This article examines the direction in which knowledge bases are constructed for diagnosis and decision making. When building an expert system, it is traditional to elicit knowledge from an expert in the direction in which the knowledge is to be applied, namely, from observable evidence toward unobservable hypotheses. However, experts usually find it simpler to reason in the opposite direction-from hypotheses to unobservable evidence-because this direction reflects causal relationships. Therefore, we argue that a knowledge base be constructed following the expert's natural reasoning direction, and then reverse the direction for use. This choice of representation direction facilitates knowledge acquisition in deterministic domains and is essential when a problem involves uncertainty. We illustrate this concept with influence diagrams, a methodology for graphically representing a joint probability distribution. Influence diagrams provide a practical means by which an expert can characterize the qualitative and quantitative relationships among evidence and hypotheses in the apporiate direction. Once constructed, the relationships can easily be reserved into the less intuitive direction in order to perform inference inference and diagnosis. In this way, knowledge acquisition is made cognitively simple; the machine carries the burden of translating the representation.

Chapman and Hall. See also: Influence diagrams for Bayesian decision analysis, European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 40, Issue 3, 15 June 1989, Pages 363–376 (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0377221789904293). Bayesian Decision Analysis: Principles and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2010 (https://books.google.com/books/about/Bayesian_Decision_Analysis.html?id=O1lXnQAACAAJ).

Belief networks are directed acyclic graphs in which the nodes represent propositions (or variables), the arcs signify direct dependencies between the linked propositions, and the strengths of these dependencies are quantified by conditional probabilities. A network of this sort can be used to represent the generic knowledge of a domain expert, and it turns into a computational architecture if the links are used not merely for storing factual knowledge but also for directing and activating the data flow in the computations which manipulate this knowledge. The first part of the paper deals with the task of fusing and propagating the impacts of new information through the networks in such a way that, when equilibrium is reached, each proposition will be assigned a measure of belief consistent with the axioms of probability theory. It is shown that if the network is singly connected (e.g. The second part of the paper deals with the problem of finding a tree-structured representation for a collection of probabilistically coupled propositions using auxiliary (dummy) variables, colloquially called “hidden causes.”

See also: Evaluating influence diagrams with decision circuits. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI2007)Operations Research, 34, 871-882

In Defense of Probability Peter Cheeseman SRI International 333 Ravenswood Ave., Menlo Park, California 94025 Abstract In this paper, it is argued that probability theory, when used correctly, is suffrcient for the task of reasoning under uncertainty. Since numerous authors have rejected probability as inadequate for various reasons, the bulk of the paper is aimed at refuting these claims and indicating the scources of error. In particular, the definition of probability as a measure of belief rather than a frequency ratio is advocated, since a frequency interpretation of probability drastically restricts the domain of applicability. Other sources of error include the confusion between relative and absolute probability, the distinction between probability and the uncertainty of that probability. Also, the interaction of logic and probability is discusses and it is argued that many extensions of logic, such as "default logic" are better understood in a probabilistic framework. The main claim of this paper is that the numerous schemes for representing and reasoning about uncertainty that have appeared in the AI literature are unnecessary--probability is all that is needed. 1 Introduction A glance through any major AI publication shows that an overwhelming proportion of papers are concerned with what might be described as the logical approach to inference and knowledge representation. It now widely accepted that many knowledge representations can be mapped into (first order) predicate calculus, and the corresponding inference procedures can be reduced to a type of controlled logical deduction. However, examples of human reasoning (judgements) are full of such terms as "probably", "most", "usually" etc., showing that many patterns of human reasoning are not logical in form, but intrinsically probabilistic. The claim that many patterns of human reasoning are probabilistic does not mean that the underlying "logic" of such patterns cannot be axiomatized. On the contrary, a basis for such an axiomatization is given in section 3. The claim is that when such an exercise is performed, the resulting patterns of inference are different in form from those found in analogous logical deductions.

Proceedings of the 7th Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, University of California, Irvine, CA. pp. 329–334

Artificial intelligence, or AI, is largely an experimental science—at least as much progress has been made by building and analyzing programs as by examining theoretical questions. MYCIN is one of several well-known programs that embody some intelligence and provide data on the extent to which intelligent behavior can be programmed. As with other AI programs, its development was slow and not always in a forward direction. But we feel we learned some useful lessons in the course of nearly a decade of work on MYCIN and related programs. In this book we share the results of many experiments performed in that time, and we try to paint a coherent picture of the work. The book is intended to be a critical analysis of several pieces of related research, performed by a large number of scientists. We believe that the whole field of AI will benefit from such attempts to take a detailed retrospective look at experiments, for in this way the scientific foundations of the field will gradually be defined. It is for all these reasons that we have prepared this analysis of the MYCIN experiments.

The complete book in a single file.

Editors' Note: Many expert systems require some means criticisms of this approach from those steeped in the practical of handling heuristic rules whose conclusions are less than certain issues of constructing large rule-based expert systems. Abstract the expert system draws inferences in solving different problems. Doyle's paper argues that it is difficult for a human expert "certainty factors," and in spite of the experimentally observed insensitivity of system performance to perturbations of the chosen values Recent successes of "expert systems" stem from much Research Projects Agency (DOD), ARPA Order No. 3597, monitored In the following, we explain the modified approach together with its practical and theoretical attractions. The client's income bracket is 50%, can be found (Minsky, 1975; Shortliffe & Buchanan, 1975; and 2. The client carefully studies market trends, Duda, Hart, & Nilsson, 1976; Szolovits, 1978; Szolovits & THEN: 3. There is evidence (0.8) that the investment Pauker, 1978). Reasoned Assumptions (from Davis, 1979) and would use the rule to draw conclusions whose "certainty factors" depend on the observed certainty Although our approach usually approximates that of Bayesian probabilities, accommodates representational systems based on "frames" namely as subjective degrees of belief.

REVEREND BAYES ON INFERENCE ENGINES: A DISTRIBUTED HIERARCHICAL APPROACH(*)(**) Judea Pearl Cognitive Systems Laboratory School of Engineering and Applied Science University of California, Los Angeles 90024 ABSTRACT This paper presents generalizations of Bayes likelihood-ratio updating rule which facilitate an asynchronous propagation of the impacts of new beliefs and/or new evidence in hierarchically organized inference structures with multi-hypotheses variables. The computational scheme proposed specifies a set of belief parameters, communication messages and updating rules which guarantee that the diffusion of updated beliefs is accomplished in a single pass and complies with the tenets of Bayes calculus. Introduction This paper addresses the issue ofefficiently propagating the impact of new evidence and beliefs through a complex network of hierarchically organized inference rules. Such networks find wide applications in expert-systems Cl], [2],[3],speech recognition [4], situation assessment [5], the modelling of reading comprehension [6] and judicial reasoning [7]. Many AI researchers have accepted the myth that a respectable computational model of inexact reasoning must distort, modify or ignore at least some principles of probability calculus.

Knowledge about a particular type of ore deposit is encoded in a computational model representing observable geological features and the relative significance thereof.