Bayesian Learning
Locally Private Parametric Methods for Change-Point Detection
Yadav, Anuj Kumar, Cadir, Cemre, Shkel, Yanina, Gastpar, Michael
We study parametric change-point detection, where the goal is to identify distributional changes in time series, under local differential privacy. In the non-private setting, we derive improved finite-sample accuracy guarantees for a change-point detection algorithm based on the generalized log-likelihood ratio test, via martingale methods. In the private setting, we propose two locally differentially private algorithms based on randomized response and binary mechanisms, and analyze their theoretical performance. We derive bounds on detection accuracy and validate our results through empirical evaluation. Our results characterize the statistical cost of local differential privacy in change-point detection and show how privacy degrades performance relative to a non-private benchmark. As part of this analysis, we establish a structural result for strong data processing inequalities (SDPI), proving that SDPI coefficients for Rรฉnyi divergences and their symmetric variants (Jeffreys-Rรฉnyi divergences) are achieved by binary input distributions. These results on SDPI coefficients are also of independent interest, with applications to statistical estimation, data compression, and Markov chain mixing.
Axioms for AI Alignment from Human Feedback
In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice .