We propose a computational framework for understanding and modeling human consciousness. This framework integrates many existing theoretical perspectives, yet is sufficiently concrete to allow simulation experiments. We do not attempt to explain qualia (subjective experience), but instead ask what differences exist within the cognitive information processing system when a person is conscious of mentally-represented information versus when that information is unconscious. The central idea we explore is that the contents of consciousness correspond to temporally persistent states in a network of computational modules. Three simulations are described illustrating that the behavior of persistent states in the models corresponds roughly to the behavior of conscious states people experience when performing similar tasks. Our simulations show that periodic settling to persistent (i.e., conscious) states improves performance by cleaning up inaccuracies and noise, forcing decisions, and helping keep the system on track toward a solution.

We propose a computational framework for understanding and modeling human consciousness. This framework integrates many existing theoretical perspectives, yet is sufficiently concrete to allow simulation experiments. We do not attempt to explain qualia (subjective experience), but instead ask what differences exist within the cognitive information processing system when a person is conscious of mentally-represented information versus when that information is unconscious. The central idea we explore is that the contents of consciousness correspond to temporally persistent states in a network of computational modules. Three simulations are described illustrating that the behavior of persistent states in the models corresponds roughly to the behavior of conscious states people experience when performing similar tasks. Our simulations show that periodic settling to persistent (i.e., conscious) states improves performance by cleaning up inaccuracies and noise, forcing decisions, and helping keep the system on track toward a solution.

We propose a computational framework for understanding and modeling human consciousness. This framework integrates many existing theoretical perspectives, yet is sufficiently concrete to allow simulation experiments. We do not attempt to explain qualia (subjective experience),but instead ask what differences exist within the cognitive information processing system when a person is conscious ofmentally-represented information versus when that information isunconscious. The central idea we explore is that the contents of consciousness correspond to temporally persistent states in a network of computational modules. Three simulations are described illustratingthat the behavior of persistent states in the models corresponds roughly to the behavior of conscious states people experience when performing similar tasks. Our simulations show that periodic settling to persistent (i.e., conscious) states improves performanceby cleaning up inaccuracies and noise, forcing decisions, and helping keep the system on track toward a solution.

"In this article we take a step towards providing an analysis of the Soar architecture as a basis for general intelligence. Included are discussions of the basic assumptions underlying the development of Soar, a description of Soar cast in terms of the theoretical idea of multiple levels of description, an example of Soar performing multi-column subtraction, and three analyses of Soar: its natural tasks, the sources of its power, and its scope and limits." Artificial Intelligence, 47, 289-325.

MIT Press.

I am struck by how little is known about so much of cognition. One goal of this paper is to argue for the need to consider a rich set of interlocking issues in the study of cognition. Mainstream work in cognition—including my own—ignores many critical aspects of animate cognitive systems. Perhaps one reason that existing theories say so little relevant to real world activities is the neglect of social and cultural factors, of emotion, and of the major points that distinguish an animate cognitive system from an artificial one: the need to survive, to regulate its own operation, to maintain itself, to exist in the environment, to change from a small, uneducated, immature system to an adult, developed, knowledgeable one. Human cognition is not the same as artificial cognition, if only because the human organism must also be concerned with the problems of life, of development, of survival.

American Psychologist 34:906-911.

New York: Academic Press