The multiple extension problem arises frequently in diagnostic and default inference. That is, we can often use any of a number of sets of defaults or possible hypotheses to explain observations or make Predictions. In default inference, some extensions seem to be simply wrong and we use qualitative techniques to weed out the unwanted ones. In the area of diagnosis, however, the multiple explanations may all seem reasonable, however improbable. Choosing among them is a matter of quantitative preference. Quantitative preference works well in diagnosis when knowledge is modelled causally. Here we suggest a framework that combines probabilities and defaults in a single unified framework that retains the semantics of diagnosis as construction of explanations from a fixed set of possible hypotheses. We can then compute probabilities incrementally as we construct explanations. Here we describe a branch and bound algorithm that maintains a set of all partial explanations while exploring a most promising one first. A most probable explanation is found first if explanations are partially ordered.

Unaided human decision making appears to systematically violate consistency constraints imposed by normative theories; these biases in turn appear to justify the application of formal decision-analytic models. It is argued that both claims are wrong. In particular, we will argue that the "confirmation bias" is premised on an overly narrow view of how conflicting evidence is and ought to be handled. Effective decision aiding should focus on supporting the contral processes by means of which knowledge is extended into novel situations and in which assumptions are adopted, utilized, and revised. The Non- Monotonic Probabilist represents initial work toward such an aid.

A model of knowledge representation is described in which propositional facts and the relationships among them can be supported by other facts. The set of knowledge which can be supported is called the set of cognitive units, each having associated descriptions of their explicit and implicit support structures, summarizing belief and reliability of belief. This summary is precise enough to be useful in a computational model while remaining descriptive of the underlying symbolic support structure. When a fact supports another supportive relationship between facts we call this meta-support. This facilitates reasoning about both the propositional knowledge. and the support structures underlying it.

Much of the controversy about methods for automated decision making has focused on specific calculi for combining beliefs or propagating uncertainty. We broaden the debate by (1) exploring the constellation of secondary tasks surrounding any primary decision problem, and (2) identifying knowledge engineering concerns that present additional representational tradeoffs. We argue on pragmatic grounds that the attempt to support all of these tasks within a single calculus is misguided. In the process, we note several uncertain reasoning objectives that conflict with the Bayesian ideal of complete specification of probabilities and utilities. In response, we advocate treating the uncertainty calculus as an object language for reasoning mechanisms that support the secondary tasks. Arguments against Bayesian decision theory are weakened when the calculus is relegated to this role. Architectures for uncertainty handling that take statements in the calculus as objects to be reasoned about offer the prospect of retaining normative status with respect to decision making while supporting the other tasks in uncertain reasoning.

We propose an abductive diagnosis theory that integrates probabilistic, causal and taxonomic knowledge. Probabilistic knowledge allows us to select the most likely explanation; causal knowledge allows us to make reasonable independence assumptions; taxonomic knowledge allows causation to be modeled at different levels of detail, and allows observations be described in different levels of precision. Unlike most other approaches where a causal explanation is a hypothesis that one or more causative events occurred, we define an explanation of a set of observations to be an occurrence of a chain of causation events. These causation events constitute a scenario where all the observations are true. We show that the probabilities of the scenarios can be computed from the conditional probabilities of the causation events. Abductive reasoning is inherently complex even if only modest expressive power is allowed. However, our abduction algorithm is exponential only in the number of observations to be explained, and is polynomial in the size of the knowledge base. This contrasts with many other abduction procedures that are exponential in the size of the knowledge base.

Although many investigators affirm a desire to build reasoning systems that behave consistently with the axiomatic basis defined by probability theory and utility theory, limited resources for engineering and computation can make a complete normative analysis impossible. We attempt to move discussion beyond the debate over the scope of problems that can be handled effectively to cases where it is clear that there are insufficient computational resources to perform an analysis deemed as complete. Under these conditions, we stress the importance of considering the expected costs and benefits of applying alternative approximation procedures and heuristics for computation and knowledge acquisition. We discuss how knowledge about the structure of user utility can be used to control value tradeoffs for tailoring inference to alternative contexts. We address the notion of real-time rationality, focusing on the application of knowledge about the expected timewise-refinement abilities of reasoning strategies to balance the benefits of additional computation with the costs of acting with a partial result. We discuss the benefits of applying decision theory to control the solution of difficult problems given limitations and uncertainty in reasoning resources.

Much artificial intelligence research focuses on the problem of deducing the validity of unobservable propositions or hypotheses from observable evidence.! Many of the knowledge representation techniques designed for this problem encode the relationship between evidence and hypothesis in a directed manner. Moreover, the direction in which evidence is stored is typically from evidence to hypothesis.

The concepts of rough and definite objects are relatively more determinate than those of granules and granulation in general rough set theory (RST) [1]. Representation of rough objects can however depend on the dialectical relation between granulation and definiteness. In this research, we make this exact in the context of RST over proto-transitive approximation spaces. This approach can be directly extended to many other types of RST. These are used for formulating an extended concept of knowledge interpretation (KI)(relative the situation for classical RST) and the problem of knowledge representation (KR) is solved. These will be of direct interest in granular KR in RST as developed by the present author [2] and of rough objects in general. In [3], these have already been used for five different semantics by the present author. This is an extended version of [4] with key examples and more results.

Cognitive structures are the foundation of Jean Piaget’s Genetic Epistemology. Yet the elusive question remains: “What are Piaget’s cognitive structures?” and more importantly, “How can they be represented computationally?” Piaget described the monad as an immaterial, weightless, dimensionless entity, while he referred to a scheme as both process and structure. This paper explores an approach to combining the notions of monad and scheme to create a simple knowledge representation. Building upon the work of several authors, notably Jean Piaget, Ryszard Michalski, and Roland Hausser, the neural proposition is the central cognitive structure of the PAM-P2 cognitive system.

A new probabilistic network construction system, DYNASTY, is proposed for diagnostic reasoning given variables whose probabilities change over time. Diagnostic reasoning is formulated as a sequential stochastic process, and is modeled using influence diagrams. Given a set O of observations, DYNASTY creates an influence diagram in order to devise the best action given O. Sensitivity analyses are conducted to determine if the best network has been created, given the uncertainty in network parameters and topology. DYNASTY uses an equivalence class approach to provide decision thresholds for the sensitivity analysis. This equivalence-class approach to diagnostic reasoning differentiates diagnoses only if the required actions are different. A set of network-topology updating algorithms are proposed for dynamically updating the network when necessary.