Comprehensible explanations of probabilistic reasoning are a prerequisite for wider acceptance of Bayesian methods in expert systems and decision support systems. A study of human reasoning under uncertainty suggests two different strategies for explaining probabilistic reasoning: The first, qualitative belief propagation, traces the qualitative effect of evidence through a belief network from one variable to the next. This propagation algorithm is an alternative to the graph reduction algorithms of Wellman (1988) for inference in qualitative probabilistic networks. It is based on a qualitative analysis of intercausal reasoning, which is a generalization of Pearl's "explaining away", and an alternative to Wellman's definition of qualitative synergy. The other, Scenario-based reasoning, involves the generation of alternative causal "stories" accounting for the evidence. Comparing a few of the most probable scenarios provides an approximate way to explain the results of probabilistic reasoning. Both schemes employ causal as well as probabilistic knowledge. Probabilities may be presented as phrases and/or numbers. Users can control the style, abstraction and completeness of explanations.

Several different uncertain inference systems (UISs) have been developed for representing uncertainty in rule-based expert systems. Some of these, such as Mycin's Certainty Factors, Prospector, and Bayes' Networks were designed as approximations to probability, and others, such as Fuzzy Set Theory and DempsterShafer Belief Functions were not. How different are these UISs in practice, and does it matter which you use? When combining and propagating uncertain information, each UIS must, at least by implication, make certain assumptions about correlations not explicily specified. The maximum entropy principle with minimum cross-entropy updating, provides a way of making assumptions about the missing specification that minimizes the additional information assumed, and thus offers a standard against which the other UISs can be compared. We describe a framework for the experimental comparison of the performance of different UISs, and provide some illustrative results.

This paper is concerned with two theories of probability judgment: the Bayesian theory and the theory of belief functions. It illustrates these theories with some simple examples and discusses some of the issues that arise when we try to implement them in expert systems. The Bayesian theory is well known; its main ideas go back to the work of Thomas Bayes (1702-1761). The theory of belief functions, often called the Dempster-Shafer theory in the artificial intelligence community, is less well known, but it has even older antecedents; belief-function arguments appear in the work of George Hooper (16401723) and James Bernoulli (1654-1705). For elementary expositions of the theory of belief functions, see Shafer (1976, 1985).

Judea Pearl Computer Science Department, Univenity of California, Loa Angelea The paper demonstrates that strict adherence to probability theory does not preclude the use of concurrent, self-activated constraint-propagation mechanisms for managing uncer tainty. Maintaining local records of sources-of-belief allows both predictive and diagnostic inferences to be activated simultanously and propagate harmoniously towards a stable equillibrium.

This paper examines the quantities used by MYCIN to reason with uncertainty, called certainty factors. It is shown that the original definition of certainty factors is inconsistent with the functions used in MYCIN to combine the quantities. This inconsistency is used to argue for a redefinition of certainty factors in terms of the intuitively appealing desiderata associated with the combining functions. It is shown that this redefinition accommodates an unlimited number of probabilistic interpretations. These interpretations are shown to be monotonic transformations of the likelihood ratio p(EIH)/p(El H). The construction of these interpretations provides insight into the assumptions implicit in the certainty factor model. In particular, it is shown that if uncertainty is to be propagated through an inference network in accordance with the desiderata, evidence must be conditionally independent given the hypothesis and its negation and the inference network must have a tree structure. It is emphasized that assumptions implicit in the model are rarely true in practical applications. Methods for relaxing the assumptions are suggested.

We propose an inequality paradigm for probabilistic reasoning based on a logic of upper and lower bounds on conditional probabilities. We investigate a family of probabilistic logics, generalizing the work of Nilsson [14]. We develop a variety of logical notions for probabilistic reasoning, including soundness, completeness justification; and convergence: reduction of a theory to a simpler logical class. We argue that a bound view is especially useful for describing the semantics of probabilistic knowledge representation and for describing intermediate states of probabilistic inference and updating. We show that the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence is formally identical to a special case of our generalized probabilistic logic. Our paradigm thus incorporates both Bayesian "rule-based" approaches and avowedly non-Bayesian "evidential" approaches such as MYCIN and DempsterShafer. We suggest how to integrate the two "schools", and explore some possibilities for novel synthesis of a variety of ideas in probabilistic reasoning.

Box 516, St. Louis, MO 63166 ABSTRACT This paper examines the accuracy of the PROSPECTOR model for uncertain reasoning. PROSPECTOR's solutions for a large number of computer·generated inference networks were compared to those obtained from probe· bility theory and minimum cross-entropy calculations. PROSPECTOR's answers were generally accurate for a restricted subset of problems that are consistent with its assumptions. However, even within this subset, we identified conditions under which PROSPECTOR's perfor· mance deteriorates. I NTRCOUCT I ON Researchers in artificial Intelligence have proposed or implemented several approaches to uncertain reason· in-- for knowledge-based systems.

In this paper, we describe a scheme for propagating belief functions in certain kinds of trees using only local computations. This scheme generalizes the computational scheme proposed by Shafer and Logan1 for diagnostic trees of the type studied by Gordon and Shortliffe, and the slightly more general scheme given by Shafer for hierarchical evidence. It also generalizes the scheme proposed by Pearl for Bayesian causal trees (see Shenoy and Shafer). Pearl's causal trees and Gordon and Shortliffe's diagnostic trees are both ways of breaking the evidence that bears on a large problem down into smaller items of evidence that bear on smaller parts of the problem so that these smaller problems can be dealt with one at a time. This localization of effort is often essential in order to make the process of probability judgment feasible, both for the person who is making probability judgments and for the machine that is combining them. The basic structure for our scheme is a type of tree that generalizes both Pearl's and Gordon and Shortliffe's trees. Trees of this general type permit localized computation in Pearl's sense. They are based on qualitative judgments of conditional independence. We believe that the scheme we describe here will prove useful in expert systems. It is now clear that the successful propagation of probabilities or certainty factors in expert systems requires much more structure than can be provided in a pure production-system framework. Bayesian schemes, on the other hand, often make unrealistic demands for structure. The propagation of belief functions in trees and more general networks stands on a middle ground where some sensible and useful things can be done. We would like to emphasize that the basic idea of local computation for propagating probabilities is due to Judea Pearl. It is a very innovative idea; we do not believe that it can be found in the Bayesian literature prior to Pearl's work. We see our contribution as extending the usefulness of Pearl's idea by generalizing it from Bayesian probabilities to belief functions. In the next section, we give a brief introduction to belief functions. The notions of qualitative independence for partitions and a qualitative Markov tree are introduced in Section III. Finally, in Section IV, we describe a scheme for propagating belief functions in qualitative Markov trees.

Influence diagrams are a directed graph representation for uncertainties as probabilities. Influence diagrams have been used for the last ten years as a model structuring and elicitation device in the practical field of decision analysis. They have been a powerful communication tool during the initial discussion about a problem, as well as when explaining results after analysis. Because the diagrams are heirarchical, with the numbers "hidden" within the nodes Within the last few years, a number of theoretical results allow for the analysis to be performed directly on the influence diagram-- as assessed. In general, these techniques apply a sequence of transformations to different influence diagrams, to solve either probabilistic inference or decision analysis problems.

Much artificial intelligence research focuses on the problem of deducing the validity of unobservable propositions or hypotheses from observable evidence.! Many of the knowledge representation techniques designed for this problem encode the relationship between evidence and hypothesis in a directed manner. Moreover, the direction in which evidence is stored is typically from evidence to hypothesis.