Designing and deriving effective model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) algorithms with a performance improvement guarantee is challenging, mainly attributed to the high coupling between model learning and policy optimization. Many prior methods that rely on return discrepancy to guide model learning ignore the impacts of model shift, which can lead to performance deterioration due to excessive model updates. Other methods use performance difference bound to explicitly consider model shift. However, these methods rely on a fixed threshold to constrain model shift, resulting in a heavy dependence on the threshold and a lack of adaptability during the training process. In this paper, we theoretically derive an optimization objective that can unify model shift and model bias and then formulate a fine-tuning process. This process adaptively adjusts the model updates to get a performance improvement guarantee while avoiding model over-fitting.

Simulation agents are controlled objects that perform realistic behaviors in a virtual world.

In this work, we study the low-rank MDPs with adversarially changed losses in the full-information feedback setting.

Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence is one of the most important measures to calculate the difference between probability distributions. In this paper, we theoretically study several properties of KL divergence between multivariate Gaussian distributions.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice .