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RandAugment: Practical Automated Data Augmentation with a Reduced Search Space

Neural Information Processing Systems

Recent work on automated data augmentation strategies has led to state-of-the-art results in image classification and object detection. An obstacle to a large-scale adoption of these methods is that they require a separate and expensive search phase. A common way to overcome the expense of the search phase was to use a smaller proxy task. However, it was not clear if the optimized hyperparameters found on the proxy task are also optimal for the actual task. In this work, we rethink the process of designing automated data augmentation strategies. We find that while previous work required searching for many augmentation parameters (e.g.


Latent World Models For Intrinsically Motivated Exploration

Neural Information Processing Systems

In this work we consider partially observable environments with sparse rewards. We present a self-supervised representation learning method for image-based observations, which arranges embeddings respecting temporal distance of observations. This representation is empirically robust to stochasticity and suitable for novelty detection from the error of a predictive forward model. We consider episodic and life-long uncertainties to guide the exploration. We propose to estimate the missing information about the environment with the world model, which operates in the learned latent space.


On the Power of (Approximate) Reward Models for Inference-Time Scaling

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Inference-time scaling has recently emerged as a powerful paradigm for improving the reasoning capability of large language models. Among various approaches, Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) has become a particularly important framework, enabling iterative generation, evaluation, rejection, and resampling of intermediate reasoning trajectories. A central component in this process is the reward model, which evaluates partial solutions and guides the allocation of computation during inference. However, in practice, true reward models are never available. All deployed systems rely on approximate reward models, raising a fundamental question: Why and when do approximate reward models suffice for effective inference-time scaling? In this work, we provide a theoretical answer. We identify the Bellman error of the approximate reward model as the key quantity governing the effectiveness of SMC-based inference-time scaling. For a reasoning process of length $T$, we show that if the Bellman error of the approximate reward model is bounded by $O(1/T)$, then combining this reward model with SMC reduces the computational complexity of reasoning from exponential in $T$ to polynomial in $T$. This yields an exponential improvement in inference efficiency despite using only approximate rewards.


Temporal Complexity and Self-Organization in an Exponential Dense Associative Memory Model

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Dense Associative Memory (DAM) models generalize the classical Hopfield model by incorporating n-body or exponential interactions that greatly enhance storage capacity. While the criticality of DAM models has been largely investigated, mainly within a statistical equilibrium picture, little attention has been devoted to the temporal self-organizing behavior induced by learning. In this work, we investigate the behavior of a stochastic exponential DAM (SEDAM) model through the lens of Temporal Complexity (TC), a framework that characterizes complex systems by intermittent transition events between order and disorder and by scale-free temporal statistics. Transition events associated with birth-death of neural avalanche structures are exploited for the TC analyses and compared with analogous transition events based on coincidence structures. We systematically explore how TC indicators depend on control parameters, i.e., noise intensity and memory load. Our results reveal that the SEDAM model exhibits regimes of complex intermittency characterized by nontrivial temporal correlations and scale-free behavior, indicating the spontaneous emergence of self-organizing dynamics. These regimes emerge in small intervals of noise intensity values, which, in agreement with the extended criticality concept, never shrink to a single critical point. Further, the noise intensity range needed to reach the critical region, where self-organizing behavior emerges, slightly decreases as the memory load increases. This study highlights the relevance of TC as a complementary framework for understanding learning and information processing in artificial and biological neural systems, revealing the link between the memory load and the self-organizing capacity of the network.


Learning from logical constraints with lower- and upper-bound arithmetic circuits

AIHub

In the road traffic example, the network predicts probabilities for each agent's identity, action and position. At inference, logical rules are evaluated using these predictions. The resulting satisfaction degree is then used to update the network so that future predictions better align with the knowledge constraints, as illustrated in Figure 2.


A Unified Definition of Hallucination, Or: It's the World Model, Stupid

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Despite numerous attempts to solve the issue of hallucination since the inception of neural language models, it remains a problem in even frontier large language models today. Why is this the case? We walk through definitions of hallucination used in the literature from a historical perspective up to the current day, and fold them into a single definition of hallucination, wherein different prior definitions focus on different aspects of our definition. At its core, we argue that hallucination is simply inaccurate (internal) world modeling, in a form where it is observable to the user (e.g., stating a fact which contradicts a knowledge base, or producing a summary which contradicts a known source). By varying the reference world model as well as the knowledge conflict policy (e.g., knowledge base vs. in-context), we arrive at the different existing definitions of hallucination present in the literature. We argue that this unified view is useful because it forces evaluations to make clear their assumed "world" or source of truth, clarifies what should and should not be called hallucination (as opposed to planning or reward/incentive-related errors), and provides a common language to compare benchmarks and mitigation techniques. Building on this definition, we outline plans for a family of benchmarks in which hallucinations are defined as mismatches with synthetic but fully specified world models in different environments, and sketch out how these benchmarks can use such settings to stress-test and improve the world modeling components of language models.