In [12], Nilsson proposed the probabilistic logic in which the truth values of logical propositions are probability values between 0 and 1. It is applicable to any logical system for which the consistency of a finite set of propositions can be established. The probabilistic inference scheme reduces to the ordinary logical inference when the probabilities of all propositions are either 0 or 1. This logic has the same limitations of other probabilistic reasoning systems of the Bayesian approach. For common sense reasoning, consistency is not a very natural assumption. We have some well known examples: {Dick is a Quaker, Quakers are pacifists, Republicans are not pacifists, Dick is a Republican}and {Tweety is a bird, birds can fly, Tweety is a penguin}. In this paper, we shall propose some extensions of the probabilistic logic. In the second section, we shall consider the space of all interpretations, consistent or not. In terms of frames of discernment, the basic probability assignment (bpa) and belief function can be defined. Dempster's combination rule is applicable. This extension of probabilistic logic is called the evidential logic in [ 1]. For each proposition s, its belief function is represented by an interval [Spt(s), Pls(s)]. When all such intervals collapse to single points, the evidential logic reduces to probabilistic logic (in the generalized version of not necessarily consistent interpretations). Certainly, we get Nilsson's probabilistic logic by further restricting to consistent interpretations. In the third section, we shall give a probabilistic interpretation of probabilistic logic in terms of multi-dimensional random variables. This interpretation brings the probabilistic logic into the framework of probability theory. Let us consider a finite set S = {sl, s2, ..., Sn) of logical propositions. Each proposition may have true or false values; and may be considered as a random variable. We have a probability distribution for each proposition. The e-dimensional random variable (sl,..., Sn) may take values in the space of all interpretations of 2n binary vectors. We may compute absolute (marginal), conditional and joint probability distributions. It turns out that the permissible probabilistic interpretation vector of Nilsson [12] consists of the joint probabilities of S. Inconsistent interpretations will not appear, by setting their joint probabilities to be zeros. By summing appropriate joint probabilities, we get probabilities of individual propositions or subsets of propositions. Since the Bayes formula and other techniques are valid for e-dimensional random variables, the probabilistic logic is actually very close to the Bayesian inference schemes. In the last section, we shall consider a relaxation scheme for probabilistic logic. In this system, not only new evidences will update the belief measures of a collection of propositions, but also constraint satisfaction among these propositions in the relational network will revise these measures. This mechanism is similar to human reasoning which is an evaluative process converging to the most satisfactory result. The main idea arises from the consistent labeling problem in computer vision. This method is originally applied to scene analysis of line drawings. Later, it is applied to matching, constraint satisfaction and multi sensor fusion by several authors [8], [16] (and see references cited there). Recently, this method is used in knowledge aggregation by Landy and Hummel [9].

We propose an abductive diagnosis theory that integrates probabilistic, causal and taxonomic knowledge. Probabilistic knowledge allows us to select the most likely explanation; causal knowledge allows us to make reasonable independence assumptions; taxonomic knowledge allows causation to be modeled at different levels of detail, and allows observations be described in different levels of precision. Unlike most other approaches where a causal explanation is a hypothesis that one or more causative events occurred, we define an explanation of a set of observations to be an occurrence of a chain of causation events. These causation events constitute a scenario where all the observations are true. We show that the probabilities of the scenarios can be computed from the conditional probabilities of the causation events. Abductive reasoning is inherently complex even if only modest expressive power is allowed. However, our abduction algorithm is exponential only in the number of observations to be explained, and is polynomial in the size of the knowledge base. This contrasts with many other abduction procedures that are exponential in the size of the knowledge base.

We present a new, deterministic, distributed MAP estimation algorithm for Markov Random Fields called Local Highest Confidence First (Local HCF). The algorithm has been applied to segmentation problems in computer vision and its performance compared with stochastic algorithms. The experiments show that Local HCF finds better estimates than stochastic algorithms with much less computation.

We introduce a graceful approach to probabilistic inference called bounded conditioning. Bounded conditioning monotonically refines the bounds on posterior probabilities in a belief network with computation, and converges on final probabilities of interest with the allocation of a complete resource fraction. The approach allows a reasoner to exchange arbitrary quantities of computational resource for incremental gains in inference quality. As such, bounded conditioning holds promise as a useful inference technique for reasoning under the general conditions of uncertain and varying reasoning resources. The algorithm solves a probabilistic bounding problem in complex belief networks by breaking the problem into a set of mutually exclusive, tractable subproblems and ordering their solution by the expected effect that each subproblem will have on the final answer. We introduce the algorithm, discuss its characterization, and present its performance on several belief networks, including a complex model for reasoning about problems in intensive-care medicine.

The paper demonstrates that strict adherence to probability theory does not preclude the use of concurrent, self-activated constraint-propagation mechanisms for managing uncertainty. Maintaining local records of sources-of-belief allows both predictive and diagnostic inferences to be activated simultaneously and propagate harmoniously towards a stable equilibrium.

Plan recognition does not work the same way in stories and in "real life" (people tend to jump to conclusions more in stories). We present a theory of this, for the particular case of how objects in stories (or in life) influence plan recognition decisions. We provide a Bayesian network formalization of a simple first-order theory of plans, and show how a particular network parameter seems to govern the difference between "life-like" and "story-like" response. We then show why this parameter would be influenced (in the desired way) by a model of speaker (or author) topic selection which assumes that facts in stories are typically "relevant".

In an earlier paper, a new theory of measurefree "conditional" objects was presented. In this paper, emphasis is placed upon the motivation of the theory. The central part of this motivation is established through an example involving a knowledge-based system. In order to evaluate combination of evidence for this system, using observed data, auxiliary at tribute and diagnosis variables, and inference rules connecting them, one must first choose an appropriate algebraic logic description pair (ALDP): a formal language or syntax followed by a compatible logic or semantic evaluation (or model). Three common choices- for this highly non-unique choice - are briefly discussed, the logics being Classical Logic, Fuzzy Logic, and Probability Logic. In all three,the key operator representing implication for the inference rules is interpreted as the often-used disjunction of a negation (b => a) = (b'v a), for any events a,b. However, another reasonable interpretation of the implication operator is through the familiar form of probabilistic conditioning. But, it can be shown - quite surprisingly - that the ALDP corresponding to Probability Logic cannot be used as a rigorous basis for this interpretation! To fill this gap, a new ALDP is constructed consisting of "conditional objects", extending ordinary Probability Logic, and compatible with the desired conditional probability interpretation of inference rules. It is shown also that this choice of ALDP leads to feasible computations for the combination of evidence evaluation in the example. In addition, a number of basic properties of conditional objects and the resulting Conditional Probability Logic are given, including a characterization property and a developed calculus of relations.

Much artificial intelligence research focuses on the problem of deducing the validity of unobservable propositions or hypotheses from observable evidence.! Many of the knowledge representation techniques designed for this problem encode the relationship between evidence and hypothesis in a directed manner. Moreover, the direction in which evidence is stored is typically from evidence to hypothesis.

IDEAL (Influence Diagram Evaluation and Analysis in Lisp) is a software environment for creation and evaluation of belief networks and influence diagrams. IDEAL is primarily a research tool and provides an implementation of many of the latest developments in belief network and influence diagram evaluation in a unified framework. This paper describes IDEAL and some lessons learned during its development.

This paper is concerned with two theories of probability judgment: the Bayesian theory and the theory of belief functions. It illustrates these theories with some simple examples and discusses some of the issues that arise when we try to implement them in expert systems. The Bayesian theory is well known; its main ideas go back to the work of Thomas Bayes (1702-1761). The theory of belief functions, often called the Dempster-Shafer theory in the artificial intelligence community, is less well known, but it has even older antecedents; belief-function arguments appear in the work of George Hooper (16401723) and James Bernoulli (1654-1705). For elementary expositions of the theory of belief functions, see Shafer (1976, 1985).