The arc reversal/node reduction approach to probabilistic inference is extended to include the case of instantiated evidence by an operation called "evidence reversal." This not only provides a technique for computing posterior joint distributions on general belief networks, but also provides insight into the methods of Pearl [1986b] and Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter [1988]. Although it is well understood that the latter two algorithms are closely related, in fact all three algorithms are identical whenever the belief network is a forest.

Bayesian Belief Networks have been largely overlooked by Expert Systems practitioners on the grounds that they do not correspond to the human inference mechanism. In this paper, we introduce an explanation mechanism designed to generate intuitive yet probabilistically sound explanations of inferences drawn by a Bayesian Belief Network. In particular, our mechanism accounts for the results obtained due to changes in the causal and the evidential support of a node.

We show an approach to automated control of machine vision systems based on incremental creation and evaluation of a particular family of influence diagrams that represent hypotheses of imagery interpretation and possible subsequent processing decisions. In our approach, model-based machine vision techniques are integrated with hierarchical Bayesian inference to provide a framework for representing and matching instances of objects and relationships in imagery and for accruing probabilities to rank order conflicting scene interpretations. We extend a result of Tatman and Shachter to show that the sequence of processing decisions derived from evaluating the diagrams at each stage is the same as the sequence that would have been derived by evaluating the final influence diagram that contains all random variables created during the run of the vision system.

Many Artificial Intelligence systems depend on the agent's updating its beliefs about the world on the basis of experience. Experiments constitute one type of experience, so scientific methodology offers a natural environment for examining the issues attendant to using this class of evidence. This paper presents a framework which structures the process of using scientific data from research reports for the purpose of making decisions, using decision analysis as the basis for the structure and using medical research as the general scientific domain. The structure extends the basic influence diagram for updating belief in an object domain parameter of interest by expanding the parameter into four parts: those of the patient, the population, the study sample, and the effective study sample. The structure uses biases to perform the transformation of one parameter into another, so that, for instance, selection biases, in concert with the population parameter, yield the study sample parameter. The influence diagram structure provides decision theoretic justification for practices of good clinical research such as randomized assignment and blindfolding of care providers. The model covers most research designs used in medicine: case-control studies, cohort studies, and controlled clinical trials, and provides an architecture to separate clearly between statistical knowledge and domain knowledge. The proposed general model can be the basis for clinical epidemiological advisory systems, when coupled with heuristic pruning of irrelevant biases; of statistical workstations, when the computational machinery for calculation of posterior distributions is added; and of meta-analytic reviews, when multiple studies may impact on a single population parameter.

BPS, the Bayesian Problem Solver, applies probabilistic inference and decision-theoretic control to flexible, resource-constrained problem-solving. This paper focuses on the Bayesian inference mechanism in BPS, and contrasts it with those of traditional heuristic search techniques. By performing sound inference, BPS can outperform traditional techniques with significantly less computational effort. Empirical tests on the Eight Puzzle show that after only a few hundred node expansions, BPS makes better decisions than does the best existing algorithm after several million node expansions

An efficient algorithm is developed that identifies all independencies implied by the topology of a Bayesian network. Its correctness and maximality stems from the soundness and completeness of d-separation with respect to probability theory. The algorithm runs in time O (l E l) where E is the number of edges in the network.

Stochastic simulation approaches perform probabilistic inference in Bayesian networks by estimating the probability of an event based on the frequency that the event occurs in a set of simulation trials. This paper describes the evidence weighting mechanism, for augmenting the logic sampling stochastic simulation algorithm [Henrion, 1986]. Evidence weighting modifies the logic sampling algorithm by weighting each simulation trial by the likelihood of a network's evidence given the sampled state node values for that trial. We also describe an enhancement to the basic algorithm which uses the evidential integration technique [Chin and Cooper, 1987]. A comparison of the basic evidence weighting mechanism with the Markov blanket algorithm [Pearl, 1987], the logic sampling algorithm, and the evidence integration algorithm is presented. The comparison is aided by analyzing the performance of the algorithms in a simple example network.

We describe a mechanism for performing probabilistic reasoning in influence diagrams using interval rather than point valued probabilities. We derive the procedures for node removal (corresponding to conditional expectation) and arc reversal (corresponding to Bayesian conditioning) in influence diagrams where lower bounds on probabilities are stored at each node. The resulting bounds for the transformed diagram are shown to be optimal within the class of constraints on probability distributions that can be expressed exclusively as lower bounds on the component probabilities of the diagram. Sequences of these operations can be performed to answer probabilistic queries with indeterminacies in the input and for performing sensitivity analysis on an influence diagram. The storage requirements and computational complexity of this approach are comparable to those for point-valued probabilistic inference mechanisms, making the approach attractive for performing sensitivity analysis and where probability information is not available. Limited empirical data on an implementation of the methodology are provided.

In recent years, researchers in decision analysis and artificial intelligence (Al) have used Bayesian belief networks to build models of expert opinion. Using standard methods drawn from the theory of computational complexity, workers in the field have shown that the problem of probabilistic inference in belief networks is difficult and almost certainly intractable. K N ET, a software environment for constructing knowledge-based systems within the axiomatic framework of decision theory, contains a randomized approximation scheme for probabilistic inference. The algorithm can, in many circumstances, perform efficient approximate inference in large and richly interconnected models of medical diagnosis. Unlike previously described stochastic algorithms for probabilistic inference, the randomized approximation scheme computes a priori bounds on running time by analyzing the structure and contents of the belief network. In this article, we describe a randomized algorithm for probabilistic inference and analyze its performance mathematically. Then, we devote the major portion of the paper to a discussion of the algorithm's empirical behavior. The results indicate that the generation of good trials (that is, trials whose distribution closely matches the true distribution), rather than the computation of numerous mediocre trials, dominates the performance of stochastic simulation. Key words: probabilistic inference, belief networks, stochastic simulation, computational complexity theory, randomized algorithms.

Plan recognition does not work the same way in stories and in "real life" (people tend to jump to conclusions more in stories). We present a theory of this, for the particular case of how objects in stories (or in life) influence plan recognition decisions. We provide a Bayesian network formalization of a simple first-order theory of plans, and show how a particular network parameter seems to govern the difference between "life-like" and "story-like" response. We then show why this parameter would be influenced (in the desired way) by a model of speaker (or author) topic selection which assumes that facts in stories are typically "relevant".