-regret agent.

Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) has emerged as a powerful metaheuristic global optimization approach over the past three decades. Its appeal lies in its ability to tackle complex multidimensional problems that defy conventional algorithms. However, PSO faces challenges, such as premature stagnation in single-objective scenarios and the need to strike a balance between exploration and exploitation. Hybridizing PSO by integrating its cooperative nature with established optimization techniques from diverse paradigms offers a promising solution. In this paper, we investigate various strategies for synergizing gradient-based optimizers with PSO. We introduce different hybridization principles and explore several approaches, including sequential decoupled hybridization, coupled hybridization, and adaptive hybridization. These strategies aim to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of PSO, ultimately improving its ability to navigate intricate optimization landscapes. By combining the strengths of gradient-based methods with the inherent social dynamics of PSO, we seek to address the critical objectives of intelligent exploration and exploitation in complex optimization tasks. Our study delves into the comparative merits of these hybridization techniques and offers insights into their application across different problem domains.

The prevalence of multi-agent applications pervades various interconnected systems in our everyday lives. Despite their ubiquity, the integration and development of intelligent decision-making agents in a shared environment pose challenges to their effective implementation. This survey delves into the domain of multi-agent systems (MAS), placing a specific emphasis on unraveling the intricacies of learning optimal control within the MAS framework, commonly known as multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). The objective of this survey is to provide comprehensive insights into various dimensions of MAS, shedding light on myriad opportunities while highlighting the inherent challenges that accompany multi-agent applications. We hope not only to contribute to a deeper understanding of the MAS landscape but also to provide valuable perspectives for both researchers and practitioners. By doing so, we aim to facilitate informed exploration and foster development within the dynamic realm of MAS, recognizing the need for adaptive strategies and continuous evolution in addressing emerging complexities in MARL.

The emerging field of Diverse Intelligence seeks to identify, formalize, and understand commonalities in behavioral competencies across a wide range of implementations. Especially interesting are simple systems that provide unexpected examples of memory, decision-making, or problem-solving in substrates that at first glance do not appear to be complex enough to implement such capabilities. We seek to develop tools to help understand the minimal requirements for such capabilities, and to learn to recognize and predict basal forms of intelligence in unconventional substrates. Here, we apply novel analyses to the behavior of classical sorting algorithms, short pieces of code which have been studied for many decades. To study these sorting algorithms as a model of biological morphogenesis and its competencies, we break two formerly-ubiquitous assumptions: top-down control (instead, showing how each element within a array of numbers can exert minimal agency and implement sorting policies from the bottom up), and fully reliable hardware (instead, allowing some of the elements to be "damaged" and fail to execute the algorithm). We quantitatively characterize sorting activity as the traversal of a problem space, showing that arrays of autonomous elements sort themselves more reliably and robustly than traditional implementations in the presence of errors. Moreover, we find the ability to temporarily reduce progress in order to navigate around a defect, and unexpected clustering behavior among the elements in chimeric arrays whose elements follow one of two different algorithms. The discovery of emergent problem-solving capacities in simple, familiar algorithms contributes a new perspective to the field of Diverse Intelligence, showing how basal forms of intelligence can emerge in simple systems without being explicitly encoded in their underlying mechanics.

Atomic congestion games are a classic topic in network design, routing, and algorithmic game theory, and are capable of modeling congestion and flow optimization tasks in various application areas. While both the price of anarchy for such games as well as the computational complexity of computing their Nash equilibria are by now well-understood, the computational complexity of computing a system-optimal set of strategies -- that is, a centrally planned routing that minimizes the average cost of agents -- is severely understudied in the literature. We close this gap by identifying the exact boundaries of tractability for the problem through the lens of the parameterized complexity paradigm. After showing that the problem remains highly intractable even on extremely simple networks, we obtain a set of results which demonstrate that the structural parameters which control the computational (in)tractability of the problem are not vertex-separator based in nature (such as, e.g., treewidth), but rather based on edge separators. We conclude by extending our analysis towards the (even more challenging) min-max variant of the problem.