Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is instrumental for inhibiting hallucinations in large language models (LLMs) through the use of a factual knowledge base (KB). Although PDF documents are prominent sources of knowledge, text-based RAG pipelines are ineffective at capturing their rich multi-modal information. In contrast, visual document RAG (VD-RAG) uses screenshots of document pages as the KB, which has been shown to achieve state-of-the-art results. However, by introducing the image modality, VD-RAG introduces new attack vectors for adversaries to disrupt the system by injecting malicious documents into the KB. In this paper, we demonstrate the vulnerability of VD-RAG to poisoning attacks targeting both retrieval and generation. We define two attack objectives and demonstrate that both can be realized by injecting only a single adversarial image into the KB. Firstly, we introduce a targeted attack against one or a group of queries with the goal of spreading targeted disinformation. Secondly, we present a universal attack that, for any potential user query, influences the response to cause a denial-of-service in the VD-RAG system. We investigate the two attack objectives under both white-box and black-box assumptions, employing a multi-objective gradient-based optimization approach as well as prompting state-of-the-art generative models. Using two visual document datasets, a diverse set of state-of-the-art retrievers (embedding models) and generators (vision language models), we show VD-RAG is vulnerable to poisoning attacks in both the targeted and universal settings, yet demonstrating robustness to black-box attacks in the universal setting.

Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) is enabling unprecedented automation in content creation and decision support, but it also raises novel risks. This paper presents a first-principles risk assessment framework underlying the IEEE P3396 Recommended Practice for AI Risk, Safety, Trustworthiness, and Responsibility. We distinguish between process risks (risks arising from how AI systems are built or operated) and outcome risks (risks manifest in the AI system's outputs and their real-world effects), arguing that generative AI governance should prioritize outcome risks. Central to our approach is an information-centric ontology that classifies AI-generated outputs into four fundamental categories: (1) Perception-level information, (2) Knowledge-level information, (3) Decision/Action plan information, and (4) Control tokens (access or resource directives). This classification allows systematic identification of harms and more precise attribution of responsibility to stakeholders (developers, deployers, users, regulators) based on the nature of the information produced. We illustrate how each information type entails distinct outcome risks (e.g. deception, misinformation, unsafe recommendations, security breaches) and requires tailored risk metrics and mitigations. By grounding the framework in the essence of information, human agency, and cognition, we align risk evaluation with how AI outputs influence human understanding and action. The result is a principled approach to AI risk that supports clear accountability and targeted safeguards, in contrast to broad application-based risk categorizations. We include example tables mapping information types to risks and responsibilities. This work aims to inform the IEEE P3396 Recommended Practice and broader AI governance with a rigorous, first-principles foundation for assessing generative AI risks while enabling responsible innovation.

Clinical trials face mounting challenges: fragmented patient populations, slow enrollment, and unsustainable costs, particularly for late phase trials in oncology and rare diseases. While external control arms built from real-world data have been explored, a promising alternative is the generation of synthetic control arms using generative AI. A central challenge is the generation of time-to-event outcomes, which constitute primary endpoints in oncology and rare disease trials, but are difficult to model under censoring and small sample sizes. Existing generative approaches, largely GAN-based, are data-hungry, unstable, and rely on strong assumptions such as independent censoring. We introduce a variational autoencoder (VAE) that jointly generates mixed-type covariates and survival outcomes within a unified latent variable framework, without assuming independent censoring. Across synthetic and real trial datasets, we evaluate our model in two realistic scenarios: (i) data sharing under privacy constraints, where synthetic controls substitute for original data, and (ii) control-arm augmentation, where synthetic patients mitigate imbalances between treated and control groups. Our method outperforms GAN baselines on fidelity, utility, and privacy metrics, while revealing systematic miscalibration of type I error and power. We propose a post-generation selection procedure that improves calibration, highlighting both progress and open challenges for generative survival modeling.

In spite of its promise, though, inferring the structure of differentiable programs is a fundamentally hard problem.

The growing importance of massive datasets used for deep learning makes robustness to label noise a critical property for classifiers to have.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

There are two main classes of approaches to explain the prediction of a model.

We present a novel and unified deep learning framework which is capable of learning domain-invariant representation from data across multiple domains.

We conduct extensive experiments on four challenging RC benchmarks.

Deep neural networks (NNs) are extremely high dimensional objects.