Games have been the perfect test-beds for artificial intelligence research for the characteristics that widely exist in real-world scenarios. Learning and optimisation, decision making in dynamic and uncertain environments, game theory, planning and scheduling, design and education are common research areas shared between games and real-world problems. Numerous open-source games or game-based environments have been implemented for studying artificial intelligence. In addition to single- or multi-player, collaborative or adversarial games, there has also been growing interest in implementing platforms for creative design in recent years. Those platforms provide ideal benchmarks for exploring and comparing artificial intelligence ideas and techniques. This paper reviews the game-based platforms for artificial intelligence research, discusses the research trend induced by the evolution of those platforms, and gives an outlook.

With the widespread use of large language models (LLMs) in NLP tasks, researchers have discovered the potential of Chain-of-thought (CoT) to assist LLMs in accomplishing complex reasoning tasks by generating intermediate steps. However, human thought processes are often non-linear, rather than simply sequential chains of thoughts. Therefore, we propose Graph-of-Thought (GoT) reasoning, which models human thought processes not only as a chain but also as a graph. By representing thought units as nodes and connections between them as edges, our approach captures the non-sequential nature of human thinking and allows for a more realistic modeling of thought processes. Similar to Multimodal-CoT, we modeled GoT reasoning as a two-stage framework, generating rationales first and then producing the final answer. Specifically, we employ an additional graph-of-thoughts encoder for GoT representation learning and fuse the GoT representation with the original input representation through a gated fusion mechanism. We implement a GoT reasoning model on the T5 pre-trained model and evaluate its performance on a text-only reasoning task (GSM8K) and a multimodal reasoning task (ScienceQA). Our model achieves significant improvement over the strong CoT baseline with 3.41% and 5.08% on the GSM8K test set with T5-base and T5-large architectures, respectively. Additionally, our model boosts accuracy from 84.91% to 91.54% using the T5-base model and from 91.68% to 92.77% using the T5-large model over the state-of-the-art Multimodal-CoT on the ScienceQA test set. Experiments have shown that GoT achieves comparable results to Multimodal-CoT(large) with over 700M parameters, despite having fewer than 250M backbone model parameters, demonstrating the effectiveness of GoT.

An emerging method to cheaply improve a weaker language model is to finetune it on outputs from a stronger model, such as a proprietary system like ChatGPT (e.g., Alpaca, Self-Instruct, and others). This approach looks to cheaply imitate the proprietary model's capabilities using a weaker open-source model. In this work, we critically analyze this approach. We first finetune a series of LMs that imitate ChatGPT using varying base model sizes (1.5B--13B), data sources, and imitation data amounts (0.3M--150M tokens). We then evaluate the models using crowd raters and canonical NLP benchmarks. Initially, we were surprised by the output quality of our imitation models -- they appear far better at following instructions, and crowd workers rate their outputs as competitive with ChatGPT. However, when conducting more targeted automatic evaluations, we find that imitation models close little to none of the gap from the base LM to ChatGPT on tasks that are not heavily supported in the imitation data. We show that these performance discrepancies may slip past human raters because imitation models are adept at mimicking ChatGPT's style but not its factuality. Overall, we conclude that model imitation is a false promise: there exists a substantial capabilities gap between open and closed LMs that, with current methods, can only be bridged using an unwieldy amount of imitation data or by using more capable base LMs. In turn, we argue that the highest leverage action for improving open-source models is to tackle the difficult challenge of developing better base LMs, rather than taking the shortcut of imitating proprietary systems.

On we develop effective ways to describe their behaviour the one hand, it's natural to use the same in high-level terms without falling into folk-psychological language to describe dialogue the trap of anthropomorphism. In this paper, we agents that we use to describe human behaviour, foreground the concept of role-play. Casting dialogue to freely deploy words like "knows", "understands", agent behaviour in terms of role-play allows and "thinks". Attempting to avoid us to draw on familiar folk psychological terms, such phrases by using more scientifically precise without ascribing human characteristics to language substitutes often results in prose that is clumsy models they in fact lack. Two important and hard to follow. On the other hand, taken cases of dialogue agent behaviour are addressed too literally, such language promotes anthropomorphism, this way, namely (apparent) deception and (apparent) exaggerating the similarities between self-awareness.

Like humans, large language models (LLMs) do not always generate the best output on their first try. Motivated by how humans refine their written text, we introduce Self-Refine, an approach for improving initial outputs from LLMs through iterative feedback and refinement. The main idea is to generate an initial output using an LLMs; then, the same LLMs provides feedback for its output and uses it to refine itself, iteratively. Self-Refine does not require any supervised training data, additional training, or reinforcement learning, and instead uses a single LLM as the generator, refiner, and feedback provider. We evaluate Self-Refine across 7 diverse tasks, ranging from dialog response generation to mathematical reasoning, using state-of-the-art (GPT-3.5, ChatGPT, and GPT-4) LLMs. Across all evaluated tasks, outputs generated with Self-Refine are preferred by humans and automatic metrics over those generated with the same LLM using conventional one-step generation, improving by ~20% absolute on average in task performance. Our work demonstrates that even state-of-the-art LLMs like GPT-4 can be further improved at test time using our simple, standalone approach.

Recent studies on software tool manipulation with large language models (LLMs) mostly rely on closed model APIs. The industrial adoption of these models is substantially constrained due to the security and robustness risks in exposing information to closed LLM API services. In this paper, we ask can we enhance open-source LLMs to be competitive to leading closed LLM APIs in tool manipulation, with practical amount of human supervision. By analyzing common tool manipulation failures, we first demonstrate that open-source LLMs may require training with usage examples, in-context demonstration and generation style regulation to resolve failures. These insights motivate us to revisit classical methods in LLM literature, and demonstrate that we can adapt them as model alignment with programmatic data generation, system prompts and in-context demonstration retrievers to enhance open-source LLMs for tool manipulation. To evaluate these techniques, we create the ToolBench, a tool manipulation benchmark consisting of diverse software tools for real-world tasks. We demonstrate that our techniques can boost leading open-source LLMs by up to 90% success rate, showing capabilities competitive to OpenAI GPT-4 in 4 out of 8 ToolBench tasks. We show that such enhancement typically requires about one developer day to curate data for each tool, rendering a recipe with practical amount of human supervision.

Leveraging external knowledge to enhance the reasoning ability is crucial for commonsense question answering. However, the existing knowledge bases heavily rely on manual annotation which unavoidably causes deficiency in coverage of world-wide commonsense knowledge. Accordingly, the knowledge bases fail to be flexible enough to support the reasoning over diverse questions. Recently, large-scale language models (LLMs) have dramatically improved the intelligence in capturing and leveraging knowledge, which opens up a new way to address the issue of eliciting knowledge from language models. We propose a Unified Facts Obtaining (UFO) approach. UFO turns LLMs into knowledge sources and produces relevant facts (knowledge statements) for the given question. We first develop a unified prompt consisting of demonstrations that cover different aspects of commonsense and different question styles. On this basis, we instruct the LLMs to generate question-related supporting facts for various commonsense questions via prompting. After facts generation, we apply a dense retrieval-based fact selection strategy to choose the best-matched fact. This kind of facts will be fed into the answer inference model along with the question. Notably, due to the design of unified prompts, UFO can support reasoning in various commonsense aspects (including general commonsense, scientific commonsense, and social commonsense). Extensive experiments on CommonsenseQA 2.0, OpenBookQA, QASC, and Social IQA benchmarks show that UFO significantly improves the performance of the inference model and outperforms manually constructed knowledge sources.

Large "instruction-tuned" language models (i.e., finetuned to respond to instructions) have demonstrated a remarkable ability to generalize zero-shot to new tasks. Nevertheless, they depend heavily on human-written instruction data that is often limited in quantity, diversity, and creativity, therefore hindering the generality of the tuned model. We introduce Self-Instruct, a framework for improving the instruction-following capabilities of pretrained language models by bootstrapping off their own generations. Our pipeline generates instructions, input, and output samples from a language model, then filters invalid or similar ones before using them to finetune the original model. Applying our method to the vanilla GPT3, we demonstrate a 33% absolute improvement over the original model on Super-NaturalInstructions, on par with the performance of InstructGPT-001, which was trained with private user data and human annotations. For further evaluation, we curate a set of expert-written instructions for novel tasks, and show through human evaluation that tuning GPT3 with Self-Instruct outperforms using existing public instruction datasets by a large margin, leaving only a 5% absolute gap behind InstructGPT-001. Self-Instruct provides an almost annotation-free method for aligning pre-trained language models with instructions, and we release our large synthetic dataset to facilitate future studies on instruction tuning. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/yizhongw/self-instruct.

Over the past decade, analogies, in the form of word-level analogies, have played a significant role as an intrinsic measure of evaluating the quality of word embedding methods such as word2vec. Modern large language models (LLMs), however, are primarily evaluated on extrinsic measures based on benchmarks such as GLUE and SuperGLUE, and there are only a few investigations on whether LLMs can draw analogies between long texts. In this paper, we present ANALOGICAL, a new benchmark to intrinsically evaluate LLMs across a taxonomy of analogies of long text with six levels of complexity -- (i) word, (ii) word vs. sentence, (iii) syntactic, (iv) negation, (v) entailment, and (vi) metaphor. Using thirteen datasets and three different distance measures, we evaluate the abilities of eight LLMs in identifying analogical pairs in the semantic vector space. Our evaluation finds that it is increasingly challenging for LLMs to identify analogies when going up the analogy taxonomy.

Current pre-trained language models have enabled remarkable improvements in downstream tasks, but it remains difficult to distinguish effects of statistical correlation from more systematic logical reasoning grounded on the understanding of real world. We tease these factors apart by leveraging counterfactual conditionals, which force language models to predict unusual consequences based on hypothetical propositions. We introduce a set of tests from psycholinguistic experiments, as well as larger-scale controlled datasets, to probe counterfactual predictions from five pre-trained language models. We find that models are consistently able to override real-world knowledge in counterfactual scenarios, and that this effect is more robust in case of stronger baseline world knowledge -- however, we also find that for most models this effect appears largely to be driven by simple lexical cues. When we mitigate effects of both world knowledge and lexical cues to test knowledge of linguistic nuances of counterfactuals, we find that only GPT-3 shows sensitivity to these nuances, though this sensitivity is also non-trivially impacted by lexical associative factors.